Asymmetric Power Among Agents and the Generation and Maintenance of Cooperation in International Relations

The question addressed in this analysis is whether endowing agents with various forms of asymmetric power makes cooperation more likely across a variety of structural settings of conflict and cooperation present in international relations. To address this question, an agent-based model incorporating asymmetric power among agents in a set of (2 Â 2) games that represent different forms of conflict and cooperation prevalent in international relations (Chicken, Stag, Assurance, Deadlock, and Prisoner's Dilemma) is developed and analyzed via simulation. Simulation results indicate that the introduction of asymmetric power substantially increases the chances that both cooperative agents survive and cooperative worlds evolve. This is particularly the case when agents are endowed with the ability to selectively interact with other agents. Also, anticipated variations in outcomes across the game structures regarding the likelihood of cooperation are supported. Whether and how cooperation evolves in social settings characterized by the presence of selfish agents engaged in repeated relations without central authority has been of considerable importance to scholars of international politics and of interest to scholars across all the social sciences as well as philosophy, biology, and computer science. 1 International relations scholars have been particularly interested in various features of nation-states, the relations among nation-states, and the structural environment in which nation-states are embedded that make cooperation either possible or more likely. Studying the evolution of cooperation in the context of the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD) has proven to be quite fruitful for international relations scholars. Yet, the RPD framework is also restrictive in a variety of ways. 3 For instance, while the RPD captures one important type of relationship among nation-states in the international system, there are a number of other structural settings that (1984), the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD) has become the central metaphor for the evolution of cooperation in populations of selfish agents without central authority