Domestic entry, international trade cost reduction and welfare

We show the welfare effects of international trade cost reduction under endogenous domestic market structure. If the domestic labour market is competitive, there is no integer constraint and the trade cost represents transportation cost, a reduction in the transportation cost does not affect (may reduce) domestic welfare if the products are perfect (imperfect) substitutes. If the trade cost represents tariff, domestic welfare is higher under a positive non-prohibitive tariff compared to both free trade and no trade. In the presence of an integer constraint, a lower transportation cost may reduce consumer surplus and increase the profits of the active domestic firms and domestic welfare, even if the products are homogeneous. If there is no integer (integer) constraint and the products are perfect substitutes, transportation cost reduction reduces (may increase) domestic welfare in the presence of a domestic labour union. We also show that entry for the domestic country may be socially excessive or insufficient under a competitive domestic labour market, while it is always socially insufficient in the presence of a domestic labour union.Free entry; Transportation cost; Tariff; Labour union; Welfare

Firm productivity and foreign direct investment: a non-monotonic relationship

The theoretical prediction of Head and Ries (‘Heterogeneity and the FDI versus export decision of Japanese manufacturers', 2003, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 17: 448-67) is that if the foreign plant is not used to serve the home market, the exporters can be more productive than the foreign direct investors only if the host-country wage is lower than the home-country wage. With unionized labor markets, we show that there always exist situations where the exporters are more productive than the foreign investors even if the host-country wage is higher than the home-country wage. Given the cost of FDI, a higher trade cost and higher bargaining powers of the labor unions make this result more likely.

Incidence of an outsourcing tax on intermediate inputs

The paper uses a Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson type general equilibrium framework to consider the incidence of an outsourcing tax on an economy in which the production of a specific intermediate input has been fragmented and outsourced. If the outsourced sector provides a non-traded input, the outsourcing tax can have adverse impact on labor even if it is the most capital-intensive sector of the economy. Thus contrary to expectations, a tax on a capital-intensive sector actually hurts labor. In the case where the intermediate input is traded, the outsourcing tax closes down either the intermediate input producing sector, or the final good producing sector which uses the intermediate input.Fragmentation, Outsourcing, Factor intensity, Tax incidence

Sustainabnility of Product Market Collusion under Credit Market Imperfections

We study the implications of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank-financed oligopoly in which firms face an imperfect credit market. We consider two situations, without and with credit rationing, i.e., with a binding credit limit. When there is credit rationing, a moderately higher cost of external financing may affect the degree of collusion, but a substantial increase keeps it unaffected relative to the no-constraint case. A permanent adverse demand shock in this setup does not affect the possibility of collusion, but may aggravate financing constraints and eventually lead to collusion. We consider both Cournot and Bertrand models, and the results are qualitatively the same