Indirect Control of Corporations: Analysis and Simulations

This paper is devoted to indirect control in corporate shareholding networks. This topic is important in financial economics. Since shareholding size does not actually reflect an investor’s power-control in corporate shareholding networks, diverse approaches to measuring the control-power of investors were proposed. We focuses in particular on a game-theoretical approach, namely on the model of Denti and Prati (2001) and its implementation to control sharing analysis and simulation in shareholding networks thanks to the computer program “Control Sharing Simulation.

On Public Values and Power Indices

In this paper we analyze, from a different point of view, some values and power indices well defined in the social context where the goods are public. In particular we consider the Public Good index (Holler, 1982), the Public Good value (Holler and Li, 1995), the Public Help index (Bertini, Gambarelli and Stach, 2008), the König and Bräuninger index (1998) called also Zipke index (Nevison, Zicht and Schoepke, 1978), and the Rae index (1969). The aims of this paper are: to propose an extension of the Public Help index to cooperative games; to introduce a new power index with its extension to a game value and to provide some characterizations of the new index and values

Indirect Control and Power

To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex problem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure. (original abstract

Guest editorial

This special issue of Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services is devoted to Game Theory and Applications and related topics. The origin of the issue is the 10th Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING10), which took place on 7th-9th July, 2014. The conference was hosted by the Faculty of Management at AGH University of Science and Technology in Kraków, Poland (main organizer was Izabella Stach). The history of the SING meetings started at the beginning of the 1980s with the first meetings held in Italy. Then, subsequently, meetings were added in Spain, the Netherlands and Poland. Nowadays SING is one of the most important international meetings on game theory organized each year in a European country.The SING10 meeting in 2014 attracted more than one hundred and ninety scientist from five continents. More about the SING meetings and in particular about SING10 can be funded in Gambarelli (2011) and Bertini et al. (2014). The submitted papers (139 presentations, 135 in parallel sessions and 4 in plenary sessions) covered a variety of topics on game theory and its applications. This special issue collects some surveys on recent results in different fields, presented in the conference

Aggregated Power Indices for Measuring Indirect Control in Complex Corporate Networks with Float Shareholders

The purpose of this paper is to introduce new methods to measure the indirect control power of firms in complex corporate shareholding structures using the concept of power indices from cooperative game theory. The proposed measures vary in desirable properties satisfied, as well as in the bargaining models of power indices used to construct them. Hence, they can be used to produce different pictures of the coalitional strength of firms in control of other firms in mutual shareholding networks with the presence of cycles. Precisely, in the framework of Karos and Peters from 2015, ten power indices substitute the original Shapley and Shubik power index in a modular fashion. In this way, we obtain a set of new measures called aggregated indices. The float shareholders typically hold less than 5 percent of the outstanding shares, which is an uncertain element of indirect control in complex shareholding structures. The fuzzy number seems appropriate to model these shareholders’ behavior. The novelty is that we model the behavior of float using Z-fuzzy numbers. The new methods are tested in an example

Measurement of control power in corporate networks

This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods for measuring indirect control in complex corporate shareholding networks. The methods use power indices to estimate the direct and indirect control in shareholding structures. Some of these methods only estimate the control power of investors (firms without shareholdings), and only a few measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks (which means investors and stock companies). None of them takes measuring the importance of mutual connections (edges in the networks) into consideration; thus we focus in particular on an extension of these methods in this paper to measure both the control-power of the firms involved in complex shareholding structures (represented by nodes in networks) and the importance (power) of linkages between the firms as elements of a whole corporate shareholding network. More precisely, we apply our approaches to a theoretical example of a corporate network. Moreover, we continue the considerations about reasonable properties for indirect control measurement. Some ideas of new properties are proposed. The paper also provides a brief review of the literature concerning the topic

Shapley-Based Estimation of Company Value—Concept, Algorithms and Parameters

The aim of the article is to propose a new method of valuation of a company, considering its ownership relations with other companies. For this purpose, the concept of the Shapley value from cooperative game theory is used as the basis for assessing such dependent companies. The paper presents proposals for Shapley value calculation algorithms for our model. We expand our model by discussing personal relations in addition to ownership relations and point out how intuitionistic fuzzy sets may be helpful in this context. As a result, we propose two new expanded models. In the first probabilistic model, we apply Pearson’s correlation coefficient, in the second, we use a correlation coefficient between intuitionistic fuzzy sets to determine the personal relationships. Finally, we present and interpret results for a real-world economic network with 17 companies