What Are Over-the-Road Truckers Paid For? Evidence from an Exogenous Regulatory Change on the Role of Social Comparisons and Work Organization in Wage Determination

Using evidence from recent work on truckers and disaggregated older data prior researchers did not have, we revisit a classic topic and find some new answers. We focus on differentials in average annual earnings at the firm level among mileage-paid over-the-road tractor-trailer drivers ("road drivers") employed by US for-hire trucking companies, before and after economic deregulation. Road driver output is individualized, and pay is on the basis of a piece rate (mileage). However, road drivers work under two distinct logistical systems – less-than-truckload [LTL], and truckload [TL] – associated with two different forms of work organization. We find that – contrary to the predictions of Rose (1987) – not only are road drivers for LTL companies paid more than those for TL companies, but in LTL the union earnings premium was maintained following deregulation and union coverage fell slowly, while in TL both the union differential and union coverage fell sharply. We review relevant theoretical explanations: payment for cognitive abilities or non-pecuniary disamenities; standard efficiency wage models based on independent utilities; sharing of product market rents; equity concerns resulting from social comparisons between employee groups; and differences in work organization as a source of union rents or quasi-rents. Only equity concerns, for the LTL earnings differential, and quasi rents (but not a union threat effect, contrary to Henrickson and Wilson (2008)), for union coverage and premium in LTL, are consistent with our empirical results. Both earnings differentials are based on differences in work organization, rather than differences in the workers or the work itself.less-than-truckload (LTL), trucker, trucking, work organization, rent-sharing, quasi-rent, cognitive ability, compensating differential, equity, fair wage, truckload (TL), regulation, deregulation, union premium

A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Norms and Normative Expectations within a Corporate Hierarchy: Evidence from the Financial Services Industry

This paper presents the results of a field study at a large financial services firm that combines multiple methods, including two economic experiments, to measure ethical norms and their behavioral correlates. Standard survey questions eliciting ethical evaluations of actions in on-the-job ethical dilemmas are transformed into a series of incentivized coordination games in the first experiment. We use the results of this experiment to identify the actual ethical norms for financial adviser behavior held by key personnel – financial advisers and their corporate leaders – in three settings: a clash of incentives between serving the client and earning commissions, a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client, and a dilemma about whistle-blowing on a peer. We also measure the beliefs of financial advisers about the ethical expectations of their corporate leaders and the beliefs of corporate leaders about financial adviser norms. In addition, we ask financial advisers about their personal normative opinions, matching a common methodology in the literature. We find, first, systematic agreements in the normative evaluations across the corporate hierarchy that are consistent with ex ante expectations, but second, we also find some measurable differences between the normative expectations of corporate leaders about on-the-job behavior and the actual norms shared among financial advisers. When there is a normative mismatch across the hierarchy we are able to distinguish miscommunication from ethical disagreement between leaders and employees. Our subjects also report their job satisfaction and take part in a second incentivized experiment in which it is costly to report private information honestly. A last finding is that a mismatch between advisers’ personal ethical opinions and corporate norms – especially those of peers – strongly correlates with job dissatisfaction, and less strongly but significantly with the willingness to be dishonest.field experiment, financial services, corporate leader, financial adviser, ethics, norms, coordination game

Overconfidence is a Social Signaling Bias

Evidence from psychology and economics indicates that many individuals overestimate their ability, both absolutely and relatively. We test three different theories about observed relative overconfidence. The first theory notes that simple statistical comparisons (for example, whether the fraction of individuals rating own skill above the median value is larger than half) are compatible (Benoît and Dubra, 2007) with a Bayesian model of updating from a common prior and truthful statements. We show that such model imposes testable restrictions on relative ability judgments, and we test the restrictions. Data on 1,016 individuals' relative ability judgments about two cognitive tests rejects the Bayesian model. The second theory suggests that self-image concerns asymmetrically affect the choice to get new information about oneâs abilities, and this asymmetry produces overconfidence (Kőszegi, 2006; Weinberg, 2006). We test an important specific prediction of these models: individuals with a higher belief will be less likely to search for further information about their skill, because this information might make this belief worse. Our data also reject this prediction. The third theory is that overconfidence is induced by the desire to send positive signals to others about oneâs own skill; this suggests either a bias in judgment, strategic lying, or both. We provide evidence that personality traits strongly affect relative ability judgments in a pattern that is consistent with this third theory. Our results together suggest that overconfidence in statements is most likely to be induced by social concerns than by either of the other two factors.IQ, field experiment, social signaling, self-image, Bayesian updating, overconfidence, numeracy, personality, MPQ

Cognitive Skills Explain Economic Preferences, Strategic Behavior, and Job Attachment

