Forrest v ASIC: A 'perfect storm'

The policy objectives of the continuous disclosure regime augmented by the misleading or deceptive conduct provisions in the Corporations Act are to enhance the integrity and efficiency of Australian capital markets by ensuring equality of opportunity for all investors through public access to accurate and material company information to enable them to make well-informed investment decisions. This article argues that there were failures by the regulators in the performance of their roles to protect the interests of investors in Forrest v ASIC; FMG v ASIC (2012) 247 CLR 486: ASX failed to enforce timely compliance with the continuous disclosure regime and ensure that the market was properly informed by seeking immediate clarification from FMG as to the agreed fixed price and/or seeking production of a copy of the CREC agreement; and ASIC failed to succeed in the High Court because of the way it pleaded its case. The article also examines the reasoning of the High Court in Forrest v ASIC and whether it might have changed previous understandings of the Campomar test for determining whether representations directed to the public generally are misleading

Submission to Australian Consumer Law Review Issues Paper

This submission was prepared by Professor Stephen Corones, Professor Sharon Christensen and Nicola Howell on behalf of the Commercial and Property Law Research Centre (CPLRC) at QUT. The CPLRC is a specialist network of researchers with a vision to reform legal and regulatory frameworks in the commercial and property law sector through high-impact applied research. The submission addresses particular issues and questions from the Issues Paper related to Lemon Laws, transactions involving digital content and the sharing economy, and financial services. The numbering of questions from the Issues Paper has been adopte

Consumer guarantees and the supply of educational services by higher education providers

The higher education sector is undergoing a number of significant changes, the implications of which have yet to emerge. One such change is the increasing reliance by higher education providers on the revenue generated by full fee paying international students to fund their operating expenses. The report by the Victorian Ombudsman, Investigation into how Universities Deal with International Students ('Victorian Ombudsman's Report') tabled in the Victorian Parliament on 27 October 2011, provides evidence that Australian higher education providers may be failing to meet their legal obligations to international students. The Victorian Ombudsman's Report is the result of an investigation into four Victorian universities teaching international students with a focus on accounting and nursing schools. The report contains evidence that the universities were admitting students with scores below, or at the lower end of, the International English Language Testing System ('IELTS') score considered acceptable. Alternatively, they were relying upon their own language testing admission standards and not on an independent test like the IELTS test. While the universities provided English language support services for their international students after they had been admitted, the Ombudsman was concerned that the universities 'have not dedicated sufficient resources to meet the level of need amongst international students'

Technological Tying of the Apple iPhone: Unlawful in Australia?

Technology vendors are producing products and services which, by design, use technological methods to restrict interoperability and tie the use of their products and services to the use of other products and services from the same vendor. Often this type of technological tying raises concerns that it is anti-competitive. One such example is the technological tying of the Apple iPod to music purchased from the Apple iTunes Music Store, and vice versa. The new Apple iPhone contains technological locks which tie the iPhone to the mobile telephony services of a particular third-party mobile carrier, a new development in technological tying, and much more likely to be unlawful in Australia. The purpose of this article is to examine whether the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), in its current form is adequate to deal with this type of technological tying

Unfair Terms in 'Clickwrap' and other Electronic Contracts

Clickwrap and other electronic contracts are in widespread use in markets for computer software and for many online services. When confronted by a lengthy and incomprehensible contract, the response of many, if not most, consumers is to click 'yes' – without reading the contract or giving it careful consideration. We have moved away from the traditional model of negotiated agreement on terms to the unilateral imposition by suppliers of terms, many of which are unfair. This article considers the failure of existing Commonwealth and State laws to deal with the problem and concludes that legislative intervention is necessary to protect consumers

Cartels – What are they and how to avoid being part of one : the implications of University fee deregulation

Universities supply a range of services to students. These include most obviously, tuition services in relation to undergraduate and postgraduate courses; research supervision services in relation to research degrees; as well as consultancy services in relation to Government and industry work. For the purposes of the CCA, universities are trading corporations. They engage in trade or commerce through the provision of a range of services for reward. As such Universities are subject to the same rules and regulations that govern the conduct of other trading corporations, such Coles and Woolworths. As senior officers and managers of a trading corporation you need to acquire some basic understanding of the rules that govern competition in the education sector. In other sectors, companies generally undertake a risk assessment of those areas where they are most at risk of contravening the CCA; to ascertain in advance how problems might arise so that they can put in place strategies to mitigate the risk of inadvertent contraventions

