Crises in the thrift industry and the cost of mortgage credit

Savings and loan associations ; Mortgages ; Interest rates

Housing risk and return: Evidence from a housing asset-pricing model

This paper investigates the risk-return relationship in determination of housing asset pricing. In so doing, the paper evaluates behavioral hypotheses advanced by Case and Shiller (1988, 2002, 2009) in studies of boom and post-boom housing markets. The paper specifies and tests a multi-factor housing asset pricing model. In that model, we evaluate whether the market factor as well as other measures of risk, including idiosyncratic risk, momentum, and MSA size effects, have explanatory power for metropolitan-specific housing returns. Further, we test the robustness of the asset pricing results to inclusion of controls for socioeconomic variables commonly represented in the house price literature, including changes in employment, affordability, and foreclosure incidence. We find a sizable and statistically significant influence of the market factor on MSA house price returns. Moreover we show that market betas have varied substantially over time. Also, results are largely robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables, including standard measures of risk and other housing market fundamentals. Additional tests of model validity using the Fama-MacBeth framework offer further strong support of a positive risk and return relationship in housing. Our findings are supportive of the application of a housing investment risk-return framework in explanation of variation in metro-area cross-section and time-series US house price returns. Further, results strongly corroborate Case-Shiller survey research indicating the importance of speculative forces in the determination of U.S. housing returns

Integration and contagion in US housing markets

This paper explores integration and contagion among US metropolitan housing markets. The analysis applies Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) house price repeat sales indexes from 384 metropolitan areas to estimate a multi-factor model of U.S. housing market integration. It then identifies statistical jumps in metropolitan house price returns as well as MSA contemporaneous and lagged jump correlations. Finally, the paper evaluates contagion in housing markets via parametric assessment of MSA house price spatial dynamics. A R-squared measure reveals an upward trend in MSA housing market integration over the 2000s to approximately .83 in 2010. Among California MSAs, the trend was especially pronounced, as average integration increased from about .55 in 1997 to close to .95 in 2008! The 2000s bubble period similarly was characterized by elevated incidence of statistical jumps in housing returns. Again, jump incidence and MSA jump correlations were especially high in California. Analysis of contagion among California markets indicates that house price returns in San Francisco often led those of surrounding communities; in contrast, southern California MSA house price returns appeared to move largely in lock step. The high levels of housing market integration evidenced in the analysis suggest limited investor opportunity to diversify away MSA-specific housing risk. Further, results suggest that macro and policy shocks propagate through a large number of MSA housing markets. Research findings are relevant to all market participants, including institutional investors in MBS as well as those who regulate housing, the housing GSEs, mortgage lenders, and related financial institutions.integration; correlation; contagion; house price returns

Housing Risk and Return: Evidence From a Housing Asset-Pricing Model

This paper investigates the risk-return relationship in determination of housing asset pricing. In so doing, the paper evaluates behavioral hypotheses advanced by Case and Shiller (1988, 2002, 2009) in studies of boom and post-boom housing markets. The paper specifies and tests a housing asset pricing model (H-CAPM), whereby expected returns of metropolitan-specific housing markets are equated to the market return, as represented by aggregate US house price time-series. We augment the model by examining the impact of additional risk factors including aggregate stock market returns, idiosyncratic risk, momentum, and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) size effects. Further, we test the robustness of H-CAPM results to inclusion of controls for socioeconomic variables commonly represented in the house price literature, including changes in employment, affordability, and foreclosure incidence. Consistent with the traditional CAPM, we find a sizable and statistically significant influence of the market factor on MSA house price returns. Moreover we show that market betas have varied substantially over time. Also, we find the basic housing CAPM results are robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables, including standard measures of risk and other housing market fundamentals. Additional tests of the validity of the model using the Fama-MacBeth framework offer further strong support of a positive risk and return relationship in housing. Our findings are supportive of the application of a housing investment risk-return framework in explanation of variation in metro-area cross-section and time-series US house price returns. Further, results strongly corroborate Case-Shiller behavioral research indicating the importance of speculative forces in the determination of U.S. housing returns.asset pricing, house price returns, risk factors

Integration and Contagion in US Housing Markets

This paper explores integration and contagion among US metropolitan housing markets. The analysis applies Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) house price repeat sales indexes from 384 metropolitan areas to estimate a multi-factor model of U.S. housing market integration. It then identifies statistical jumps in metropolitan house price returns as well as MSA contemporaneous and lagged jump correlations. Finally, the paper evaluates contagion in housing markets via parametric assessment of MSA house price spatial dynamics. A R-squared measure reveals an upward trend in MSA housing market integration over the 2000s to approximately .83 in 2010. Among California MSAs, the trend was especially pronounced, as average integration increased from about .55 in 1997 to close to .95 in 2008! The 2000s bubble period similarly was characterized by elevated incidence of statistical jumps in housing returns. Again, jump incidence and MSA jump correlations were especially high in California. Analysis of contagion among California markets indicates that house price returns in San Francisco often led those of surrounding communities; in contrast, southern California MSA house price returns appeared to move largely in lock step. The high levels of housing market integration evidenced in the analysis suggest limited investor opportunity to diversify away MSA-specific housing risk. Further, results suggest that macro and policy shocks propagate through a large number of MSA housing markets. Research findings are relevant to all market participants, including institutional investors in MBS as well as those who regulate housing, the housing GSEs, mortgage lenders, and related financial institutions.Integration, correlation, contagion, house price returns

