Country size and publicly provided goods

This paper studies the equilibrium size of countries. Individuals in small countries have greater influence over the nature of political decision making while individuals in large countries have the advantage of more public goods and lower tax rates. The model implies that (i) there exists excessive incentives to separate, though this need not be the case for all sets of secession rules studied; (ii) an exogenous increase in public spending decreases country size; (iii) countries with a presidential-congressional democracy are larger than countries with a parliamentary democracy

Incentives for separation and incentives for public good provision

In this paper I examine the incentives of regions to unite, to separate and to provide public goods. Separation allows for greater influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods. When public good provision is relatively inexpensive, separation occurs since individuals want to assert greater influence, while for intermediate costs of public good provision, separation can be explained by the desires for greater influence as well as for more public goods. Compared with the social optimum, there are excessive incentives for public good provision as well as excessive incentives for separation

Incentives for separation and incentives for public good provision

In this paper I examine the incentives of regions to unite, to separate and to provide public goods. Separation allows for greater influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods. When public good provision is relatively inexpensive, separation occurs since individuals want to assert greater influence, while for intermediate costs of public good provision, separation can be explained by the desires for greater influence as well as for more public goods. Compared with the social optimum, there are excessive incentives for public good provision as well as excessive incentives for separation.unification; separation; public good provision; voting

Country size and publicly provided goods

This paper studies the equilibrium size of countries. Individuals in small countries have greater influence over the nature of political decision making while individuals in large countries have the advantage of more public goods and lower tax rates. The model implies that (i) there exists excessive incentives to separate, though this need not be the case for all sets of secession rules studied; (ii) an exogenous increase in public spending decreases country size; (iii) countries with a presidential-congressional democracy are larger than countries with a parliamentary democracy.country size; public spending; structure of government

Country size and public good provision

The paper studies the equilibrium size of countries. Individuals in small countries have greater influence over the nature of political decision making while individuals in large countries have the advantage of more public goods and lower tax rates. The model implies that (i) there exists excessive incentives to separate, though this need not be the case for all sets of secession rules studied; (ii) an exogenous increase in public spending decreases country size; (iii) countries with a presidential-congressional democracy are larger than countries with a parliamentary democracy. Unlike previous papers, a rise in public spending thus does not increase the equilibrium country size, which is consistent with the increase in the size of government and the number of countries observed in the last century. The discussion on secession rules puts the excessive incentives result widely found in the literature in a different perspective, and also has implications for organizations like the European Union.country size, public spending, structure of government

War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside

In many situations there is a potential for conflict both within and between groups. Examples include wars and civil wars and distributional conflict in multitiered organizations like federal states or big companies. This paper models such situations with a logistic technology of conflict. If individuals decide simultaneously and independently about the amount of internal conflict, external conflict and production, there is typically either only internal conflict, or only external conflict - but not both. If each group decides collectively how much each member has to put into the external conflict before the members individually decide on the amounts put into the internal conflict and production, groups choose sufficiently high external conflict in order to avoid internal conflict. This is a model of the "diversionary use of force". We also study the optimal number of groups

Local Public Good Provision, Municipal Consolidation, and National Transfers

We analyze a simple model of local public good provision in a country consisting of a large number of heterogeneous regions, each comprising two districts, a city and a village. When districts remain autonomous and local public goods have positive spillover effects on the neighboring district, there is underprovision of public goods in both the city and the village. When districts consolidate, underprovision persists in the village (and may even become more severe), whereas overprovision of public goods arises in the city as urbanites use their political power to exploit the villagers. From a social welfare point of view, inhabitants of the village have insufficient incentives to vote for consolidation. We examine how national transfers to local governments can resolve these problems

Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods

We model the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making over the provision of local public goods. Centralized decisions are made in a legislature of locally elected representatives, and this creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. The legislature can be self-interested or benevolent and this can result in either efficient, excessive or misallocative provision of public goods. Decisions are inuenced by spillover effects and differences in jurisdictionalsize. Furthermore, we look at the incentives for centralization

Size and soft budget constraints

There is much evidence against the so-called "too big to fail" hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated

Nationalizations and effciency

We develop a theoretical model in which ?rms are either private or state-owned. When ?rms become insolvent, the government can intervene with general measures, like subsidies, or by nationalizing ?rms. The government only intervenes when the bankruptcy of a ?rm entails social costs. In a stylized model, we analyze how government interventions a?ect allocative and productive efficiency. Nationalization of private ?rms in case unpro?table investments were made, leads to increased allocative efficiency despite private ownership. The effort level chosen by the managers working for ?rms is also affected by government intervention with an impact on productive efficiency