Ideological traditionalism and organisational innovation in Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical governance

Studies of church governance approach religious change either as 'soft' transformation (ideological and discursive adjustments implemented by clerical elites) or as 'hard' restructuring (shifts in decision-making processes and administrative forms). This article illustrates that the joint, rather than separate, consideration of the two types of change provides a more nuanced description of the internal dynamics of religious organisations. Employing a framework with comparative applicability, which breaks with standard theoretical approaches, the empirical application examines a case in which the two types of change coincided: the Orthodox Church of Greece in the late twentieth century, where a radically conservative ideological transformation accompanied a particular instance of bureaucratic modernisation (lay involvement in high-level ecclesiastical governance)

European Union symbols under threat : identity considerations

This chapter discusses how experimental research using implicit visual cues can offer unique insights into the nature and consequences of territorial attachments in multi-level polities such as the European Union; how exposure to threat might impact on attitudes to the European Union; and how recent empirical efforts to illustrate the interaction of these two effects – exposure to visual stimuli and threat – point to a new research direction for students of European identity. The conclusion proposes empirical applications that extend recent research

Attitudes towards school choice and faith schools in the UK : a question of individual preference or collective interest?

As has been the case in a number of countries, parents in England have increasingly been given the opportunity to choose between different types of schools. Doing so is regarded as a way of meeting individual needs and improving academic standards. Faith-based schools long predate this move towards a more diversified educational system, but have come to be regarded as one of the ways of fulfilling the recent agenda. Drawing on social identity theory, we suggest that attitudes towards faith-based schools reflect social (religious) identities and group interests associated with those identities rather than beliefs about the merits of individual choice. We demonstrate this is the case using data from all four parts of the UK. However, the extent to which attitudes towards faith-based schools are a reflection of religious identities varies across the four parts in line with the structure of the religious economy and educational provision locally. We conclude that rather than reflecting a supposedly a-social concern with choice, support for diversity of educational provision may be rooted instead in collective – and potentially antagonistic - social identities

Public support for freedom of choice in schools does not translate into backing for all forms of diversity of provision

How does the general public regard faith-based schools? Are they seen as one of the ways by which individual parents are able to exercise freedom of choice? Analysis by Stratos Patrikios and John Curtice of attitudes to school choice and faith-based schools in all four parts of the UK strongly suggests that people’s attitudes towards faith-based schools have in fact relatively little to do with their views about giving individual parents the ability to choose. Instead, people’s opinions about such schools are primarily a reflection of their (collective) religious identity

Secularization

The presence and function of religion in society is foundational in Western thought. Since the first attempts by thinkers such as Plato (427 – 347 BCE), more than two millennia ago, to define the good life, the good citizen, the good judge, and the good ruler, a negotiation between the absolute and revealed, on the one hand, and the rational and relative, on the other, has been the central pursuit of philosophical debate (Tarcov and Pangle 1987). As part of the absolute and taken for granted, religion has played a constant and central part in that negotiation. Centuries after Plato, St. Augustine (354–430 CE), who made explicit the distinction between a religious domain and a separate secular domain, argued that salvation and happiness could come only from divine grace and revelation, rather than from human justice and reason as recommended by the pagan Greek philosophers (Fortin 1987, 197). In the nineteenth century, along this longstanding normative debate between those for and those against religion’s influence in human affairs, a second question crystallized. The question asked whether modern life would push religion to the brink of extinction, and the anticipated answer was affirmative. This is known as the secularization thesis

Globalization, religiosity and vote choice : an empirical test

Building on recent research that examines the impact of globalization in domestic political behaviour, particularly on economic voting, this chapter proposes that globalization strengthens the influence of religiosity on individual voting decisions (the ‘religious vote’ or ‘religious voting’). It further hypothesizes that the effect of globalization on the religious vote depends on the structure of the religious economy: some religious contexts will be more fertile settings for religious voting. The analysis combines individual-level data from CSES Module 2 (2001-2006) with two types of country-level information: globalization indices and a measure of the religious context. The main finding is that globalization strengthens the link between religiosity and right-wing party choice. This effect can be interpreted as an anti-globalization backlash that takes place within a shrinking pool of religious voters. The findings contribute to our understanding of a hitherto ignored relationship between globalization and the non-economic foundations of political behaviour

