Security Policy and the Question of Fundamental Change

Over the course of the 2008 election, the idea of fundamental change became the dominant theme of American politics, and to some degree the capacity to undertake it was displayed in response to a crisis of confidence in financial markets. When the flow of credit necessary to support normal economic activity virtually ceased in the final quarter of the year, prevailing ideology was abandoned and long-established policies radically altered in feats of reaction that would have been considered inconceivable just a few days before they actually occurred. The initial actions taken did not master the problem, and the process of doing so will apparently be lengthy and torturous. Nonetheless the ability to redirect policy in response to calamity was demonstrated at a moment—the final weeks of a presidential election—when it normally would have been considered least likely to occur

Anticipating Climate Mitigation: The Role of Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs)

Global warming is likely to force assertive redirection of global energy markets in order to achieve a prudent standard of mitigation; the resulting process of energy transformation will fundamentally alter prevailing policies and institutional relationships. Efficiency gains and renewable technologies—wind, solar, and biomass—will presumably make substantial contributions, as will carbon sequestration to some extent. But at the moment it seems quite apparent that global mitigation cannot be achieved without a very substantial expansion of nuclear power generation. While current light water reactor technology will likely play a role, this paper argues that smaller modular reactors (SMRs) of innovative design, with innovative institutional arrangements, could contribute to meeting energy demands in a more safe and secure manner. Though many SMR designs are currently being developed, it is doubtful that any of them will be brought to the point of serial production by their current developers under currently projected market conditions. Completed prototype development would almost certainly have to be a public sector initiative undertaken in support of eventual mitigation. This paper explores the potential of developing international structures whereby multiple states and entities could develop several SMR prototypes and serial manufacturing hubs. The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor development process could prove to be a useful analogue to the arrangements necessary to support such large-scale SMR development and deployment

Potentially Constructive Implications of Disaster in Iraq

It now appears likely that the invasion of Iraq will prove to be a seminal event in the evolution of international security generally. Legal order has evidently collapsed throughout the country, and the occupying forces have not been able to control the resulting pattern of predatory violence. The central reason is that the United States forfeited at the outset the critical asset of legitimacy necessary to establish and maintain consensual rule, and its continued presence undermines the indigenous institutions it is attempting to nurture. Similar breakdowns have occurred in other parts of the world, and the consequences have been tolerated over extended periods of time. Because of timing, location and the entanglement of the United States, however, intractable violence in Iraq can be expected to have much stronger global resonance. American forces alone are not likely to be able to master the situation but neither can they be withdrawn without intensifying internal violence and extending it into an already volatile region. The potential consequences of that dilemma are ominous, but for that reason the situation presents opportunity as well as danger. Calamity is sometimes a catalyst for greater wisdom

The Strategic Implications of Global Warming

At least to the frontline climate scientists, it is becoming increasingly evident that the process of global warming presents a threat to human societies of essentially unprecedented proportions. They know beyond any reasonable doubt that the thermal impulse now being imparted to the earth’s ecological system by aggregate human activity is occurring at a rate greater than any that has been documented in the entire 65 million year paleoclimate record. The current rate of CO2 accumulation in the atmosphere is ten times higher than at any time over the past 400,000 years for which annual estimates have been made based upon ice core data. For earlier periods estimates are made for longer time periods, but the natural rate of CO2 accumulation that 50 million years ago drove atmospheric concentrations and deep ocean temperatures to the highest estimated levels on record was a factor of 20,000 less than the current rate. That distant process occurred over millions of years. At the higher rates currently prevailing, the inexorable process of reestablishing energy equilibrium will occur over a time span that will certainly be much shorter and will certainly affect the operating conditions of human societies, but the exact character, magnitude, timing, or location of the consequences cannot yet be determined

The Localized Nature of Violence in Iraq

Understandably and perhaps inevitably, the ever more urgent effort to comprehend the causes of violence in Iraq has so far relied on familiar conceptions. The conflict occurring there is variously described as an insurgency, a civil war, and a manifestation of global terrorism. Standard religious and ethnic categories are used to identify the participants and impute their motives. It is becoming evident, however, that the pattern of violence reflects not only a collision of organized purposes but more fundamentally a profound disintegration of Iraq’s social fabric, a process that exposes innocent victims but also limits the capacity of predators. Violence resulting from the breakdown of legal order does not have the same character as that which occurs between managed opponents. Better understanding of that distinction is likely to be one of the more important lessons to be learned

