Education and innovation as twin-engines of growth

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of education, quality and variety innovation, and scale-invariant growth. The early endogenous innovation-based growth models incorporate a scale e?ect predicting that larger economies are characterized by higher per capita growth rates. Recent models of semi-endogenous growth remove this scale e?ect but instead imply that economic growth depends proportionally on population growth. In contrast to the predecessor models, this paper argues that endogenous human-capital accumulation rather than an exogenously given continuing increase of the population is decisive for per capita growth. The consequence of the proposed integration of human capital accumulation into a two-R&D-sector model of quality and variety innovation is that education and innovation appear as twin-engines of growth and that steady state growth rates can be enhanced by subsidizing education. - education ; quality and variety innovation ; scale-invariant growth --

Risk and the role of collateral in debt renegotiation

In his basic model of debt renegotiation, BESTER [1994] argues that collateral is more effective if high risk projects are financed. This result, however, crucially depends on the definition of risk. Using the second-order stochastic dominance criterion introduced by ROTHSCHILD AND STIGLITZ [1970], we show that it is not a project's high risk, induced by a high probability of default, that makes collateral more effective. Instead it turns out that, given the expected return, the probability of default has no impact on the collateral's effectiveness. Moreover, a higher risk of the project caused by a higher loss given default makes the use of collateral even less effective. --Debt renegotiation,Collateral,Risk,Stochastic dominance

Technological Progress and Market Growth : An Empirical Study Based on the Quality-Ladder Approach

This paper develops an extended version of the quality-ladder model by allowing for heterogeneous markets. Based on this model, it presents an empirical analysis of innovation-based growth at the market level using a technometric measurement concept. It can be shown that a growth-promoting effect due to technological progress in a particular, single year is observed after between two and up to seven years. This is true not only for highly innovative markets, but also for those in which fewer R&D resources are invested. --Innovative Activities,Quality Ladders,Endogenous Market Growth,Technometrics

Signalling Effects of a Large Player in a Global Game of Creditor Coordination

In case of multiple creditors a coordination problem can arise when the borrowing firm runs into financial distress. Even if the project's value at maturity is enough to pay all creditors in full, some creditors may be tempted to foreclose on their loans. We develop a model of creditor coordination where a large creditor moves before a continuum of small creditors, and analyze the signalling effects of the large creditor''s investment decision on the subsequent behavior of the small creditors. The signalling effects crucially depend on the relative size of the large creditor and the relative precision of information. We derive conditions under which pure herding behavior is to be expected.

Signalling effects of a large player in a global game of creditor coordination

In case of multiple creditors a coordination problem can arise when the borrowingfirm runs into financial distress. Even if the project's value at maturity is enoughto pay all creditors in full, some creditors may be tempted to foreclose on theirloans. We develop a model of creditor coordination where a large creditor movesbefore a continuum of small creditors, and analyze the signalling effects of the largecreditor's investment decision on the subsequent behavior of the small creditors. Thesignalling effects crucially depend on the relative size of the large creditor and therelative precision of information. We derive conditions under which pure herdingbehavior is to be expected. --creditor coordination,global games

Financing Constraints and the Timing of Innovations in the German Services Sector

Using newly available data at the firm level, this study provides convincing evidence of the importance of financial constraints in explaining the timing of innovations in the German services sector. Based on a dynamic model of firms' optimal R&D behavior under financial constraints, we estimate various versions of an econometric specification of the model with dichotomous innovation data by using a univariate ordered probit model and a newly developed modification of it. The modified econometric estimation strategies takes into account that some of the regressors are measured on an ordinal scale. Our results are consistent with the theoretical view that, because of capital markets imperfections, internal finance should be an important determinant of innovative activities by private firms in the manufacturing sector as well as in the services sector.

In hunt for size: Merger formation in the oil industry

This paper analyzes the recent mergers in the oil industry. Oil is assumed to be a homogeneous good which is produced by a small number of firms with different unit costs. Merger formation is endogenously explained as a result of cooperative decisions. We show that the mergers are amongst very asymmetric firms if initial size differences are moderate. If size differences are large, however, the more efficient firms participate in the mergers, while the least efficient firms are not attractive partners and, therefore, remain independent in the post-merger market. --Asymmetric horizontal mergers,Coalition formation,Oil industry

On the robustness of concealing cost information in oligopoly

Competing firms are usually better informed about their own cost parameters than about those of their rivals. Therefore, it is an important issue to study the incentives of firms to exchange private cost information. We resolve and further generalize an influential model of Raith (1996) and show that, independent of the number of firms, concealing cost information is a dominant firm strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies with substitutive as well as with complementary goods.cost uncertainty

Demand pull and technology push effects in the quality ladder model

This paper extends the standard quality ladder model of innovation and quality growth by allowing for heterogeneous industries. This enables us not only to deal with the Schumpeterian hypothesis about market power and innovation, but also to analyze industry specific demand pull and technology push effects. In accordance with the empirical evidence, we show that perspective of large market power, favorable technological opportunities and high demand expectations as well as the economy-wide endowment with qualified labor, unambiguously spur innovative activity

Worker Compensation Schemes and Product Market Competition

We analyze product market competition between firm owners where the risk-neutral workers decide on their efforts and, thereby, on the output levels. Various worker compensation schemes are compared: a piece-rate compensation scheme as a benchmark when workers’ output performance is verifiable, and a contest-based as well as a tournament-based compensation scheme when it is only verifiable who the best performing worker is. According to optimal designs, all the considered compensation contracts lead to an equal market outcome. Therefore, it depends decisively on the relative costs of organizing a monitoring device, a contest, or a tournament whether the one or the other compensation scheme should be implemented