Religious market structure and democratic performance : clientelism

Is there a connection between government intervention in religious competition and partisan clientelism in democratic systems? Drawing on the economics of religion, we argue that alongside commonly examined population-level religious processes (religious diversity), state-level religious processes (government regulation of competition in the religious market) affect institutional performance in electoral democracies. Linking comparative indicators of religion-state relations with measures of partisan clientelism, statistical analysis suggests that uncompetitive religious markets, such as those where a dominant religion is sponsored by the state, create incentives, infrastructures and opportunities that favour clientelism. The study emphasises the importance of light-touch regulation of religion not merely as a normative principle narrowly related to religious freedom, but also as a potential remedy that can enhance the quality of political institutions

Visual primes and EU identity : designing experimental research

There has been considerable attention paid to the role of symbols in forging identification with and support for the European Union (Bruter 2003, 2009; Laffan 1996; Manners 2011; Mclaren 2006; Shore 2000). Detailed empirical analysis is still, however, required of the following: i) the extent to which such symbols carry implicit messages about European Union identity; ii) the type of messages that different symbols convey; iii) the effect that exposure to these symbols in different contexts might have on political preferences. The authors employed an experimental approach to establish the extent to which implicit visual reminders of EU membership, from images of ceremonial flags to more mundane, functional symbols (like passports and driving licences), prime particular - affective or instrumental - associations, and how these associations may shape EU-related attitudes. Our motivation came from Billig’s (1995: 59) observation that: 'no one asks how many stars and stripes the average American is likely to encounter in the course of the day. Nor what is the effect of all this flagging.' Our analysis sought to measure the effect of visual cues that prime the EU on attitudes to the European Union. This chapter discusses the theoretical puzzle addressed, the details of the research design, the contribution of this approach to our understanding of the nature and consequences of EU identity and potential further applications of this type of experimental approach in the field of EU studies

Better the devil you know:Threat effects and attachment to the European Union

The EU is facing unprecedented challenges and significant threats to its economic and political security. Austerity, the Eurozone crisis, rising immigration and heightened fear of terrorism all present serious challenges to the process of integration. How does this context of insecurity impact on what the EU means to its citizens? Will the public become increasingly Eurosceptic or will they discover a hitherto unrecognised attachment to the EU as the prospect of its collapse becomes real? Psychological research has demonstrated that individual exposure to threat decreases cognitive capacity, inducing a tendency towards rigidity or conservatism - a tendency to cling to the ‘devil you know’. So what might this mean for the European integration process? Using experimental techniques drawn from political psychology, the authors find a dual threat effect. The EU symbol has a negative (anti-EU) effect on EU-related attitudes when presented in neutral context. This is consonant with conceptualisations of the EU as a threat to national cultural and political norms. In contrast, however, visual priming of participants with EU symbols has a positive (pro-EU) effect on related attitudes when these are presented in a context that implies a subtle but imminent threat to the benefits of EU membership

The voice of the community : socio-economic inequalities and user involvement in public services

Following Hirschman, two key methods can be identified for ensuring that users of public services shape the content and delivery of those services. The first consists of quasi-market mechanisms that enable users to choose which services they access ('exit'). The second comprises consultation mechanisms that enable users to state what services they would like ('voice'). The UK government has increasingly adopted the former strategy in developing policy on public services for England. However, the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales have been reluctant to introduce quasi-market mechanisms and instead have been inclined to rely on 'voice' for acquiring user input. They have argued that to choose effectively in a quasi-market users require access to resources (time, education, mobility) that are unequally distributed across the population. Consequently, the information about user preferences conveyed by the 'exit' mechanism is likely to be biased and unrepresentative. However, 'voice' might be thought vulnerable to the same criticism. This chapter uses survey data collected in the UK in 2007 to demonstrate that willingness to be involved in 'voice' does indeed vary across the population but that the views of those who are willing to get involved may still be representative