International cartel enforcement : lessons from the 1990s

The enforcement record of the 1990s shows that private international cartels are not defunct--nor do they always fall quickly under the weight of their own incentive problems. Of a sample of 40 such cartels prosecuted by the United States and the European Union in the 1990s, 24 lasted at least four years. And for the 20 cartels in this sample where sales data are available, the annual worldwide turnover in affected products exceeded $30 billion. National competition policies address harm in domestic markets, and in some cases prohibit cartels without taking strong enforcement measures. The authors propose a series of reforms to national policies and steps to enhance international cooperation that will strengthen the deterrents against international cartelization. Furthermore, the authors argue that aggressive prosecution of cartels must be complemented by vigilance in other areas of competition policy. If not, firms will respond to the enhanced deterrents to cartelization by merging or by taking other measures that lessen competitive pressures.Legal Products,Environmental Economics&Policies,Microfinance,Economic Theory&Research,Small Scale Enterprise,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Legal Products,Microfinance,Private Participation in Infrastructure

International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s

The enforcement record of the 1990s has demonstrated that private international cartels are neither relics of the past nor do they always fall quickly under the weight of their own incentive problems. Of a sample of forty such cartels prosecuted by the United States and European Union in the 1990s, twenty-four lasted at least four years. And for the twenty cartels in this sample where sales data are available, the annual worldwide turnover in the affected products exceeded US$30billion. Prevailing national competition policies are oriented towards addressing harm done in domestic markets, and in some cases merely prohibit cartels without taking strong enforcement measures. In this paper we propose a series of reforms to national policies and steps to enhance international cooperation that will strengthen the deterrents against international cartelization. Furthermore, aggressive prosecution of cartels must be complemented by vigilance in other areas of competition policy. If not, firms will respond to the enhanced deterrents to cartelization by merging or by taking other measures that lessen competitive pressures.

What Determines Cartel Success?

In this paper we survey several cross-section studies of cartels and a large sample of case studies of cartels in individual industries. We compare the findings of these studies of cartel activity from the 1800s through the 1980s with the characteristics of a sample of international cartels from the 1990s, and present preliminary evidence on whether the stylized facts regarding industry characteristics for historical cartels also hold for contemporary cartels. The hard lesson learned from our survey of the empirical work is that it is difficult to generalize about cartel behavior. Our examination of cartel duration concludes that cartels are neither short-lived nor long-lived; they are both. Similarly, our analysis of the effect of cartels on prices and profitability finds that there is enormous variance in cartel success at raising price to the jointprofit maximizing level. In our examination of cartel breakdowns we find, as suggested by recent theoretical literature, that cheating is a common cause. Occurring even more frequently, however, are entry, external shocks, and bargaining problems, suggesting that these issues should be given deeper consideration in future work. Stigler’s hypothesis that large customers contribute to cartel breakdowns is borne out in a few case studies. But there appear to be mor

Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World. By Wyatt Wells. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. Pp. x, 276. $32.50.

This book studies the development of antitrust policy from the early 1900s through the 1950s at a time when antitrust was a social religion to some. Wyatt Wells follows its successes and failures, focusing primarily on the Great Depression years and culminating in the postwar occupation of Germany and Japan. The book is both narrower and broader than its title portrays. On the one hand, this is a book about cartels, primarily international cartels, not antitrust in general. On the other hand, the book is also fundamentally about relations between government and big business and the place of big business in society. There is plenty of material, however, to fill a book on the history of international cartels and antitrust policy towards them. As noted in the book, the National Association of Manufacturers estimated that before 1939, cartels were active in industries that accounted for 42 percent of world trade; certainly a large enough concern to merit study in its own right.

Entry Deterrence Strategies

This lecture on entry is a transcript of a second-year MBA class at the Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan. At various points, student comments and comments by Francine Lafontaine, the co-teacher of this course, appear. Accompanying this lecture are the PowerPoint slides and various film clips from the lecture.

Estimating Monopoly Behavior with Competitive Recycling: An Application to Alcoa

This article develops a structural model of the aluminum industry during the period between World War I and World War II. It takes into account both the intertemporal nature of Alcoa's cost minimization problem and the competitive recycling sector. The model enables estimation of Alcoa's degree of market power, while allowing for the effect of competition from recycled aluminum. Previous work has emphasized Alcoa's control over the size of the secondary sector in the long run as a source of market power for Alcoa. The results here indicate that Alcoa could exert little influence in this regard, but nonetheless had substantial market power.

International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s

The enforcement record of the 1990s has demonstrated that private international cartels are neither relics of the past nor do they always fall quickly under the weight of their own incentive problems. Of a sample of forty such cartels prosecuted by the United States and European Union in the 1990s, twenty-four lasted at least four years. And for the twenty cartels in this sample where sales data are available, the annual worldwide turnover in the affected products exceeded US$30billion. Prevailing national competition policies are oriented towards addressing harm done in domestic markets, and in some cases merely prohibit cartels without taking strong enforcement measures. In this paper we propose a series of reforms to national policies and steps to enhance international cooperation that will strengthen the deterrents against international cartelization. Furthermore, aggressive prosecution of cartels must be complemented by vigilance in other areas of competition policy. If not, firms will respond to the enhanced deterrents to cartelization by merging or by taking other measures that lessen competitive pressures