The Existence and Persistence of a Winner’s Curse: New Evidence from the (Baseball) Field

This study takes advantage of recent developments in the measurement and valuation of individual output in the baseball labor market to (i) reassess prior evidence that this market is afflicted by the winner’s curse phenomenon and (ii) test whether bidders learn to avoid this curse over time. Though we find no evidence of negative average returns on player contracts for the earliest cohort of baseball free agents, we conclude that teams in that era failed to efficiently discount their bids in accord with available information, especially about risk. What is more, evidence from a larger sample of players signed in the late 1990s shows that teams have continued to overvalue inconsistent free agents and failed to limit their bids to conform to players’ lower values in small markets. This is consistent with experimental evidence that finds bounded-rational behavior when bidders are faced with complex valuation problems involving multiple elements.market efficiency, bounded rationality, overbidding

Testing Fair Wage Theory

Fairness considerations often are invoked to explain wage differences that appear unrelated to worker characteristics or job conditions, but non-experimental tests of fair wage models are rare and weak because of the limits of available market-generated data. In particular, such data rarely permit researchers to (a) identify suitable reference points that employees and employers might use in determining what is fair and (b) control for employees’ marginal output and its value. This study utilizes a unique dataset from the baseball labor market that solves both problems. We find no support for fair wage theory in this market. We also find that fairness premia can be illusory: Wages appear to be adjusted upward for reasons of fairness in regressions that control for variation in individuals’ physical output, but such premia evaporate when the value of that output (which can be market- or firm-specific) is held constant. This suggests that avoiding proxy measures of workers’ marginal revenue products in wage studies might reduce the number of labor market "anomalies" economists must resolve.fairness, efficiency wages, wage differentials

Initial Public Offerings of Ballplayers

As a field study of choice under uncertainty, we examine baseball teams' investments in amateur players. Though most prospects fail to deliver any return on their multi-million dollar signing bonuses, returns on the minority who succeed easily offset these losses: the expected annual yield on the median first-round draftee is 33 percent. However, the pattern of returns is inconsistent with market efficiency. Yields are lower for high schoolers than collegians (27 percent vs. 43 percent), lower for pitchers than position players (24 percent vs. 41 percent), decline for later round long-shots, and may be negative under competitive bidding.Market efficiency; Bounded rationality; Prospect theory; Winner’s curse

Enterprise,Government,And The Public

xxii,591 hlm.; 22 c

Arbitrator Bias and Self-Interest: Lessons from the Baseball Labor Market

Their desire for enduring employment is commonly assumed to induce arbitrators to make fair awards. We find, however, that in major league baseball's unique institutional setting, self-interested behavior by arbitrators has led to bias against players and preservation of monopsony rents for team owners. We apply a standard model of arbitrator behavior to all 391 arbitrated cases in baseball since 1979. Under conditions that should lead to an even split in awards to teams and players, probit analysis indicates that arbitrators favor teams 61 percent of the time. Furthermore, bias against African-American and Latin-born players is even more pronounced.