"Taste heterogeneity, labor mobility and economic geography" - A critical reconsideration and correction

This article reconsiders the linear new economic geography model under heterogeneous agents developed by Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) by applying an analytical technique introduced by Ludema and Wooton (1999). Two problematic aspects are identified: first, the divergence pattern for countries which differ in amenities is incorrect. I show that the degree of agglomeration is highest when trade costs are high. Besides this minor problem, the second critical issue concerns the welfare analysis. It is shown in this paper that this model exhibits a latent tendency for overagglomeration when trade costs are high and underagglomeration when trade costs are low, bringing it in line with other welfare analyses of new economic geography models.Agglomeration

When skilled and unskilled labor are mobile: a new economic geography approach

This paper develops an analytically solvable new economic geography model of the ‘footloose entrepreneur’ class in which not only skilled labor is mobile, but also unskilled labor. Allowing unskilled labor to move freely between different regions increases the agglomeration incentive of skilled labor. Depending on the level of unskilled labor mobility, the geographical distribution of economic activity is either a ‘pitchfork’ or a ‘tomahawk’. If unskilled labor is very mobile, complete agglomeration is the only stable outcome. When trade costs are high, skilled and unskilled labor migration reinforce each other leading to agglomeration of both types of labor in the same region. For lower levels of trade cost, unskilled labor returns to its region of origin, whereas skilled labor remains concentrated.agglomeration; migration; economic geography; bifurcation pattern

Differential labor mobility, agglomeration, and skill-biased migration policies

The paper analyzes the impact of skill-biased migration policies under the economics of agglomeration. It therefore develops an agglomeration model with two types of mobile worker who are heterogeneous and differ both within and between skill groups with respect to their migration propensity. On the one hand, the model reveals that the effectiveness of migration policies depends on the level on trade costs. On the other hand, it shows that increasing (reducing) political barriers to migration for one factor of production, reduces (increases) the migration incentive of the other. Consequently, pro-skilled and contra-unskilled migration policies attenuate each other or can even be counterproductive.agglomeration; labor mobility; economic geography; skill-biased migration policies Welfare

Trade and Industrial Policies with Heterogeneous Firms: The Role of Country Asymmetries

This paper explores the role of country asymmetries for trade and industrial policies with heterogeneous firms. Our analysis delivers a number of novel results. First, trade policies, infrastructure policies and industrial policies which improve the business conditions in one country have negative productivity and welfare effects on the trading partner. Second, symmetric trade liberalization is immiserizing for a trading partner whose business conditions are inferior. Third, there are gains from trade even for a country whose monopolistically competitive sector with heterogeneous firms is wiped out by the switch from autarky to trade.firm heterogeneity, welfare, trade policies, industrial policies, business conditions

Taste heterogeneity, labor mobility and economic geography - A critical reconsideration and correction

This article reconsiders the linear new economic geography model under heterogeneous agents developed by Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) by applying an analytical technique introduced by Ludema and Wooton (1999). Two problematic aspects are identified first, the bifurcation pattern for countries which differ in amenities is incorrect. I show that the degree of agglomeration is highest when trade costs are high. Besides this minor problem, the second critical issue concerns the welfare analysis. It is shown in this note that this model exhibits a latent tendency for overagglomeration when trade costs are high and underagglomeration when trade costs are low, bringing it in line with other welfare analyses of new economic geography models

Differential labor mobility, agglomeration, and skill-biased migration policies

The paper analyzes the impact of skill-biased migration policies under the economics of agglomeration. It therefore develops an agglomeration model with two types of mobile worker who are heterogeneous and differ both within and between skill groups with respect to their migration propensity. On the one hand, the model reveals that the effectiveness of migration policies depends on the level on trade costs. On the other hand, it shows that increasing (reducing) political barriers to migration for one factor of production, reduces (increases) the migration incentive of the other. Consequently, pro-skilled and contra-unskilled migration policies attenuate each other or can even be counterproductive

Trade and Industrial Policies with Heterogeneous Firms: The Role of Country Asymmetries

This paper explores the role of country asymmetries for trade and industrial policies with heterogeneous firms. Our analysis delivers a number of novel results. First, trade policies, infrastructure policies and industrial policies which improve the business conditions in one country have negative productivity and welfare effects on the trading partner. Second, symmetric trade liberalization is immiserizing for a trading partner whose business conditions are inferior. Third, there are gains from trade even for a country whose monopolistically competitive sector with heterogeneous firms is wiped out by the switch from autarky to trade.firm heterogeneity, welfare, trade policies, industrial policies, business conditions

Heterogeneous Firms, Trade, and Economic Policy: Insights from a Simple Two-Sector Model

The robust empirical finding that exporting firms are systematically different from firms that merely serve domestic consumers has inspired the development of a new brand of trade theory, the theory of heterogeneous firms and trade. The establishment of a canonical model due to Melitz (2003) has induced a recent wave of research which explores various policy issues and policy instruments. This paper uses a simple tractable two-sector model of monopolistic competition as unifying framework to bring out key lessons of this recent research. We address the gains from trade, country asymmetries involving technology potentials, market sizes, trade openness and various business conditions as well as the international repercussions that emerge when countries non-cooperatively choose entry subsidies and their levels of basic research. We also reinvestigate the process of market exit.firm heterogeneity, monopolistic competition, economic policies and welfare

Business Conditions and Default Risks Across Countries

The risk of default that business firms face is very significant and differs widely across countries. This paper explores the links between countries' business conditions and international trade embedment and the default risk at the country level from a theoretical point of view. Our main contribution is to set up a general equilibrium model which allows us to derive sharp predictions concerning how key factors which shape a country's business and trade environment impact on the default risk of firms which operate in these environments. The predictions are in accord with readily available data

Trade and Industrial Policies with Heterogeneous Firms: The Role of Country Asymmetries

This paper explores the role of country asymmetries for trade and industrial policies with heterogeneous firms. Our analysis delivers a number of novel results. First, trade policies, infrastructure policies and industrial policies which improve the business conditions in one country have negative productivity and welfare effects on the trading partner. Second, symmetric trade liberalization is immiserizing for a trading partner whose business conditions are inferior. Third, there are gains from trade even for a country whose monopolistically competitive sector with heterogeneous firms is wiped out by the switch from autarky to trade