Endowments, location or luck ? evaluating the determinants of sub-national growth in decentralized Indonesia

Indonesia's"big bang"decentralization in 2001 shifted much of the responsibility for local economic development from central government to district and city governments, which today number more than 450. But the performance of these districts has varied widely. This paper attempts to understand the determinants of sub-national (district/city) growth in Indonesia and map how these determinants have changed since before the 1997/98 economic crisis. The authors exploit a rich dataset that includes a wide range of district-level characteristics, including education, population, cultural, economic, and infrastructure variables, as well as a set of variables relating to distance, to try to explain growth. The analysis finds that, after accounting for differences in other variables, poorer districts tend to grow faster than better off districts. Similarly, there is evidence of spatial divergence, in the sense that districts tend to grow faster if their neighbors are growing quickly. However, the quality of the existing district-level data makes it difficult to identify whether endowments or factors related to distance are systematically associated with growth.Achieving Shared Growth,Economic Growth,Economic Theory&Research,Inequality,Nutrition

The Impact of Fiscal and Political Decentralization on Local Public Investments in Indonesia

We investigate the effects of the Indonesian decentralization and democratization process on budget allocation at the sub-national level. Based on panel data for 271 Indonesian districts for the years of 1994 to 2009, we address the determinants of local investment expenditures in public infrastructure in the sectors of education, health, and physical infrastructure. We find that after the dramatic expenditure decentralization of 2001, districts with relatively lower levels of public infrastructure started to invest more in these sectors. In contrast to the marked budgeting changes following fiscal and administrative decentralization, we find no consistent effects of the democratization process on local public investments. Our results reflect initial improvements in local targeting but show no evidence of increasing electoral accountability

Evaluating fiscal equalization in Indonesia

This paper presents a methodology to evaluate fiscal decentralization focusing on the potential mis-targeting of intergovernmental fiscal equalization transfers. The approach builds on an explicit comparison and the summary measurement of different (horizontal) allocation distributions across states or localities. Whereas formula-based fiscal transfers have the merit of being transparent and promoting revenue predictability in fiscal decentralization, in practice, two challenges emerge: (1) What are the appropriate formula designs given the sub-national data constraints evident in most decentralizing developing countries? and (2) How costly in terms of mis-targeting to the presumed expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are deviations from these types of benchmark formulas (for example, due to historical factors or the need to meet establishment costs such as civil service wages)? The authors illustrate this approach by assessing Indonesia's evolving intergovernmental fiscal system instituted in the 2001 Big Bang decentralization. The discussion comes against Indonesia's recent policy decision to fully fund sub-national civil servant wages as part of the base general allocation grant (DAU) transfers, raising questions about both incentive effects for local governments and potential mis-targeting. The authors identify potential efficiency losses from the DAU's horizontal misallocation from half a dozen alternative scenarios found in the policy dialogue, ranging from 9 to 30 percent-on the order of US$ 3.9 billion-of the overall annual size of this large intergovernmental transfer. The scale of these tradeoffs highlights the importance of intergovernmental transfers in more general debates in public finance for decentralized countries.Economic Theory&Research,Public Sector Management and Reform,Fiscal Adjustment,Regional Governance,Urban Governance and Management

The impact of fiscal and political decentralization on local public investments in Indonesia

We investigate the effects of the Indonesian decentralization and democratization process on budget allocation at the sub-national level. Based on panel data for 271 Indonesian districts for the years of 1994 to 2009, we address the determinants of local investment expenditures in public infrastructure in the sectors of education, health, and physical infrastructure. We find that after the dramatic expenditure decentralization of 2001, districts with relatively lower levels of public infrastructure started to invest more in these sectors. In contrast to the marked budgeting changes following the fiscal and administrative decentralization, we find no consistent effects of the democratization process on local public investments. Our results reflect initial improvements in local targeting but show no evidence of increasing electoral accountability

Administrative overspending in Indonesian districts: The role of local politics

We analyze the determinants of the excessive administrative spending of local governments in Indonesia. In an unbalanced panel data set of 399 districts for 2001-2009, we show that the proliferation of districts has not led to increased administrative spending; instead a lack of political accountability is responsible for this excess. The degree of political competition influences the level of administrative spending significantly; newly introduced direct elections of district heads, however, did not curtail the waste

Corruption in Russia

Analyzing law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 Russian regions for the period 2004-2007, we find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels: Corruption declines as relative salaries rise up to a turning point, beyond which corruption rises again. Other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement, available rents through government budgets and natural resources, education levels, unemployment rates, and income inequality

Political business cycles in local Indonesia

We study political business cycles (PBC) in newly democratized and decentralized Indonesia at the local level. As the timing of indirect and later on direct elections of district heads differs exogenously across jurisdictions, the political business cycle effect is clearly identified . Our data allow distinguishing PBCs for indirect and direct elections. We find significant budget cycles for discretionary budget categories at the disposal of the district head (not for the overall budget) only for direct elections, not for indirect elections. These cycles are much larger if the incumbent runs for reelection. Our results underline the conditional nature of PBC

Corruption in Russia

We analyze the determinants of corruption in Russia using law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 Russian regions for the period 2004–13. We find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels: corruption declines as relative salaries rise, yet at strongly diminishing rates. Furthermore, we show that even very limited media freedom helps to curtail corruption. Other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement, education levels, and unemployment rates