Cosmopolitanism, identity and recognition

An application of the social theory of Axel Honneth to global justice, arguing that development goals must include provision for the intersubjective recognition required for identity formation. In the disciplines of Political Philosophy and International Relations cosmopolitanism is often defined as the view that all people, no matter their national, ethnic or religious backgrounds and no matter what their gender, have an equal moral status. The most telling enunciation of this view is the United Nations&rsquo; Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the focus that is given to rights and a global form of legal equality by this document and by such theorists as John Rawls is not rich enough to capture all of the ethical demands that global society places upon well-to-do Westerners and developed nations. This paper makes use of a thesis by Axel Honneth to the effect that political thinking needs &ldquo;a basic conceptual shift to the normative premises of a theory of recognition that locates the core of all experiences of injustice in the withdrawal of social recognition, in the phenomena of humiliation and disrespect.&rdquo; Honneth identifies three spheres of recognition in modern societies: love, law, and achievement. I offer some exposition of his theory and then argue that global justice must be understood to embrace the substantive ethical values that arise in these three spheres as well as the procedural standards of moral rightness that belongs to the second of them. Such an expanded conception of global justice will yield an enriched conception of cosmopolitanism.<br /

Political patriotism

As evidenced by the reactions to Martha Nussbaum&rsquo;s famous essay of 1996, patriotism is a contested notion in moral debate. This paper explores the suggestion made by Stephen Nathanson that patriotism might be understood as &ldquo;love of one&rsquo;s country&rdquo;, and suggests that this phrase is misleading. It suggests that patriotism, like love, is not rational, and it fails to distinguish two kinds of object for that love: one&rsquo;s cultural community and one&rsquo;s political community. Accordingly, this phrase can lead to a kind of nationalism which involves chauvinism and militarism and that is, therefore, morally objectionable. The problem arises from ambiguities in the notion of &ldquo;country&rdquo; which is said to be the object of such love. Moreover, &ldquo;love&rdquo; is not the appropriate term for a relationship whose central psychological function is that of establishing an individual&rsquo;s identity as a citizen. I suggest that the proper mode of attachment involved in patriotism is identification with one&rsquo;s political community, and that the proper object of a patriot&rsquo;s allegiance is the political community thought of without the emotional, nationalistic and moralistic connotations that often accompany the concept of community. The &ldquo;political patriotism&rdquo; that arises from such an attitude is sceptical of &ldquo;the national interest&rdquo; and does not accept that our moral responsibilities to others stop at national borders. In this way political patriotism is consistent with a cosmopolitan stance towards human rights and global justice.<br /