TAXATION - JURISDICTION TO TAX INTANGIBLES - BUSINESS SITUS

The appellant, a Delaware corporation doing business in Minnesota, held the controlling interest in the stock of a large number of banks in numerous states. It transacted its corporate business and fiscal affairs in Minnesota and maintained a business office there. A property tax was imposed by Minnesota upon appellant\u27s shares of stock in Montana and North Dakota state banking corporations. Appellant contended that, since Montana and North Dakota had imposed a property tax on the same shares, the Minnesota tax was contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the shares of stock had acquired a business situs in Minnesota and so were taxable there and that it was not necessary to decide whether Montana and North Dakota had jurisdiction to tax or whether the Fourteenth Amendment would prevent multiple taxation in such a case. First Bank Stock Corporation v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234, 57 S. Ct. 677 (1937)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW --TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT AND ITS EFFECT ON THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AS APPLIED TO LIQUOR

Plaintiffs were granted an injunction in the lower court restraining the enforcement of the California Alcoholic Beverage Control Act on the ground that it violated the commerce clause and the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. The act imposed a license fee of $500 for the privilege of importing beer, in addition to the$50 fee to be paid by all wholesalers for the privilege of selling the beer. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court\u27s decision and held that the Twenty-first Amendment withdrew the protection of the commerce clause from liquor and that there was no denial of equal protection of the laws because a classification recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth, and, moreover, that the classification rests on conditions requiring a difference in treatment. State Board of Equalization of California v. Young\u27s Market Co., 299 U.S. 51, 57 S. Ct. 77 (1936)

INTERSTATE COMMERCE - FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER ACT - EXTENT OF SUPERSEDURE OF STATE JURISDICTION

Prior to the passage of the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, interstate motor carriers were subject to regulation by the states to a limited extent. This power to regulate may be briefly summarized as follows: (1) a state could not require interstate motor carriers to show that their operation was required in the interest of public convenience and necessity; (2) it could regulate to some extent the service and facilities offered by such carriers but it could not regulate their rates; (3) it could require them to carry liability insurance for the protection of third parties but it could not require them to carry insurance to assure the satisfaction of legal liabilities to passengers and shippers; (4) it had a wide power to regulate interstate motor carriers in the interests of public safety; (5) it could impose regulation designed to conserve its highways and prevent congestion upon them