« Autrefois à la guerre, tout était simple. » La modernisation du combat interarmes à partir de l’exemple d’une division d’infanterie allemande sur le front de l’Ouest entre 1916 et 1918

Au cours de la Première Guerre mondiale, la conduite de la guerre sur le front occidental fut caractérisée par une situation tactique bloquée, suite à l’enlisement des armées dans la guerre de position à l’automne 1914. Entre 1915 et 1918, l’armée allemande procéda alors à une modernisation de ses principes d’engagement, pour l’offensive comme pour la défensive. Cette modernisation passa par un échange d’expérience entre le commandement et la troupe. Une coopération intensive de toutes les armes au sein de la division d’infanterie (combat interarmes) et le principe allemand de commandement par objectif constituèrent la base de cette transformation, mais l’opposition entre tradition et innovation resta présente. Cet article se propose d’étudier, à travers l’exemple de la brillante 11e division d’infanterie bavaroise, la difficile application de ces innovations tactiques. Tout en étant conforme à l’image de la guerre du xixe siècle, qui consistait en une conduite « industrialisée » de l’armée de masse elle-même, ce niveau médian de commandement de l’armée emprunta, sous la pression permanente de la recherche du succès, une voie intermédiaire conciliante, efficace et somme toute habituelle. Il contribua en tout cas de manière essentielle à accroitre l’efficacité au combat de la division."Once upon a time in the war, everything was simple."The modernization of the combat arms from the example of a German infantry division on the Western front between 1916 and 1918. During the First World War, the conduct of war on the Western Front was characterized by the static tactical situation, following the stalemate of the armies in the war of position in autumn 1914. Between 1915 and 1918, the German army then proceeded to modernize its principles of engagement, for the offensive as well as the defensive. This modernization proceeded through an exchange of experience between the command and the troops.  An intensive cooperation of all arms in the infantry division (combined arms) and the German principle of command by objective formed the basis of this transformation, but the conflict between tradition and innovation remained present. This article will examine, through the example of the brilliant 11th Bavarian Infantry Division, the difficult application of these tactical innovations. While conforming with the image of war in the nineteenth century, which consisted of the "industrialized" conduct of the army of mass itself, this median level of the army’s command, found, under the pressure of the search for success, an intermediate way that was flexible, efficient and in short customary. It contributed in an essential manner to increasing the combat effectiveness of the division

« Autrefois à la guerre, tout était simple. » La modernisation du combat interarmes à partir de l’exemple d’une division d’infanterie allemande sur le front de l’Ouest entre 1916 et 1918

Au cours de la Première Guerre mondiale, la conduite de la guerre sur le front occidental fut caractérisée par une situation tactique bloquée, suite à l’enlisement des armées dans la guerre de position à l’automne 1914. Entre 1915 et 1918, l’armée allemande procéda alors à une modernisation de ses principes d’engagement, pour l’offensive comme pour la défensive. Cette modernisation passa par un échange d’expérience entre le commandement et la troupe. Une coopération intensive de toutes les armes au sein de la division d’infanterie (combat interarmes) et le principe allemand de commandement par objectif constituèrent la base de cette transformation, mais l’opposition entre tradition et innovation resta présente. Cet article se propose d’étudier, à travers l’exemple de la brillante 11e division d’infanterie bavaroise, la difficile application de ces innovations tactiques. Tout en étant conforme à l’image de la guerre du xixe siècle, qui consistait en une conduite « industrialisée » de l’armée de masse elle-même, ce niveau médian de commandement de l’armée emprunta, sous la pression permanente de la recherche du succès, une voie intermédiaire conciliante, efficace et somme toute habituelle. Il contribua en tout cas de manière essentielle à accroitre l’efficacité au combat de la division."Once upon a time in the war, everything was simple."The modernization of the combat arms from the example of a German infantry division on the Western front between 1916 and 1918. During the First World War, the conduct of war on the Western Front was characterized by the static tactical situation, following the stalemate of the armies in the war of position in autumn 1914. Between 1915 and 1918, the German army then proceeded to modernize its principles of engagement, for the offensive as well as the defensive. This modernization proceeded through an exchange of experience between the command and the troops.  An intensive cooperation of all arms in the infantry division (combined arms) and the German principle of command by objective formed the basis of this transformation, but the conflict between tradition and innovation remained present. This article will examine, through the example of the brilliant 11th Bavarian Infantry Division, the difficult application of these tactical innovations. While conforming with the image of war in the nineteenth century, which consisted of the "industrialized" conduct of the army of mass itself, this median level of the army’s command, found, under the pressure of the search for success, an intermediate way that was flexible, efficient and in short customary. It contributed in an essential manner to increasing the combat effectiveness of the division

Strategy "in a microcosm": Processes of tactical learning in a WWI German Infantry Division

This is an assessment of  command, learning and combat performance within one German formation during the First World War. The 11th Bavarian Infantry Division, is used as a marker for the experiences of normal German divisions during the war. This account, based on detailed empirical study, is an example of operational history at the divisional level. It isolates variables such as how command and training worked within the 11th Bavarian Infantry Division, how much autonomy commanders had, and how they adapted to changes in circumstances.

“Lessons learned” in WWI: The German Army, Vimy Ridge and the Elastic Defence in Depth in 1917

In late 1916, the German 3rd Supreme Army Command (OHL) under General Hindenburg and General Ludendorff decided to go onto a strategic defensive on the main front in the west. With the help of the tactical lessons learned in the battle of materiel at the Somme, the OHL developed the principle of elastic defense in depth. It consisted of mounting a mobile and offensive defense that granted the forces limited room to withdraw and was primarily based on immediate counterstrokes being conducted by reserves. For this purpose, the bulk of the force would no longer be concentrated in the front line, but were to disperse in a several kilometer deep position area. This new doctrine, which was by no means uncontested among German commanders, faced the crucial test when the Anglo-Canadian attack on Vimy Ridge /Arras was launched on 9 April 1917. As a consequence of blatant leadership errors and a flawed implementation of the principles of elastic defense, the German defenders lost Vimy Ridge at the beginning of the battle. Nevertheless, the allied breakthrough attempt ended in early May 1917 in failure and with severe losses. This paper shows how the German side learned from the battles at Vimy/Arras and optimized its system of elastic defense for the forthcoming defensive operations in 1917