Exchange rate pass-through in Switzerland: Evidence from vector autoregressions

This study investigates the pass-through of exchange rate and import price shocks to different aggregated prices in Switzerland. The baseline analysis is carried out with recursively identified vector autoregressive (VAR) models. The data set comprises monthly observations, and pass-through effects are quantified by means of impulse response functions. Evidence shows that the exchange rate pass-through to import prices is substantial (although incomplete), but only moderate to total consumer prices. Moreover, a sub-sample analysis reveals that the pass-through decreased in the 1990s below the levels recorded in previous decades. This decrease was more pronounced for the pass-through to consumer prices than that to import prices, and it coincided with a shift towards lower and more stable consumer price inflation.Exchange rate pass-through, VAR, consumer prices, import prices

Should We Fear Derivatives?

This paper discusses the extent to which derivatives pose threats to firms and to the economy. After reviewing the derivatives markets and putting in perspective the various measures of the size of these markets, the paper shows who uses derivatives and why. The difficulties firms face in valuing derivatives portfolios are evaluated. Although academics pay much attention to no-arbitrage pricing results, the paper points out that there can be considerable subjectivity in the pricing of derivatives that do not have highly liquid markets. It is shown that the known risks of derivatives portfolios can generally be measured and managed well at the firm level. However, derivatives can create systemic risks when a market participant becomes excessively large relative to particular derivatives markets. Overall, the benefits of derivatives outweigh the potential threats.

Financial Globalization, Corporate Governance, and Eastern Europe

For many countries, the most significant barriers to trade in financial assets have been knocked down. Yet, the financial world is not flat because poor governance prevents firms from being widely held and from taking full advantage of financial globalization. Poor governance has implications for corporate finance as well as for macroeconomics. I show that poor governance in Eastern Europe is accompanied, as expected, by high corporate ownership concentration, low firm valuation, poor financial development, and low foreign participation.

U.S. Banks, Crises, and Bailouts: From Mexico to LTCM

This paper investigates the impact on bank stock prices of emerging market currency crises and bailouts. The stock market distinguishes between banks with exposure to a crisis country and other banks. In general, banks with exposures to a crisis country are affected adversely by currency events and positively by bailouts. Other banks are mostly unaffected by events in countries experiencing a crisis. The paper uses the impact of the LTCM crisis on bank stock prices to put the emerging market events in perspective. The LTCM crisis had no significant contagion effects in the banking sector either, but banks that participated in the LTCM rescue experienced negative stock returns when the rescue was announced.

The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial Institutions

A conflict of interest exists when a party to a transaction could potentially make a gain from taking actions that are detrimental to the other party in the transaction. This paper examines the economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions and reviews the growing empirical literature (mostly focused on analysts) on the economic implications of these conflicts. Economic analysis shows that, although conflicts of interest are omnipresent when contracting is costly and parties are imperfectly informed, there are important factors that mitigate their impact and, strikingly, it is possible for customers of financial institutions to benefit from the existence of such conflicts. The empirical literature reaches conclusions that differ across types of conflicts of interest, but overall these conclusions are more ambivalent and certainly more benign than the conclusions drawn by journalists and politicians from mostly anecdotal evidence. Though much has been made of conflicts of interest arising from investment banking activities, there is no consensus in the empirical literature supporting the view that conflicts resulting from these activities had a systematic adverse impact on customers of financial institutions.

Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value

From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. The probability of large decreases in ownership is strongly increasing in contemporaneous and past stock returns but the probability of large increases in ownership through managerial purchases of shares is not. The relation between changes in Tobin's q and past and contemporaneous changes in ownership depends critically on controlling for past stock returns. When controlling for past stock returns, past large decreases in managerial ownership are unrelated to current changes in Tobin's q but there is some evidence that past large increases in managerial ownership are positively related to current changes in Tobin's q. Because managers sell shares when a firm's stock is performing well, large contemporaneous decreases in managerial ownership are associated with increases in Tobin's q. We argue that our evidence is mostly inconsistent with existing theories and propose a managerial discretion theory of ownership consistent with our evidence.

The Risks of Financial Institutions

Over the last twenty years, the consensus view of systemic risk in the financial system that emerged in response to the banking crises of the 1930s and before has lost much of its relevance. This view held that the main systemic problem is runs on solvent banks leading to bank panics. But financial crises of the last two decades have not fit the mold. A new consensus has yet to emerge, but financial institutions and regulators have considerably broadened their assessment of the risks facing financial institutions. The dramatic rise of modern risk management has changed how the risks of financial institutions are measured and how these institutions are managed. However, modern risk management is not without weaknesses that will have to be addressed.

How Different is Japanese Corporate Finance? An Investigation of the Information Content of New Security Issues

This paper studies the shareholder wealth effects associated with 875 new security issues in Japan from January 1, 1985 to May 31, 1991. The sample includes public equity, private equity, rights offerings, straight debt, warrant debt and convertible debt issues. Contrary to the U.S., the announcement of convertible debt issues is accompanied by a significant positive abnormal return of 1.05%. The announcement of equity issues has a positive abnormal return of 0.45%, significant at the 0.10 level, but this positive abnormal return can be attributed to one year in our sample and is offset by a negative issue date abnormal return of -1.01%. The abnormal returns are negatively related to firm size, so that for equity issues (but not for convertible debt issues), large Japanese firms have significant negative announcement abnormal returns. Our evidence is consistent with the view that Japanese managers decide to issue shares based on different considerations than American managers.

Banks, the IMF, and the Asian Crisis

This paper examines the impact of the Asian crisis on bank stocks across four Western countries and six Asian countries. In the second half of 1997, Western banks experienced positive returns. In contrast East Asian bank indices incurred losses in excess of 60% in each of the crisis countries. Most of this poor performance is explained by the exposure of the banks to general stock market movements in their countries. Currency exposures affected banks adversely beyond their stock market impact only in Indonesia and the Philippines. Except for the Korean program, IMF programs had little effect on bank values. The announcement of the Korean program increased shareholder wealth at the U.S. banks with the highest reported exposure in Korea by about 7% and had a favorable effect on bank shareholder wealth in all the countries in our sample but one. There is no evidence that the Korean IMF program had a positive impact on banks without exposure to Korea and hence our results do not support the argument that such programs reduce systemic risk.