Secondary Markets, Risk, and Access to Credit Evidence from the Mortgage Market

Secondary markets for credit are widely believed to improve efficiency and increase access to credit. In part, this is because of their greater ability to manage risk. However, the degree to which secondary markets expand access to credit is virtually unknown. Using the mortgage market as an example, we begin to fill that gap. Our conceptual model suggests that secondary credit markets have potentially ambiguous effects on interest rates, but unambiguous positive effects on the number of loans issued. We focus our empirical analysis on the latter using 1992-2004 HMDA files for conventional, conforming, home purchase loans in conjunction with Census tract data

Homeownership Boom and Bust 2000 to 2009: Where Will the Homeownership Rate Go from Here?

The increase in the homeownership rate in the middle of the last decade extended to all age groups but was most pronounced among individuals under age 30. These increases coincided with looser credit conditions that enhanced household access to mortgage credit along with evidence of less risk averse attitudes towards investment in homeownership. Following the crash, these trends have reversed and homeownership rates have largely reverted back to the levels of 2000. The drop in the homeownership rate from an all-time high of 69.2 in 2004 to 66.4 percent in the first quarter of 2011 reflects a decline from unsustainable levels to something closer to historical averages, and while the homeownership rate may have bottomed out, it could fall another one or two percentage points due to tightened credit and other factors

Do the GSEs Expand the Supply of Mortgage Credit? New Evidence of Crowd Out in the Secondary Mortgage Market

The dramatic government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September, 2008 was motivated in part by a desire to ensure a continued flow of credit to the mortgage market. This study examines a closely related issue: the extent to which GSE activity crowds out mortgage purchases by private secondary market intermediaries. Evidence of substantial crowd out suggests that government support for the GSEs may be less warranted, whereas the absence of crowd out implies that GSE loan purchases enhance liquidity.Using 1994-2008 HMDA data for conventional, conforming sized loans, three distinct periods with regard to GSE crowd out are apparent. From 1994-2003, the share of loans sold to the secondary market increased from 60 to over 90 percent, private sector and GSE market shares of loan purchases were roughly similar for most market segments, and IV estimates indicate relatively little GSE crowd out of private secondary market purchases. From 2004 to 2006, private loan purchases boomed and dominated those of the GSEs, while IV estimates indicate crowd out jumped to 50 percent at the peak of the boom. This is especially true in the market for home purchase as opposed to refinance loans. With the crash in housing and mortgage markets in 2007, private sector intermediaries pulled back, the GSEs regained market share, and evidence of GSE crowd out disappeared in both the home purchase loan and refinance markets. These patterns suggest that the degree of GSE crowd out varies with market conditions and that the federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac likely served to enhance liquidity to the mortgage market during the 2007-2009 financial crisis

Specific inhibition of the chymotrypsin-like activity of the proteasome induces a bipolar morphology in neuroblastoma cells

AbstractBackground: Lactacystin inhibits cell proliferation and induces a distinctive, predominantly bipolar (two-neurite-bearing) morphology in Neuro 2A murine neuroblastoma cells. It binds with high specificity to the multicatalytic 20S proteasome and inhibits at least three of its peptidase activities (chymotrypsin-like, trypsin-like and peptidylglutamyl-peptide hydrolyzing), each at a different rate, without inhibiting other known proteases. The chymotrypsin-like and trypsin-like activities of the proteasome are inhibited most rapidly, and irreversibly. In an effort to determine which of the peptidase activities needs to be inhibited for neurite outgrowth to occur, we treated Neuro 2A cells with peptide aldehydes that selectively inhibit different proteasome activities.Results: Treatment with peptide aldehydes ending in a hydrophobic residue, all of which inhibit the chymotrypsin-like activity, results in a bipolar morphology in Neuro 2A cells, whereas treatment with a peptide aidehyde inhibitor of the trypsin-like activity does not lead to a detectable change in morphology. One of the inhibitors that induces neurite outgrowth has been previously shown to inhibit the chymotrypsin-like activity of the proteasome without inhibiting the other apparently distinct peptidase activities that cleave after neutral residues, the so-called ‘branched chain amino acid preferring’ (BrAAP) and ‘small neutral amino acid preferring’ (SNAAP) activities, or the peptidylglutamyl-peptide hydrolyzing (PGPH) activity.Conclusions: The chymotrypsin-like activity appears to antagonize bipolar-type neurite outgrowth in Neuro 2A cells, while the trypsin-like, PGPH, BrAAP and SNAAP appear not to do so. Selective inhibition of a single peptidase activity, as opposed to general inhibition of the proteasome, appears sufficient to induce a specific cellular process. Selective inhibition might be useful in managing diseases where only one activity is involved without completely inhibiting the proteasome. It is also possible that endogenous regulators of the proteasome could affect cellular processes and that certain peptidase activities of the proteasome may have roles in specifying a given cell fate