Economics of Information and the Theory of Economic Development

This paper shows how recent developments in the Economics of Information can provide insights into economic relations in less developed countries, and how they can provide explanations for institutions which, in neoclassical theory, appear anomalous and/or inefficient. Sharecropping and other tenancy relationships in the rural sector and wage determination and urban unemployment are both investigated within this perspective.

Sorting Out the Differences Between Signaling and Screening Models

In this paper we analyze games in which there is trade between informed and uninformed players. The informed know the value of the trade (for instance, the value of their productivity in a labor market example); the uninformed only know the distribution of attributes among the informed. The informed choose actions (education levels in the Spence model); the uninformed choose prices (wages of interest rates). We refer to games in which the informed move first as signaling games - they choose actions to signal their type. Games when the uninformed move first are referred to as screening games. We show that in sequential equilibria of screening games same contracts can generate positive profits and others negative profits, while in signaling games all contracts break even. However, if the indifference carves of the informed agents satisfy what roughly would amount to a single crossing property in two dimensions, and some technical conditions hold, then all contacts in the screening game break even, and the set of outcomes of the screening game is a subset of the outcomes of the corresponding signaling game. In the postscript we take a broad view of the strengths and weakness of the approach taken in this and other papers to problems of asymmetric information, and present recommendations for how future research should proceed in this field.

A Simple Proof That Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Inefficient

Previous work which showed that prices could aggregate perfectly the diverse information of traders depended critically on the assumption that all agents had constant absolute risk utility. We show that either all agents must have constant absolute risk aversion utility, or all must have constant relative aversion in order for the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis to hold generically.

The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition

The central objective of this paper is to show how vertical restraints, which affect intra-brand competition, can and will be used as an effective mechanism for reducing inter-brand competition and increasing producer profits. We show how exclusive territories alter the perceived demand curve, making each producer believe he faces a less elastic demand curve, thereby inducing an increase of the equilibrium price. The use of exclusive territories may increase producers' profits, even if the producers cannot charge franchise fees, and so cannot recapture, from the retailers, the monopoly rents they earn from their exclusive territory: we show that 'double marginalization' effects can be overcome by the strategic effect on producers' competition. We provide a model in which we can clearly specify the full range of feasible contracts between producers and retailers, and show that it is always a dominant strategy for firms to use exclusive territories (so that exclusive territories are used in equilibrium) and that the best situation from the producers' viewpoint may or may not entail franchise fees. In all cases, exclusive territories hurt consumer surplus and reduce total welfare, which yields a different light on vertical restraints from a competition policy perspective.

The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard

This paper shows that, except in certain limiting cases, competitive equilibrium with moral hazard is constrained inefficient. The first section compares the competitive equilibrium and the constrained social optimum in a fairly general model, and identifies types of market failure. Each of the subsequent sections focuses on a particular market failure.

Money, Imperfect Information and Economic Fluctuations

This paper summarizes the macro-economic and, in particular, monetary and financial market implications of recent developments in the micro-economic theory of imperfect information. These micro-economic models which lead to credit-rationing on the one hand and limitations in the availability of equity type financing on the other can account for a wide range of observed business cycle and monetary phenomena. These include (a) unemployment, (b) the existence of Keynesian-type multiples, (c) the observed lack of production smoothing in response to cyclical fluctuations in demand, (d) the impact of monetary policy on business activity despite the absence of significant changes in real interest rates, and (e) price rigidities which arise from rational firm decisions (not as an a priori assumption).

Equilibrium fictions : a cognitive approach to societal rigidity

This paper assesses the role of ideas in economic change, combining economic and historical analysis with insights from psychology, sociology and anthropology. Belief systems shape the system of categories ("pre-confirmatory bias") and perceptions (confirmatory bias), and are themselves constrained by fundamental values. The authors illustrate the model using the historical construction of racial categories. Given the post-Reformation fundamental belief that all men had rights, colonial powers after the 15th century constructed ideologies that the colonized groups they exploited were naturally inferior, and gave these beliefs precedence over other aspects of belief systems. Historical work finds that doctrines of race came into their own in the colonies that became the United States after, not before, slavery; that out of the"scandal of empire"in India emerged a"race theory that cast Britons and Indians in a relationship of absolute difference"; and that arguments used by the settlers in Australia to justify their policies toward the Aborigines entailed in effect the expulsion of the Aborigines from the human race. Racial ideology shaped categories and perceptions in ways that the authors show can give rise to equilibrium fictions. In the framework of this paper, technology, contacts with the outside world, and changes in power and wealth matter not just directly but because they can lead to changes in ideology.Cultural Policy,Race in Society,Educational Sciences,Cultural Heritage&Preservation,Ethics&Belief Systems

