Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical Investigation

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3388</p

Tools for legislative oversight : an empirical investigation

Parliaments are the institutions through which governments are held accountable to the electorate. They have a wide range of tools with which to carry out this oversight function, but until recently little analysis had been undertaken on the characteristics or use of such tools. This paper uses data for 83 countries that was collected in 2001 to investigate whether the oversight potential relates to three variables, namely the form of government (presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary), per capita income levels, and the level of democracy. The paper finds that oversight potential is greatly affected by the form of government, per capita income levels, and levels of democracy. Countries with parliamentary forms of government, higher income levels, and which are more democratic have a greater number of oversight tools and greater oversight potential. While the oversight potential follows this general trend, the use of committees of enquiry, interpellations and ombudsman offices follows a different pattern. The use of interpellations as an oversight tool is most common in high income countries, less common in low income countries and least common in middle income countries while the presence of committees of enquiry and of the ombudsman offices is most common in middle income countries, less common in high income countries and least common in low income countries.Labor Policies,Municipal Financial Management,Income,Parliamentary Government,Health Economics&Finance,Governance Indicators,National Governance,TF054599-PHRD-KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: WATER MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT,Parliamentary Government,Municipal Financial Management

Trends in Parliamentary Oversight: Proceedings from a Panel at the 2004 Southern Political Science Association Conference

World Bank Institute Working Paper- Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development, Washington D

Parliamentary Libraries, Institutes and Offices: The Sources of Parliamentary Information

World Bank Institute Working Paper Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary, Washington D

Legislative ethics and codes of conduct

This chapter discusses the difference between codes of ethics and codes of conduct, their role, their function and their distribution. The chapter also pays some attention to what makes codes of conduct most effective

Scrutinizing public expenditures: assessing the performance of public accounts committees

In 2002, David McGee wrote a comprehensive report on two important elements in the system of public financial accountability, namely the office of the Auditor General and the parliamentary oversight committee commonly referred to as the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). The purpose of the present paper is to deepen McGee's analysis of PACs. In particular, the authors define PAC success and identify those factors that affect PAC peformance. They use data that were collected by the World Bank Institute in 2002, when a survey questionnaire was sent to 51 national and state/provincial parliaments in Commonwealth countries in Asia and Australasia, and Canada and the United Kingdom. The authors find that the institutional factors which most account for the success of the PACs are the focus on government's financial activity rather than its policies, the power to investigate all past and present government expenses, the power to follow up on government action in response to its recommendations, and its relationship with the Auditors General.National Governance,Parliamentary Government,Politics and Government,Business Environment,Business in Development

Legislative Ethics and Codes of Conduct

World Bank Institute Working Paper - Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development, Washington</p

Parliamentary oversight of extractive industries

Africa has experienced a boom in extractive industries since the beginning of this century. Extractive companies often are exposed not just to government patronage, but also to requests to consider local third-party agents, vendors or applications for employment. But is corruption a necessary evil? While there is consensus that multifaceted strategies are required to curb corruption, heretofore there has been little research on how legislative oversight can help reduce corruption in general and on legislative oversight of corruption in the extractive sector in particular