Reconsidering the Morality of Deterrence

In 1983, at one of the more intense moments of the Cold War period, the United States Catholic Bishops issued a pastoral letter addressing the moral implications of the deterrence doctrine. The letter observed that the mass attack plans on which the operational practice of deterrence was based could not be reconciled with traditional just war principles and declared that the practice was only provisionally acceptable in moral terms. That formulation expressed reluctant deference to the prevailing belief that national security depended on the deterrent effect of a massively destructive threat actively deployed and that there was no viable alternative. A decade later, after the alliance confrontation that defined the Cold War had dissolved, the bishops issued a commentary on the original letter. They reaffirmed their original judgment on deterrence and broadened their discussion to address the problems of civil conflict and basic human rights then emerging into greater prominence. They reiterated their support for policies that would restrain the practice of deterrence, but they did not intensify their moral prescription. They acknowledged differing judgments regarding the strategic justification of the deterrence doctrine and set no time limit on provisional moral acceptance. They did not issue a moral mandate to transform the legacy practice. Nearly three decades after the pastoral letter, the practice of deterrence continues essentially unaltered. The number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons has been substantially reduced, but their destructive potential has not been proportionately affected. Urban industrial infrastructure and human population concentrations are nearly as vulnerable as they ever were. If the mass attack plans embedded in continuously alert deterrent forces were ever implemented, they would inflict tens of millions of immediate casualties and so damage social capacity that recovery would be a distant and uncertain question. The potential destructiveness of contemporary deterrent forces poses by far the greatest immediate physical threat to human life as we know it. As a result the security of all people and all countries fundamentally depends on the justifying doctrine – that is, on the assumption that continuously wielding a massive threat reliably assures it will never be carried out. Because of its central importance and potential consequence, the deterrence doctrine has become both an axiom of security policy and a matter of intense personal belief. In both countries primarily engaged in the operational practice of deterrence – The Russian Federation and the United States -- the doctrine has evolved beyond the status of a justifying assumption and is generally treated as an elemental truth not open to meaningful doubt. But that is an attitude not an assured reality, and there are strong reasons not only to question the core validity of the basic deterrent assumption but also to fear that prevailing operational practice involves an unacceptable and unnecessary risk of catastrophe. That in turn implies that provisional moral acceptance of the doctrine needs to be reconsidered

The Argument for Oversight

Presentation in the Panel "Biosecurity Challenges in the Post 9-11 World" at American Association for the Advancement of Science, Annual Meeting, St. LouisThe fundamental problem of managing biotechnology arises from two circumstances. First, it is evident that the momentum of discovery in molecular biology in particular is simultaneously enabling therapeutic and destructive applications of extraordinary potential consequence. But, second, no one is able to judge with assurance the exact character or extent of those consequences. That situation is likely to require competent but independent oversight of those areas of research that inherently pose extreme danger. An outline of an appropriate oversight arrangement will be presented

The Significance of Joint Missile Surveillance

Occasional Paper of the Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and SciencesAt a summit meeting in Moscow in September of 1998, the presidents of the United States and Russia signed an agreement to share information on the launch of ballistic missiles. The announcement was not received as a major accomplishment. There had been a minimum amount of bureaucratic preparation within the two governments and only cursory negotiation between them. The essential details were yet to be worked out and would obviously be troublesome. Moreover, at the time of the meeting neither of the individuals involved commanded the personal political authority normally considered necessary to sponsor a meaningful venture. The visiting President Clinton was entangled in the blooming phases of an impeachment proceeding. The hosting President Yeltsin was widely believed to be in the waning stages of personal health and political stature. Despite the burdens of the moment, however, the agreement was intrinsically significant. It addressed an underlying problem grave enough to compel attention regardless of the circumstances. There were reasons to take the core idea seriously whatever immediate sentiment might be. The problem was then and still remains a legacy of the cold war. Although not proclaiming themselves to be strategic opponents, Russia and the United States nonetheless continuously maintain thousands of nuclear weapons in an operational state poised to initiate a massive attack within a few minutes. As a result of that practice, each country constantly presents to the other the greatest physical threat that it encounters from any source. The force configurations are justified as protective deterrent threats, whose overwhelming destructiveness are meant to assure that no such attack will ever occur. But as an unavoidable corollary of that logic, each side must also convey credible reassurance that no error of judgment would ever be made. Both countries for their own safety mustbe absolutely certain that the forces of the other side are not susceptible to false alarm. The two societies entangled in this active deterrent relationship are forced to trust each other on that latter point. John Steinbruner is the Director of the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland

Renovating Arms Control through Reassurance

The Washington Quarterly, SpringSecurity policy has traditionally focused on the threat of deliberate aggression with a clarity and emotional intensity that presumably derives from the far recesses of time. For most of history, it was appropriate to be primarily concerned with intentional aggression since the destruction human beings could inflict on one another had to be consciously organized if it was to occur on a major scale. It is increasingly evident, however, that advanced technology and the sheer magnitude of human activity are generating a different form of threat. Today, an unanticipated chain of spontaneous effects might rival or exceed the destructiveness of intentional war. This sort of accidental war might erupt, ironically, from the military operations designed to protect against the risk of classic aggression itself. The danger of accidental war was demonstrated in World War I and was recognized in its aftermath. The experience of World War II, however, obscured the lesson and powerfully reinforced the traditional concern of intentional aggression. Over the ensuing decades, as the instruments of warfare acquired capacities for rapid and massive destruction, the military forces that wielded them were configured to deter or to defeat deliberate attack. Precautions were taken to assure that their enormously destructive power would not be employed without legitimate authorization, but those precautions were clearly subordinated to the purpose of deterrence. That effect was achieved and is plausibly credited with preventing at least the largest forms of deliberate aggression, but the accomplishment has enabled a massive accident to occur. Overwhelming deterrence entails some inherent risk of inadvertent catastrophe. John Steinbruner is the director of the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland