Beyond the European Community Treaty Provisions : A Need To Question the Cassis de Dijon Rule of Reason in Wouters?

Ⅰ. INTRODUCTIONⅡ. THE CASSIS DE DIJON RULE OF REASON OUTSIDE THE FREE MOVEMENT JURISPRUDENCEA. A Reference to Reiseb?ro in WoutersB. Meca-Medina Confirms WoutersC. The Importance of Wouters\u27 Confirmation in Meca-MedinaⅢ. CASSIS DE DIJON LINKED WITH WOUTERS VIA THE RULE OF REASONA. Free Movement of Goods Jurisprudence Guiding the InterpretationB. Dassonville as a Seedbed for Cassis de DijonC. Cassis de Dijon, Beyond DiscriminationD. The Rule of Reason in Cassis de DijonE. Cassis de Dijon and Wouters, Structural SimilarityⅣ. THE RULE OF REASON JUSTIFIEDA. The Rule of Reason within the Free Movement Jurisprudence1. Extending the Prohibitions\u27 Scope of Application2. The Limited Scope of Exceptions3. Positioning the Rule of Reason: Article 28 EC or Article 30 EC?B. Free Movement Jurisprudence within Article 81(1) EC Necessary?2. Article 81 EC, Prohibitions and Exceptions2. Article 81(3) EC and Public Interest Considerations3. Wouters and Meca-Medina under Article 81(3)?4. Making Sense out of Wouters and Meca-MedinaⅤ. CONCLUSIO

The Japanese Antimonopoly Law and its Leniency Program : Deterrence or Strategic Opportunism?

はじめに 一.日本の課徴金減免制度 二.課徴金減免制度に関するデータの調査 三.カルテルの防止か戦略的日和見主義の道具か? 四.カルテルの防止またはカルテル発見の効果とは別に課徴金減免制度を正当化する 終わり

A Comparative US and EU Perspective on the Japanese Antimonopoly Law\u27s Leniency Program

1. INTRODUCTION 2. THE FEATURES OF THE JAPANESE LEMENCY PROGRAM 3. EVALUATING LENIENCY PROGRAMS 3.1. A Game of Strategic Rational Behavior 3.2. Information in Function of a Leniency Program 4. LENIENCY FOR THE PRE-AND POST-INVESTIGATION STAGE 4.1. Few Lessons from Practice 4.2. Leniency beyond the Pre-Investigation Stage in Japan 5. IMMUNITY As AN INCENTIVE 5.1. Immunity, only for the Pre-investigation Stage? 5.2. Japan Thrifty with Immunity 6. A RACE TO THE COURTHOUSE DOOR 6.1. Limiting Leniency to the First Applicant? 6.2. A Race to Kasumigaseki? 7. THE ABSENCE OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS 7.1. Immunity or Not, That is the Question 7.2. Immunity or Reduction, That is the Question 7.3. Discretion or Not, That is the Question in Japan 8. CLEAR CONDITIONS FOR QUALIFICATION 8.1. A Forgotten Aspect of Leniency Programs 8.2. 0verview of Conditions 8.3. Problematic Conditions 8.4. Short and Clear Conditions in Japan 9. CONCLUSIO

Conceptualizing International Compention Law

はじめに 一　国際刑法とその六つの意味 二　国際競争法に六つの意味はあるのか (一)国内競争法の場所的適用範囲 (ニ)国内競争法の執行に関する国際協力 (三)全ての国家に共通する競争法 (四)国際的に規定された国内競争法 (1)ソフト・ロー（soft law）の方法 (2)WTO体制における規定 (五)国際的に承認された国内競争法 (六)実体的意味における国際競争法 三　今日における国際競争法の事例 (一)国際競争法としての国内管轄ルール (ニ)国際競争法としてのネットワーク・モデル(network model) (三)国際競争法としての原則とガイドライン おわり

Technology in the Driver’s Seat: Legal Obstacles and Regulatory Gaps in Road Traffic Law

The gradual automation of the driving task and the accompanying shift in performance of the driving task from a human driver to automated driving systems poses the question to what extent this technology can be lawfully used on public roads. This chapter explores this question, primarily focusing on the international framework of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic. Discussions primarily focus on the key question whether the notion of “driver” can be faithfully interpreted to permit the operation of self-driving cars. However, the question of who can or should be regarded as driver and the duties and obligations that (should) rest upon him or her are closely intertwined. For this reason, formally amending the Convention by only redefining the notion of “driver” to make it undisputedly consistent with the use of automated driving systems will not be enough to adequately accommodate automated driving. This will also require defining the role and responsibilities of the operator of the automated driving system, as well as considering an alternative system of sanctions in the event of failures or infringements of the rules of the road