Stable Consciousness?:The “Hard Problem” Historically Reconstructed and in Perspective of Neurophenomenological Research on Meditation

Finding a scientific, third-person explanation of subjective experience or phenomenal content is commonly called the “hard problem” of consciousness. There has recently been a surge in neuropsychological research on meditation in general and long-term meditators in particular. These experimental subjects are allegedly capable of generating a stable state of consciousness over a prolonged period of time, which makes experimentation with them an interesting paradigm for consciousness research. This perspective article starts out with a historical reconstruction of the “hard problem,” tracing it back to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Emil du Bois-Reymond in the 18th and 19th century, respectively, and the problem of introspection as already acknowledged by Wilhelm Wundt in the 19th century. It then discusses the prospects of research on long-term meditators from a contemporary perspective and with respect to the neurophenomenological research program already advocated by Francisco J. Varela

fMRI in Translation: The Challenges Facing Real-World Applications

Functional neuroimaging has increased our understanding of human brain function tremendously and has become a standard tool in clinical and cognitive neuroscience research. We briefly review its methodological foundations and describe remaining challenges for translational research. The application of neuroimaging results to individual subjects, for example in predicting treatment response or determining the veracity of a statement, is limited by these challenges, in particular by the anatomical and statistical procedures commonly employed. We thus argue for sincere caution in the translation of functional neuroimaging to real-world applications

Grounded in Biology:Why the Context-Dependency of Psychedelic Drug Effects Means Opportunities, Not Problems for Anthropology and Pharmacology

Langlitz and colleagues wrote about clinically used psychedelic drugs and the possibility of a “moral psychopharmacology” earlier in this journal (1). They emphasized the context-dependency of the effects of these substances (e.g., ayahuasca, psilocybin) and the importance of understanding their impact on social and moral cognition, particularly now that there is more research on their possible clinical applications (e.g., to facilitate psychotherapy). In this opinion article, I want to, first, reflect on the context-dependency from the perspective of recent research on placebo effects, and, second, clarify different meanings of “moral psychopharmacology”. The latter will be placed in the context of a broader conceived view on drug instrumentalization (2–4) and different values associated with it (5–7). In the conclusion, I will briefly distinguish aspects primarily relevant to theoretical, research-oriented, or applied perspectives, respectively, to inform further theoretical, empirical, and ethical discussion of these topics

Real Neurolaw in the Netherlands:The Role of the Developing Brain in the New Adolescent Criminal Law

Previous publications discussed the conditions under which courts admitted or could admit neurotechnological evidence like brain scans. There were also first attempts to investigate legal decisions neuroscientifically. The present paper analyzes a different way in which neuroscience already influenced the law: The legal justification of the new Dutch adolescent criminal law explicitly mentions findings on brain development to justify a higher maximum age for the application of juvenile criminal law than before. The lawmaker’s reasoning is compared with the neuroscientific studies on which it is based. In particular, three neurodevelopmental publications quoted by the Dutch Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles to justify that adolescents can be legally less responsible are analyzed in detail. The paper also addresses possibilities under which brain research could improve legal decision-making in the future. One important aspect turns out to be that neuroscience should not only matter on the level of justification, but also provide better instruments on the individual level of application

Neurorights in History: A Contemporary Review of José M. R. Delgado’s “Physical Control of the Mind” (1969) and Elliot S. Valenstein’s “Brain Control” (1973)

Scholars from various disciplines discuss the ethical, legal, and social implications of neurotechnology. Some have proposed four concrete “neurorights”. This review presents the research of two pioneers in brain stimulation from the 1950s to 1970s, José M. R. Delgado and Elliot S. Valenstein, who also reflected upon the ethical, legal, and social aspects of their and other scientists’ related research. Delgado even formulated the vision “toward a psychocivilized society” where brain stimulation is used to control, in particular, citizens’ aggressive and violent behavior. Valenstein, by contrast, believed that the brain is not organized in such a way to allow the control or even removal of only negative processes without at the same time diminishing desirable ones. The paper also describes how animal and human experimentation on brain stimulation was carried out in that time period. It concludes with a contemporary perspective on the relevance of neurotechnology for neuroethics, neurolaw, and neurorights, including two recent examples for brain-computer interfaces

Neuroscience Education Begins With Good Science:Communication About Phineas Gage (1823–1860), One of Neurology’s Most-Famous Patients, in Scientific Articles

Phineas Gage is one of the most famous neurological patients. His case is still described in psychology textbooks and in scientific journal articles. A controversy has been going on about the possible consequences of his accident, destroying part of his prefrontal cortex, particularly with respect to behavioral and personality changes. Earlier studies investigated the accuracy of descriptions in psychology textbooks. This is, to my knowledge, the first analysis of journal articles in this respect. These were investigated with regard to four criteria: Description of (1) personality changes, (2) psychopathy-like behavior, (3) alternative explanations besides the immediate brain damage, and (4) Gage’s recovery. 92% of articles described personality changes, 52% of a psychopathy-like kind; only 4% mentioned alternative explanations and 16% described Gage’s recovery. The results are discussed in the light of the available historical evidence. The article closes with several suggestions on improving science communication about the famous case