"Compensatory inter vivos gifts"

Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers usually find that bequests are equally divided among heirs while inter vivos gifts tend to be compensatory. Using the 1992 and 1994 waves of the Health and Retirement Study, we find that only 4 percent of parents who give divide their gifts equally among their children. Estimating probit models using family panels, we find that gifts are compensatory in the sense that a child is more likely to receive a gift if she works fewer hours and has lower income than her brothers and sisters; these results carry over to the amounts given. Fixed effects Tobit estimations show that the fewer hours a child works and the lower her income is, the more the parents give. These results imply that gifts are compensatory. The empirical results are, therefore, consistent with the predictions of the altruistic model of intergenerational transfers.

Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance: Empirical Evidence from a Large Administrative Sample

We study risk behavior of Danish self-employed entrepreneurs, whose income risk may be driven by both exogenous factors and effort choice (moral hazard). Partial insurance is available through voluntary unemployment insurance (UI). Additional incentives to sign insurance contracts stem from a UI-embedded, government-subsidized early retirement (ER) program, giving benefits that are unrelated to business risk. Indeed, we argue that the self-employeds’ incentives to insure themselves stem from the ER plan rather than from the UI cover. We show how to use a policy reform to identify moral hazard in observed transitions to unemployment when insurance is a choice variable. We use administrative (register) panel data covering 10% of the Danish population. We find that the insured are indeed more likely to transit into unemployment than the uninsured, once we properly instrument for the insurance choice.entrepreneurs; self-employment; early retirement; unemployment insurance; moral hazard; Denmark; panel data

Compensatory inter vivos gifts

Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers usually find that bequests are equally divided among heirs while inter vivos gifts tend to be compensatory. Using the 1992 and 1994 waves of the Health and Retirement Study, we find that only 4% of parents who give, divide their gifts equally among their children. Estimating probit models, using family panels, we find that gifts are compensatory in the sense that a child is more likely to receive a gift if she works fewer hours and has lower income than than her brothers and sisters. These results carry over to the amounts given. Fixed effects Tobit estimations show that the fewer hours a child works and the lower her income is, the more the parents give. Gifts are compensatory. The empirical results are, therefore, consistent with the predictions of the altruistic model of intergenerational transfers.inter vivos gifts; altruism; compensatory transfers;

Wealth mobility and dynamics over entire individual working life cycles

We study taxable wealth in unique Swedish administrative data, annually following a large sample of households over a period of almost 40 years. The main data limitation is non-observability of wealth for those below the tax exemption level. This implies that much of the focus of the paper is on the rich, since we are confined to those whose wealth becomes taxable over time. We exploit the long panel dimension by estimating dynamic ‘fixed effects’ models for limited dependent variables that allow for individual heterogeneity in both constants and autoregressive parameters, and control for heterogeneity through observables. We find substantial wealth mobility over the long time spans, partly accounted for by life-cycle behavior, while sufficiently capturing dynamics by an AR(1) process at the individual level. JEL Classification: C230, D140, D310, D910, H240heterogeneity, life cycle, panel data, wealth dynamics, wealth mobility

Compensatory Inter Vivos Gifts

Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers usually find that bequests are equally divided among heirs while inter vivos gifts tend to be compensatory. Using the 1992 and 1994 waves of the Health and Retirement Study, we find that only 4 percent of parents who give divide their gifts equally among their children. Estimating probit models using family panels, we find that gifts are compensatory in the sense that a child is more likely to receive a gift if she works fewer hours and has lower income than her brothers and sisters; these results carry over to the amounts given. Fixed effects Tobit estimations show that the fewer hours a child works and the lower her income is, the more the parents give. These results imply that gifts are compensatory. The empirical results are, therefore, consistent with the predictions of the altruistic model of intergenerational transfers.

Job Search Requirements for Older Unemployed: Transitions to Employment, Early Retirement and Disability Benefits

In this paper, we use a recent policy change in the Netherlands to study how changes in search requirements for the older unemployed affect their transition rates to employment, early retirement and sickness/disability benefits. The reform, becoming effective on January 1st 2004, required the elderly to formally report their job search efforts to the employment office in order to avoid a (temporary) cut in benefits. Before the new law was passed, unemployed were allowed to stop all search activity at the moment they turned 57.5. Estimating various duration models using difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity approaches, we find that for several groups of individuals that were affected by the policy change, the stricter search requirements did significantly increase their entry rate into employment. However, we also find evidence of a higher outflow to sickness/disability insurance schemes, a presumably unwanted side-effect of the policy change.duration analysis, policy evaluation, search effort, substitution

Dealer Pricing of Consumer Credit

Interest rates on consumer lending are lower when funds are tied to purchase of a durable good than when they are made available on an unconditional basis. Further, dealers often choose to bear the financial cost of their customers' credit purchases. This paper interprets this phenomenon in terms of monopolistic price discrimination. We characterize consumers' intertemporal consumption decisions and the dealer's pricing incentives when the consumers' unconditional lending and borrowing rate as well as the internal rate of return of the durable purchase differ. Our empirical analysis offers considerable support for the assumptions and implications of our theoretical perspective.

Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance

We study risk behavior of Danish self-employed entrepreneurs, whose income risk may be driven by both exogenous factors and effort choice (moral hazard). Partial insurance is available through voluntary unemployment insurance (UI). Additional incentives to sign insurance contracts stem from a UI-embedded, government-subsidized early retirement (ER) program, giving benefits that are unrelated to business risk. Indeed, we argue that the self-employed's incentives to insure themselves stem from the ER plan rather than from the UI cover. We show how to use a policy reform to identify moral hazard in observed transitions to unemployment when insurance is a choice variable. We use administrative (register) panel data covering 10% of the Danish population. We find that the insured are indeed more likely to transit into unemployment than the uninsured, once we properly instrument for the insurance choice