What Belgium Can Teach Bosnia: The Uses of Autonomy in 'Divided House' States

Belgium and Bosnia can be understood as “divided house” states, which contain proportionally similar groups with opposing views regarding whether the state should be more unitary or more decentralised. The Belgian example demonstrates that even where groups disagree on state structure, a mixture of various forms of group autonomy may facilitate stability and compromise within the state. Belgium addresses this dilemma in two ways: 1) non-territorial autonomous units in the form of the linguistic communities, and 2) exclusive competencies for different units within the diverse Belgian state. In Bosnia, the rights of minorities in different territorial units, as well as refugee returns to areas where they are minorities, might be improved by structures with non-territorial autonomy that are similar to the Belgian linguistic communities. Similar to Belgium, these non-territorial units might hold exclusive competencies for educational, linguistic, cultural, and religious matters, and enable more political representation of minority individuals. In order to advocate working models for Bosnia, analysts should more carefully examine actual examples from states with similarly divided populations

Reconfiguring state-minority negotiations for better outcomes

This chapter focuses on collective remedies for minorities, in the form of autonomy as advocated by the Lund Recommendations. It provides first an overview of the territorial and non-territorial autonomy structures proposed in the Lund Recommendations, and then outlines the ways in which majority-minority claims are framed within an institutional framework of territorial autonomy. Next, it contrasts this with the framing of majority-minority disagreements and accommodation in terms of NTA. It demonstrates how NTA removes the zero-sum nature of disputes between majorities and minorities, such that better outcomes become possible for each than under conditions of territorial autonomy. NTA reconfigures disputes between states and minorities, by emphasizing governance as a menu of functional competencies that can take place according to a personal, rather than a territorial, principle. This shift can transform majority-minority disputes to avoid conflict between groups

Discourse in Bosnia and Macedonia on the Independence of Kosovo: When and What is a Precedent?

Bosnia and Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992, and subsequent referenda legitimised these declarations, but unitary state actors did not emerge. Rather, Bosnia and Macedonia each contain groups with divisive views regarding the nature of the state in which they live. Kosovo is regularly invoked as an example in their contentious discussions. In this essay, I present a framework for understanding this discursive contention in which Kosovo provides the focus for disputes between extremists and moderates of different groups. Within the two states, groups differ over the recognition of Kosovo's declaration of independence and the question of whether this might constitute a precedent. A political, rather than simply a legal, view on these discussions helps us to better understand not only these dynamics, but similar contestations unfolding elsewhere. © 2013 Copyright University of Glasgow

Populism, Nationalism, and Party Politics

Recent political events have forced an examination of ideologies of populism and nationalism in politics. In this piece, I examine literature on the post-2016 political context to illustrate why the rise of identity-based politics has surprised analysts. An understanding of identity-based parties requires a focus on both the forms by which they navigate electoral and party systems, and the content of their rhetorical appeals to publics. I consider the electoral and party systems literature, and indicate some reasons that majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to foster the dominance of identity-based politics. In such systems, large parties might become weaponized by extremist elements, and lack the potential for checks from new parties. In addition, presidential systems lack a mechanism for no confidence votes, and might also have weak checks on an extremist executive. In terms of content, populism and nationalism might draw differing boundaries to include or exclude perceived elites. However, they can otherwise align in terms of their stances against “Others,” and against individualistic or technocratic stances that may fall under the label of “liberalism.” Nationalism and populism are not simply ideologies, but can be used as strategies by elites who can successfully deploy these mobilizing rhetorical appeals

Institutional change and identity shift: the case of Scotland

Many studies of state fragmentation and secession emphasize the importance of institutions in these dynamics. Devolved or federal institutions may be intended to placate national sentiments at the regional level, but they often provide a foundation for attempts at secession or independence. Much of the literature on these dynamics emphasizes the material and network resources and infrastructure that sub-state institutions can provide for independence movements. Their discursive and symbolic resources have been less examined. This contribution outlines how the 1997 devolution for Scotland has provided an institutional resource for the Scottish National Movement. However, the institutions of devolution did not only serve as material and infrastructural resource. They also provided a symbolic and ideational context for rhetorical and discursive disputes with the Conservative-Liberal Democrat British government established in Westminster in 2010. The Scottish case is particularly useful to illustrate both the possibilities and limits of these discursive contestations. The Scottish example shows how identities are solidified in the process of contention (Tilly 2008) – thus, whatever the referendum outcome in 2014, Scottish-ness is strengthened by these events

Understanding Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Europe

The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics will be a key reference point both for advanced-level students developing knowledge about the subject, researchers producing new material in the area, and those interested and working in the fields of East European Politics, Russian Politics, EU Politics, and more broadly in European Politics, Comparative Politics, Democratization Studies, and International Relations. This chapter presents a summary examination of ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe. The chapter first provides a historical overview of the development of the concept of ethnic minorities, which will show how the emergence and change of state borders in the region have produced ethnically diverse states out of empires. Politically-mobilised ethnic groups first truly emerged during the 1800s in the region. Ethnicity was then subsumed within the socialist political structures but emerged as a strong political force in post-1989 democratisation processes. Following this historic and demographic overview, the chapter then sketches some of the key ideas on how ethnic groups matter in society and politics. The discussion outlines general dynamics of ethnic relations, mobilisation, and group goals, and then turns to ethnic minority parties, elections, and decentralisation. The piece concludes with a consideration of the promise and limitations of these general ideas in the complex ethnic context of Eastern Europe

Ethnic conflict: looking inside groups

This article sketches the premises of a relational orientation to understanding ethnic conflict. Following on the work of Charles Tilly and others, it prioritizes relations and interactions in the dynamics of ethnic boundary preservation, rather than individual entities. I first outline the role of boundary activation mechanisms in ethnic conflict. I then present the interactions between elites and masses of ethnic groups in mixed settings that preserve coexistence, noting how a rupture of these interactions can lead to conflict. The aim of this orientation is to identify causal mechanisms and sequences in political processes. These mechanisms and sequences then serve as general statements that can be examined across a variety of settings. I conclude with a sketch of how progress in the field will involve a stronger focus on local research. In particular, the revered ethnic and political demographics of ethnic enclaves are a fruitful area for future research

In Defence of Public Higher Education: Knowledge for a Successful Society (The Alternative White Paper for HE)

The present Conservative Government, like the Coalition Government that preceded it, has an ideological predisposition towards the market and its supposed benefits to consumers, but appears to have no vision of Higher Education and its benefits to students and to the whole of society. These wider societal benefits can be summarised under three aspects: * educating the next generation of the population * carrying out research to address social and scientific challenges * maintaining an independent platform for research into society and science to facilitate democratic debate. The last of these, sometimes drawn under the umbrella of ‘academic freedom’, is the basis of the historic contract between Universities and the State. We contend, following the UNESCO Recommendation (1997), that academic freedom must be sufficient to guarantee the independence of scientific inquiry, commentary and teaching. Pressures from funding agencies and the state are usually cited as the principal threats to academic independence. The last decade has seen the rise of a third threat, namely an increasing managerial interference in academic life deriving from the introduction of market imperatives. These three societal benefits are interconnected. Without independent research there can be no scientific independence and no cutting-edge teaching. Without a focus on critique and challenge, students may see ‘education’ as a mere process of accumulating ‘facts’ to meet test criteria. A narrow focus on the acquisition of qualifications undermines the education process itself. Employers have criticised graduate recruits for insufficient creativity, of being rote-taught and thus un-adaptable to a modern business subject to rapid technological change. Importantly, critical skills are necessary to meet the challenge of business and for inclusive democratic engagement. The idea of a University that unites these three aspects is undermined by a new model of Higher Education Institution that sees the investment in human capital only as a private benefit. The Government’s White Paper, Success as a Knowledge Economy, and associated legislative programme, consolidate a fee-loan (or debt-finance) model of funding which puts the costs of higher education onto new graduates and future taxpayers, while reducing taxes for current taxpayers – many of whom directly benefit from publicly-supported higher education, or from its wider public benefits. The Government suggests that it is merely replacing direct public funding with one that places the ‘student at the heart of the system’. But it proposes that public funding should be directed towards the realisation of the private benefits of higher education, and it fails to acknowledge the wider public benefits that higher education affords. In truth, the proposals place the market at the heart of the system and subordinate the student as a consumer of higher education, with loans functioning as a voucher to present at a university of choice (providing that the student has the grades required). It is our view that this new funding model is wrong in principle and deficient in practice. The regulatory framework that is being introduced in its wake will undermine the declared aims to improve teaching quality, to enhance social mobility, and to improve access and achievement. The extension of university title to for-profit providers will also threaten the wider public benefits of higher education, by allowing them to compete as single-function institutions, and giving them access to publicly-supported loans for their students without a guarantee of their longer term stability. This will intensify existing competition and encourage a ‘race to the bottom’. Our defence of an alternative vision of Higher Education takes place in the context of a dismal lack of leadership by the various mission groups representing universities in the sector – for example, Universities UK and the Russell Group – and other bodies responsible for the sector. Their willing advocacy of a fee-loan model of funding (to avoid possible cuts) has abdicated their leadership role in a proper debate on the values of public higher education. This failure to defend the values of the very public higher education they are chartered to provide is in marked contrast to representations made by another group. Lobbyists on behalf of for-profit providers are seeking a supposed ‘level-playing field’ in undergraduate degree provision, despite having no track record of success in the UK, a disastrous record in the USA, and no desire to provide any wider public benefit of their existence. The Government’s position is also in marked contrast to public attitudes. The British Social Attitudes Survey (NatCen) has, before and since the introduction of tuition fee changes, regularly asked questions about public attitudes to higher education and inequality. The majority of the population has consistently opposed high levels of student debt, believed that education has a value beyond simply providing the means to a better job, and maintained that inequality in Britain is an obstacle to the fulfillment of opportunities. Perhaps surprisingly, this commitment to the values of publicly-funded higher education is especially marked among those without graduate-level qualifications. Politicians who argue that the latter resent paying taxes to finance education for ‘middle-class people’ should seek evidence for this assertion. But the ‘debate’ among politicians, members of the BIS secretariat and corporate lobbyists over the issue has been remarkable for its superficial, un-evidenced character. It has also been remarkable for the absence of full public debate (Leach 2016). This Alternative White Paper aims to correct this imbalance. We need a proper debate about the future of UK Higher Education

Graded Smad2/3 Activation Is Converted Directly into Levels of Target Gene Expression in Embryonic Stem Cells

The Transforming Growth Factor (TGF) β signalling family includes morphogens, such as Nodal and Activin, with important functions in vertebrate development. The concentration of the morphogen is critical for fate decisions in the responding cells. Smad2 and Smad3 are effectors of the Nodal/Activin branch of TGFβ signalling: they are activated by receptors, enter the nucleus and directly transcribe target genes. However, there have been no studies correlating levels of Smad2/3 activation with expression patterns of endogenous target genes in a developmental context over time. We used mouse Embryonic Stem (ES) cells to create a system whereby levels of activated Smad2/3 can be manipulated by an inducible constitutively active receptor (Alk4*) and an inhibitor (SB-431542) that blocks specifically Smad2/3 activation. The transcriptional responses were analysed by microarrays at different time points during activation and repression. We identified several genes that follow faithfully and reproducibly the Smad2/3 activation profile. Twenty-seven of these were novel and expressed in the early embryo downstream of Smad2/3 signalling. As they responded to Smad2/3 activation in the absence of protein synthesis, they were considered direct. These immediate responsive genes included negative intracellular feedback factors, like SnoN and I-Smad7, which inhibit the transcriptional activity of Smad2/3. However, their activation did not lead to subsequent repression of target genes over time, suggesting that this type of feedback is inefficient in ES cells or it is counteracted by mechanisms such as ubiquitin-mediated degradation by Arkadia. Here we present an ES cell system along with a database containing the expression profile of thousands of genes downstream of Smad2/3 activation patterns, in the presence or absence of protein synthesis. Furthermore, we identify primary target genes that follow proportionately and with high sensitivity changes in Smad2/3 levels over 15–30 hours. The above system and resource provide tools to study morphogen function in development