Multiagent resource allocation with k-additive utility functions

We briefly review previous work on the welfare engineering framework where autonomous software agents negotiate on the allocation of a number of discrete resources, and point out connections to combinatorial optimisation problems, including combinatorial auctions, that shed light on the computational complexity of the framework. We give particular consideration to scenarios where the preferences of agents are modelled in terms of k-additive utility functions, i.e. scenarios where synergies between different resources are restricted to bundles of at most k items. Key words: negotiation, representation of utility functions, social welfare, combinatorial optimisation, bidding languages for combinatorial auctions

Allocation de ressources multi-agents (théorie et pratique)

Dans le domaine des systèmes multi-agents, la majorité des recherches dédiées à l'allocation de ressources indivisibles se focalise sur le problème centralisé enchères combinatoires). Nous avons choisi d'aborder ce problème en distribuant la prise de décision et en recourant à la négociation entre agents. Nous allons nous intéresser aux allocations atteintes à l'issue des négociations et plus particulièrement au bien-être social de celles-ci. Cette étude se fera dans le cadre restreint, cependant très réaliste, des échanges bilatéraux et nos agents seront égoïstes et rationnels. Dans un premier temps on présentera une étude de la complexité de l'atteinte du bien-être social utilitaire après avoir présenté succinctement les représentations compactes des préférences ainsi que les différents type de fonction d'utilité. Dans la seconde partie, nous avons choisi de nous concentrer sur le problème de l'égalitarisme dans les sociétés d'agents égoïstes car parfois une allocation ne doit pas seulement être efficace mais aussi équitable. Nous allons donc étudier les différents bien-être sociaux à caractère égalitaire avec tout d'abord le bien-être social égalitaire, mais également l'absence d'envie. La question qui sous tend cette deuxième partie de nos travaux est : sachant que dans notre cadre les échanges individuellement rationnels sont bien adaptés à l'obtention d'un bien-être social utilitaire, dans quelle mesure ces transactions permettent-elles d'atteindre ou d'approcher un optimum égalitaire et que se passe-t-il du point de vue de l'envieIn the field of multi-agent systems, most of researches on the indivisible ressources allocation focus on the centralized problem (combinatorial auctions). To tackle this problem, we propose to use a distributed decision making coupled with negotiations between agents. The objective is to analyze the allocations reached at the end of these negotiations and more particularly with their social welfare. This study is conduced in a restricted, but very realistic, bilateral exchanges framework, where agents are selfish and rational. In the first part of the work , we present : (i) the compact representations of the preferences and the different types of utility functions, and (ii) the study of the omplexity of reaching the social welfare. Since the allocation should be both effective and equitable, in the second part of the work we focus on the egalitarianism problem in the selfish agents society. Specifically, we are concerned with different egalitarian social welfare, in respect to two points : (i) egalitarian social welfare, and (ii) envy-free. Knowing that the rational individual exchanges framework are well adopted to get the utilitarian social well fare,then two important questions should be addressed. First, up to what point these exchanges or transactions make it possible to reach or approach an egalitarian optimum? Second, what happen regarding envy? These two points will be discussed in this thesisPARIS-DAUPHINE-BU (751162101) / SudocLENS-CRIL (624982203) / SudocSudocFranceF

How equitable is rational negotiation

Notions of fairness have recently received increased attention in the context of resource allocation problems, pushed by diverse applications where not only pure utilitarian efficiency is sought. In this paper, we study a framework where allocations of goods result from distributed negotiation conducted by autonomous agents implementing very simple deals. Assuming that these agents are strictly self-interested, we investigate how equitable the outcomes of such negotiation processes are. We first discuss a number of methodological issues raised by this study, pertaining in particular to the design of suitable payment functions as a means of distributing the social surplus generated by a deal amongst the participating agents. By running different experiments, we finally identify conditions favouring equitable outcomes

Multiagent resource allocation in k-additive domains: preference representation and complexity

We study a framework for multiagent resource allocation where autonomous software agents negotiate over the allocation of bundles of indivisible resources. Connections to well-known combinatorial optimisation problems, including the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions, shed light on the computational complexity of the framework. We give particular consideration to scenarios where the preferences of agents are modelled in terms of k-additive utility functions, i.e. scenarios where synergies between different resources are restricted to bundles of at most k items.ou