Double-sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts

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The Resolution of bankruptcy by auction : allocating the residual right of design

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Horizontal acquisitions and buying power: A product market analysis

Horizontal mergers exert price pressure on dependent suppliers and adversely affect their performance. Consistent with the theory of countervailing power, concentrated suppliers and those with greater barriers to entry experience larger price declines after consolidation downstream. Time-series results suggest that consolidation in dependent supplier industries follows mergers in main customer industries, indicating that consolidation activity travels up the supply chain. The findings are broadly consistent with pervasive beliefs in the business community about the buying power effects of horizontal mergers.Takeovers Mergers Buying power

Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts

Contractual arrangements involving revenue/profit sharing are often based on fairly simple, often linear, rules. In addition, in many contexts these contracts are not finely adjusted to the particular circumstances of individual agents or markets, nor do they vary over time to the extent current theories based on optimal contracting suggest they should. We develop a simple model of such revenue- or profit-sharing arrangements based on double-sided moral hazard and show that this model can account for many of these stylized facts. More specifically, the model shows that linear contracts can be optimal and that benefits from customizing terms can, in some cases, be quite limited, if not zero.