THE EFFECT OF QUALITY ASSURANCE POLICIES FOR PROCESSING TOMATOES ON THE DEMAND FOR PESTICIDES

In California, acceptance sampling is used to monitor the quality of processing tomatoes delivered by growers to processors. A proposal to change the current quality assurance policy was recently put forth to reduce the growersÂ’' incentive to use pesticides. In this article we examine the effect of alternative quality assurance policies on profit-maximizing growerÂ’s' demand for pesticides. The results indicate that the demand for pesticides is sensitive to changes in the quality assurance policy and that the proposed policy would reduce the optimal level of pesticide use on processing tomatoes. Disregarding the impacts of quality assurance policy may be the reason that the demand for pesticides has been underestimated so often in the past.Crop Production/Industries,

DESIGNING FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONS: THE EFFECT OF INSPECTION POLICY AND PENALTIES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE ON FOOD PROCESSOR BEHAVIOR

In the United States, federal, state, and local governments are involved with the regulation of the safety of the food supply. Food safety regulations that set standards for food processors usually include inspection policies for monitoring performance and penalties for processors who do not comply with regulatory standards. In this analysis, we examine how penalties and inspection policies interact to influence processor behavior. We distinguish between internal penalties (imposed by the regulator) and external penalties (imposed by the market or by the court). Using a model of the processor's expected annual cost, we find that under a given inspection policy internal penalties are only relevant under specific conditions. For cases in which internal and external penalties can be influenced, we use comparative statics to discover that internal penalties are more economically efficient for motivating processors than external penalties. These results imply that regulators should utilize internal penalties for noncompliance rather that rely on market or court-imposed penalties.Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

OPTIMAL GRADE DEFINITIONS FOR MULTIPLE QUALITY CHARACTERISTICS

The growing importance of quality in agricultural markets makes effective segregation and grading essential to efficient marketing strategy. In this paper, we develop an economic model, potentially applicable to many products, to determine optimal segregation strategies based on multiple stochastic quality measures. The model is applied to Oklahoma wheat quality data.Marketing,

Field trips in art in greater Boston: a handbook for teachers and students

Thesis (Ed.M.)--Boston University, 1933. This item was digitized by the Internet Archive

INTRODUCTION

Agribusiness,

Do Inspection and Traceability Provide Incentives for Food Safety?

One of the goals of inspection and traceability is to motivate suppliers to deliver safer food. The ability of these policies to motivate suppliers depends on the accuracy of the inspection, the cost of failing inspection, the cost of causing a foodborne illness, and the proportion of these costs paid by the supplier. We develop a model of the supplier's expected cost as a function of inspection accuracy, the cost of failure, and the proportion of the failure cost that is allocated to suppliers. The model is used to identify the conditions under which the supplier is motivated to deliver uncontaminated lots. Surprisingly, our results show that when safety failure costs can be allocated to suppliers, minimum levels of inspection error are required to motivate a supplier to deliver uncontaminated lots. This result does not hold when costs cannot be allocated to suppliers. As a case study, we use our results to analyze the technical requirements for suppliers of frozen beef to the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service.diagnostic error, food safety, inspection, sampling error, traceability, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Art ability: its analysis and measurement for purposes of prognosis.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University This item was digitized by the Internet Archive

Land Grant Application- Turner, Starbird (Rome)

Land grant application submitted to the Maine Land Office for Starbird Turner for service in the Revolutionary War.https://digitalmaine.com/revolutionary_war_me_land_office/1914/thumbnail.jp

Traceability, Moral Hazard, and Food Safety

Errors in traceability can significantly impact the moral hazard associated with producing safe food. The effect of moral hazard depends on the proportion of unsafe food costs that can be allocated to the responsible producer, which depends on the efficiency of the traceability system. In this paper, we develop a model that identifies the minimum level of traceability needed to mitigate moral hazard and motivate suppliers to produce safe food. Regulators and consumer can use the results of this research to design regulations and contracts that mitigate moral hazard and motivate producers to deliver safe food.Food safety, traceability, moral hazard, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,