Constitutional Parenthood

Despite having recognized the constitutional rights of parents almost a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court has not weighed in on the subject of who qualifies as a “parent” under the Fourteenth Amendment in thirty years. In light of the Court’s silence, the states have been forced to individually grapple with the issue of constitutional parenthood — a task made exponentially more difficult by the fact that the last thirty years have ushered in an avalanche of change when it comes to the American family. With such societal changes as advances in assisted reproduction, the legalization of same-sex marriage, and the increased frequency of divorce, remarriage and cohabitation, states now regularly encounter claims of parental identity that thirty years ago would have been unimaginable. Nonetheless, the states have persevered, adopting a number of approaches to deal with these increasingly thorny issues. The problem, however, is that the constitutional protections that are afforded parents now vary by state. Even more troubling is the fact that some states have defined “parent” in such a way as to discriminate against those families that do not comport with that states’ conception of the “ideal” family. To solve this problem, this Article makes two proposals. First, the Supreme Court must offer more guidance on how states may define constitutional parenthood. Although a definitive definition of the term is both impractical and unrealistic, the Court can and should delineate the outer boundaries of that constitutional standard. Second, taking a cue from some of the tests developed by the states, this Article proposes what exactly those boundaries should be so as to help craft a definition of constitutional parenthood that is more responsive to and protective of the twenty-first century family

The Right to Bear (Robotic) Arms

Can robotic weapons be Arms under the Second Amendment? This article argues that they can. In particular, it challenges the claim that the Second Amendment protects only weapons that can be carried in one\u27s hands, which has roots in both Supreme Court Second Amendment doctrine, namely District of Columbia v. Heller, and scholarship. Scrutinizing these roots shows that Heller did not create such a requirement and that little, if any, constitutional basis for it exists. This article also contextualizes robotic weapons within the established Second Amendment framework for arms. Robotic weapons are not yet arms, but there is no legal impediment-nor should there be-to them becoming arms. Finally, this article presents an alternative theory of Second Amendment protection for robotic weapons based on auxiliary rights, in light of the Seventh Circuit case United States v. Ezell. This article posits that Second Amendment auxiliary rights include the right to employ a bodyguard, whether human or robot