The role of warrants in corporate reorganizations

An argument that informational asymmetries explain why the original shareholders of some firms emerge from Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings with stock in the reorganized company, while others receive warrants. By proposing a reorganization plan in which they receive warrants, the original stockholders of a firm with good future prospects can signal their superior information to the creditors in a way that firms with poor prospects will not wish to mimic.Bankruptcy ; Options (Finance) ; Stocks

Beneficial "firm runs"

The author argues that runs, which are generally considered undesirable, also have a beneficial effect--improving lenders' monitoring incentives. Lenders' ability to run on the firm helps control its moral hazard problem, while the first-come, first-served aspect of asset distribution keeps lenders from wanting to free ride on the monitoring efforts of others.Bankruptcy ; Bank loans

A note on absolute priority rule violations, credit rationing, and efficiency

An argument that APR violations exacerbate credit rationing problems by reducing the payment lenders receive in default states.Bankruptcy ; Credit

Measuring pricing bias in mortgages

Detecting and measuring discrimination in the pricing of mortgage loans present unique challenges for bank regulators. This Commentary outlines how loans are priced in the mortgage market and the difficulties involved in comparing the prices charged to different borrowers.Mortgages ; Discrimination in mortgage loans

Mortgage brokers and fair lending

Mortgage brokers play an important role in the housing finance market, but they also present unique challenges to regulators attempting to enforce fair lending laws. Should lenders be held responsible for the pricing decisions of brokers from whom they receive loan applications, or should fair lending laws instead be applied directly to the brokers themselves?Mortgages ; Discrimination in mortgage loans

Beneath the rhetoric: clarifying the debate on mortgage lending discrimination

The authors' simple model of the mortgage underwriting process provides a framework within which to define discrimination and various notions of the default rate. By providing those with differing views a common framework for discussing their positions, the model clarifies and reconciles some of the most controversial issues in the debate over mortgage discrimination. It also shows how this theoretical framework can help in the design of practical policy responses to this vexing social problem.Discrimination in mortgage loans ; Mortgages

Protection for whom? creditor conflicts in bankruptcy

Revised. In this article we provide a rationale for bankruptcy law that is based on the conflicts among creditors that occur when a debtor’s liabilities exceed its assets. In the absence of a bankruptcy law, the private debt-collection remedies that creditors pursue when a debtor is insolvent result in an ad hoc disposal of the debtor’s assets, thereby reducing the aggregate value of creditors’ claims. We show that coordination clauses can be used by creditors in their loan agreements that will result in coordination, ex post. Although all creditors would benefit from including these clauses in their contracts, they nevertheless choose not to in precisely those circumstances in which it is desirable to coordinate. This is an important insight because previous theories supporting a role for bankruptcy law are based on the notion that creditors want to contract about bankruptcy, but cannot. In contract, we demonstrate that creditors will choose not to coordinate ex ante, even though it is in their best interest ex post. ; We also examine a variety of other contractual mechanisms, including covenants and seniority, and show that although including these terms in loan contracts can improve creditors’ incentives to write coordination clauses, they do so only in special circumstances. Our analysis of creditor conflicts and the potential for private contracting remedies provides an economic rationale for the existence of a bankruptcy law that mandates ex post coordination among the creditors of an insolvent debtor.Bankruptcy

Self-selection and discrimination in credit markets

This paper increases understanding of the causes and consequences of discrimination in credit markets. It develops an underwriting model in which lenders use a simple Bayesian updating process to evaluate applicant creditworthiness. It also models individuals' self-selection behavior to show how market frictions can affect application decisions.Mortgages ; Discrimination in consumer credit

The importance of bank seniority for relationship lending

The authors examine two aspects of a bank's interaction with its borrowers--the relative priority of bank debt and the role of banks as "relationship lenders." They show that making the bank senior improves its incentives to build a relationship with the firm, thereby fulfilling an important function of intermediated debt.Bank loans

The Housing Wealth Effect: The Crucial Roles of Demographics, Wealth Distribution and Wealth Shares

Current estimates of housing wealth effects vary widely. We consider the role of omitted variables suggested by economic theory that have been absent in a number of prior studies. Our estimates take into account age composition and wealth distribution (using poverty rates as a proxy), as well as wealth shares (how much of total wealth is comprised of housing vs. stock wealth). We exploit cross-state variation in housing, stock wealth and other variables in a newly assembled panel data set and find that the impact of housing on consumer spending depends crucially on age composition, poverty rates, and the housing wealth share. In particular, young people who are more likely to be credit-constrained, and older homeowners, likely to be “trading down” on their housing stock, experience the largest housing wealth effects, as suggested by theory. Also, as suggested by theory, housing wealth effects are higher in state-years with higher housing wealth shares, and in state-years with higher poverty rates (likely reflecting the greater importance of credit constraints for those observations). Taking these various factors into account implies huge variation over time and across states in the size of housing wealth effects.