Innovation, Intellectual Property, and Development: A Better Set of Approaches for the 21st Century

This paper aims to provide an intellectual basis to think about the relationship between development, intellectual property and innovation; where we currently are and what alternatives are available. For the most part, we are concerned less with the implications of current IP laws for the advanced countries as we are with their impact on developing countries. We focus here not only on the current pathologies of the system and on potential alternative ways to tackle its most egregious excesses; but on a more positive note, on what kind of "system" would best promote development and well-being in the developing world. We are looking for a world with new and better rules for intellectual property. Just as some have begun to think about re-writing the rules of the American economy to ensure a more just and efficient system, the time is ripe for doing the same for the global economy, especially with regard to the IP system

After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies

With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989-91, many economic reformers supported"Big Bang"privatization-the rapid transfer of state-owned enterprises to private individuals. It was hoped that Big Bang privatization would create the conditions for a demand-led evolution of legal institutions. But there was no theory to explain how this process of institutional evolution, including a legal framework for the protection of investors, would occur and, in fact, it has not yet occurred in Russia, in other former Soviet Union countries, in the Czech Republic, and elsewhere. A central reason for that, according to many scholars, is the weakness of the political demand for the rule of law. To shed light on this puzzle, the authors consider a model where the conditions for the emergence of the rule of law might be interpreted as highly favorable. Individuals with control rights over privatized assets can collectively bring about the rule of law simply by voting for it. These individuals are concerned with the wealth they can obtain from the privatized assets, and have two alternative strategies: building value and stripping assets. Building value under the rule of law yields higher benefits to a majority than stripping assets under no rule of law. But uncertainty about when the rule of law will be established may lead some individuals to choose an economic strategy-stripping assets, including converting corporate assets to private use-that gives them an interest in postponing the establishment of the rule of law. And therefore in the succeeding period, the rule of law may again not be in place, and so again individuals may strip assets. If they do, some of them may again have an interest in postponing the establishment of the rule of law. And so a weak demand for the rule of law can persist. The contribution of the paper is to show that the view that once stripping has occurred, the strippers will say"enough"and by supporting the rule of law seek public protection of their gains, is flawed. By abstracting from the obvious problem that strippers who obtain great wealth can buy special favored treatment from the state, the model highlights two less obvious flaws in the optimistic view about the Big Bang: First, that the asset-strippers can remove the assets from exposure to further stealing, and in that case they do not care about public protection for their gains. And second, that the perceived justice of a system is important to gaining the cooperation of those involved in the process of producing the rule of law (judges, regulators, jurors, potential offenders). Accordingly, state protection of asset strippers may be infeasible, even under an ostensible rule of law. Knowing this, strippers will be less supportive of the rule of law. The model makes one further point: what is at issue is how fast the rule of law will emerge. The presumption of the Big Bang strategy was that the faster state property was turned over to private hands, the faster a true market economy, including the rule of law, would be established. The analysis shows that, even if eventually a rule of law is established, the Big Bang may put into play forces that delay the establishment of the rule of law. The tortoise once again may beat the hare! Finally, the authors analyze the impact of certain policies, such as the particular structure of privatization and monetary policy. Policies that enhance the returns to investment and wealth creation rather than assetstripping not only serve to strengthen the economy in the short run, but enhance political support for the rule of law and thus put it in a position for stronger long-term growth.Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Legal Products,Labor Policies,Legal Products,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Judicial System Reform

Promoting Competition in Telecommunications

There is a growing recognition of the importance of competition for the success of market economies, and of the need for government action both to maintain competition and to regulate industries where competition remains limited. In the area of telecommunications, upon which I shall focus today, we have seen examples where privatization has not delivered on its promises: in some cases access in certain vital areas has actually been reduced. Competition and regulatory policy are vital for a market economy. The fundamental theorems of welfare economics, assume that both private property and competitive markets exist in the economy. Until recently, however, emphasis was placed almost exclusively on creating private property, and privatization of public assets. A well designed privatization, where there is a good regulatory framework in place, can raise enormous revenues and at the same time increase services and lower prices.market economies; government; competition; regulate industries; telecommunications