Economic analysis has said little about how an individual’s cognitive skills (CS's) are related to the individual’s preferences in different choice domains, such as risk-taking or saving, and how preferences in different domains are related to each other. Using a sample of 1,000 trainee truckers we report three findings. First, we show a strong and significant relationship between an individual’s cognitive skills and preferences, and between the preferences in different choice domains. The latter relationship may be counterintuitive: a patient individual, more inclined to save, is also more willing to take calculated risks. A second finding is that measures of cognitive skill predict social awareness and choices in a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma game. Subjects with higher CS's more accurately forecast others' behavior, and differentiate their behavior depending on the first mover’s choice, returning higher amount for a higher transfer, and lower for a lower one. After controlling for investment motives, subjects with higher CS’s also cooperate more as first movers. A third finding concerns on-the-job choices. Our subjects incur a significant financial debt for their training that is forgiven only after twelve months of service. Yet over half leave within the first year, and cognitive skills are also strong predictors of who exits too early, stronger than any other social, economic and personality measure in our data. These results suggest that cognitive skills affect the economic lives of individuals, by systematically changing preferences and choices in a way that favors the economic success of individuals with higher cognitive skills.field experiment, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, loss aversion, time preference, Prisoners Dilemma, social dilemma, IQ, MPQ, numeracy, U.S. trucking industry, for-hire carriage, truckload (TL), driver turnover, employment duration, survival model

Which Measures of Time Preference Best Predict Outcomes? Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment

Economists and psychologists have devised numerous instruments to measure time preferences and have generated a rich literature examining the extent to which time preferences predict important outcomes; however, we still do not know which measures work best. With the help of a large sample of non-student participants (truck driver trainees) and administrative data on outcomes, we gather four different time preference measures and test the extent to which they predict both on their own and when they are all forced to compete head-to-head. Our results suggest that the now familiar (β, δ) formulation of present bias and exponential discounting predicts best, especially when both parameters are used.time preference, impatience, discounting, present bias, field experiment, trucker

The Balance Between Private and For-Hire Carriage and Trends in the Use of Large Trucks (1977 to 1997)

An analysis of data from 20 years (1977 – 1997) of the quinquennial Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (VIUS), collected by the U.S. Census Bureau, indicates that the overall population of heavy freight vehicles grew at the same rate as real GDP, just under 3% per year. However, the total miles operated by vehicles of this type grew 50% more, 4.5%, which produced a very large cumulative increase, from 46.8 billion miles in 1977 to 111.6 billion in 1997. This was because of a 34% increase in the intensity of use of heavy freight vehicles, as measured by changes in their average annual miles of operation. The key patterns underlying these aggregate changes are analyzed by examining the trajectories of several subdivisions within trucking over the period, segregating the data by private versus for-hire carriage and geographic range of service. There are a number of interesting nuances, but the main underlying trend is a sharp increase in the specialization of for-hire carriage in long-haul operations, complemented by an increasing relative dominance of private carriage in local operations

Trends in the Use of Large Trucks by Truckload and Less-Than-Truckload Motor Carriers in the 1990s

Using information from the Economic Census, Motor Carrier Financial and Operating Statistics, and the Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey, trends are examined in specialization and in vehicle use in the truckload (TL) and less-than-truckload (LTL) segments of the for-hire trucking industry. The VIUS data show that capacity, output, and intensity of use vary significantly by segment. TL firms have almost three times as many large trucks as LTL firms and operate more than three times the annual total miles, a consequence of the fact that TL firms use their vehicles more intensely (mean annual miles) than LTL firms. This gap, however, closed slightly during the 1990s. Both types of operations shifted vehicles away from local toward long-haul service in the 1990s, but LTL, which is less specialized in this regard, shifted more sharply

Self Selection Does Not Increase Other-Regarding Preferences among Adult Laboratory Subjects, but Student Subjects May Be More Self-Regarding than Adults

We use a sequential prisoner's dilemma game to measure the other-regarding behavior in samples from three related populations in the upper Midwest of the United States: 100 college students, 94 non-student adults from the community surrounding the college and 1,069 adult trainee truckers in a residential training program. Both of the first two groups were recruited according to procedures commonly used in experimental economics (i.e., via e-mail and bulletin-board advertisements) and therefore subjects self-selected into the experiment. Because the structure of their training program reduced the opportunity cost of participating dramatically, 91% of the solicited trainees participated in the third group, so there was little scope for self-selection in this sample. We find no differences in the elicited other-regarding preferences between the self-selected adults and the adult trainees, suggesting that selection into this type of experiment is unlikely to bias inferences with respect to non-student adult subjects. We also test (and reject) the more specific hypothesis that approval-seeking subjects are the ones most likely to select into experiments. At the same time, we find a large difference between the self-selected students and the self-selected adults from the surrounding community: the students appear considerably less pro-social. Regression results controlling for demographic factors confirm these basic findings.methodology, selection bias, laboratory experiment, field experiment, other-regarding behavior, social preferences, truckload, trucker

Fairness and Freight-Handlers: Local Labor-Market Conditions and Wage-Fairness Perceptions in a Trucking Firm

This paper draws on evidence from an internal attitude survey in the freight-handling terminals of a unionized trucking firm to investigate the effect of local labor market conditions on employee wage-fairness perceptions. The key element of our research design is that local managers have no discretion to vary wage rates in response to local labor market conditions; local economic shocks thus generate exogenous variation in the attractiveness of the wage paid by the firm relative to employees’ options in the outside labor market. We find robust associations between two indicators of local conditions – the rate of unemployment and the wages of similar workers in the outside market – and the wage-fairness perceptions of employees in the firm, which we argue reflects a causal relationship. As an extension, we relate the changes in local conditions and fairness perceptions to changes in employee performance, as measured by the rate of disciplinary dismissals. We find suggestive evidence that increased local unemployment leads to improved employee performance, and, conditional on a particular assumption about the mechanism through which local conditions affect performance, that increases in wage-fairness perceptions lead employees to supply more effort