Competition Policy Review: Draft recommendations on competition laws

On 4 December 2013, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Small Business announced a “root and branch” review of Australia’s competition policy. The Minister for Small Business released the final Terms of Reference for the competition policy review on 27 March 2014, following consultation with the States and Territories, and announced the Review Panel headed by Professor Ian Harper. Under the terms of reference the Competition Policy Review Committee (the Harper Committee) is required to focus on three broad areas: •examining what can be done to create more competition in service areas such as health, education and intellectual property; •considering whether the structure and powers of the competition institutions (the ACCC , the NCC, the Tribunal and the AER) remain appropriate; and •examining the effectiveness of the competition provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) and laying down a broad framework through which the law can be streamlined and reformed over time

Strategic entry deterrence: Does it constitute a misuse of market power?

A challenge for regulators and the courts has been establishing the boundary between behaviour is exclusionary and should be condemned under s 46 of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), now s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), and behaviour that is not exclusionary and might even be pro-competitive. This boundary can be especially difficult to draw in the case of entry deterring strategies. Section 46(1) prohibits corporations with a substantial degree of market power from taking advantage of that market power for one of the statutorily proscribed purposes which include preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market. Section 45(2) separately prohibits corporations from making and giving effect to contracts arrangements and understandings that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. The latest case in which the ACCC has failed to satisfy the s 46 criteria is the decision of Greenwood J in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 909 (Cement Australia case). Final orders were published in a separate judgment, in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 148 (28 February 2014). The case concerned an entry deterring strategy, namely the pre-emptive buying of input factors in an upstream market to protect an incumbent with substantial market power in a downstream market and to prevent new entry in the downstream market. Greenwood J found that while Cement Australia Pty Ltd, formerly known as Queensland Cement Ltd (QCL), had substantial market power, its conduct in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was not a contravention of s 46, because Cement Australia had not “taken advantage” of its market power. However, since Cement Australia’s purpose in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was anti-competitive, they were held to contravene s 45(2) of the TPA. The purpose of this Note is to consider only the reasons for judgment in the Cement Australia case in relation to the “taking advantage” element. The judgment was handed down on 10 September 2013. The final hearing date was 15 July 2011, so it was long-awaited. At 714 pages, it is carefully drafted

Competition law and market regulation: Behaviour v structure: Tribunal's AGL Energy merger authorisation

Section 95AT of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) provides that the Tribunal may grant an authorisation to acquire shares or assets that would otherwise contravene s 50. Section 95AT was inserted by the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) and commenced on 1 January 2007. In Application for Authorisation of Macquarie Generation by AGL Energy Limited, (AGL Energy) the Tribunal has for the first time granted AGL Energy Limited (AGL) a conditional authorisation to acquire the assets of Macquarie Generation from the NSW Government

When should private property rights give way to the public interest?

Since Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177 it has been recognised that corporations with substantial market power are subject to special responsibilities and restraints that corporations without market power are not. In NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 219 CLR 90 McHugh A-CJ, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in their joint reasons stated (at [76]), that s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) can operate not only to prevent firms with substantial market power from doing prohibited things, but also compel them positively to do things they do not want to do. Their Honours also stated (at [126]) that the proposition that a private property owner who declines to permit competitors to use the property is immune from s 46 is “intrinsically unsound”. However, the circumstances in which a firm with substantial power must accommodate competitors, and private property rights give way to the public interest are uncertain. The purpose of this Note is to consider recent developments in two areas of the CCA where the law requires private property rights to give way to the public interest. The first part of the Note considers two recent cases which clarify the circumstances in which s 46 of the CCA can be used to compel a firm with substantial market power to accommodate a competitor and allow the competitor to make use of private property rights in the public interest. Secondly, on 12 February 2014 the Minister for Small Business, the Hon Bruce Billson,released the Productivity Commission’s Final Report, on the National Access Regime in Pt IIIA of the CCA (National Access Regime, Inquiry Report No 66, Canberra). Pt IIIA provides for the processes by which third parties may obtain access to infrastructure owned by others in the public interest. The Report recommends that Pt IIIA be retained but makes a number of suggestions for its reform, some of which will be briefly considered