The new global governors: Globalization, civil society, and the rise of private philanthropic foundations

One of the important drivers of change within contemporary global civil society is the growing power and influence of private philanthropic foundations (PPFs). In the analysis below, I consider the cases of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the Open Society Foundations (OSF), the largest and fourth largest PPFs in the world today by wealth or assets, and, especially, their founders. I consider their influence within global civil society, within the context of international development, and the consequences of their activities for a range of international actors. I do so in the context of debate within the literature on the activities of PPFs and I side with advocates of critical scrutiny. In developing my argument, I draw on a range of sources including the financial statements and audited accounts of PPFs, of other non-governmental organizations and of selected inter-governmental organizations. I argue that the BMGF and OSF are engines of neoliberalism and potent symbols of a second distinct ‘gilded age’ and that their influence must be restrained through anti-trust measures and through greater taxation and regulation

Optimal leverage from non-ergodicity

In modern portfolio theory, the balancing of expected returns on investments against uncertainties in those returns is aided by the use of utility functions. The Kelly criterion offers another approach, rooted in information theory, that always implies logarithmic utility. The two approaches seem incompatible, too loosely or too tightly constraining investors' risk preferences, from their respective perspectives. The conflict can be understood on the basis that the multiplicative models used in both approaches are non-ergodic which leads to ensemble-average returns differing from time-average returns in single realizations. The classic treatments, from the very beginning of probability theory, use ensemble-averages, whereas the Kelly-result is obtained by considering time-averages. Maximizing the time-average growth rates for an investment defines an optimal leverage, whereas growth rates derived from ensemble-average returns depend linearly on leverage. The latter measure can thus incentivize investors to maximize leverage, which is detrimental to time-average growth and overall market stability. The Sharpe ratio is insensitive to leverage. Its relation to optimal leverage is discussed. A better understanding of the significance of time-irreversibility and non-ergodicity and the resulting bounds on leverage may help policy makers in reshaping financial risk controls.Comment: 17 pages, 3 figures. Updated figures and extended discussion of ergodicit

House price Keynesianism and the contradictions of the modern investor subject

This article conceptualises the marked downturn in UK house prices in the 2007-2009 period in relation to longer-term processes of national economic restructuring centred on a new model of homeownership. The structure of UK house prices has been impacted markedly by the Labour Government‟s efforts to ingrain a particular notion of financial literacy amid the move towards an increasingly asset-based system of welfare. New model welfare recipients and new model homeowners have thereby been co-constituted in a manner consistent with a new UK growth regime of „house price Keynesianism‟. However, the investor subjects who drive such growth are necessarily rendered uncertain as compared with the idealised image of Government policy because of their reliance on the credit-creating decisions of private financial institutions. The recent steep decline in UK house prices is explained here as an epiphenomenon of the disruptive effect on the idealised image caused by the dependence of investor subjects on pricing dynamics not of their making

Fiscal and Monetary Policy Determinants of the Eurozone Crisis and Its Resolution

Unlike the crisis years of 2007-2009 (when the insolvency of large banks was a major problem), the current round of the global financial crisis has fiscal origins. Almost all developed countries suffer from an excessive public debt burden that has been built up over the last two decades or more. The financial crisis caused a further deterioration of government accounts as a result of ill-tailored countercyclical fiscal response and, in some cases, a costly financial sector rescue. All excessively indebted countries must conduct fiscal adjustment, even if this involves economic and political costs in terms of lower output and higher unemployment. Central banks can reduce these costs through accommodative monetary policies but without compromising their anti-inflationary missions and institutional independence. The ECB is additionally constrained by its institutional status which is based on a delicate cross-country political consensus. Excessive ECB involvement in quasi-fiscal rescue operations can undermine this consensus and lead to a disintegration of the Eurozone. There are also strong arguments in favor of strengthening fiscal and banking integration within the EU, especially the fiscal discipline mechanism at national levels, and building the EU rescue capacity in respect to sovereigns and banks based on strong policy conditionality

Cluster Performance reconsidered: Structure, Linkages and Paths in the German Biotechnology Industry, 1996-2003

This paper addresses the evolution of biotechnology clusters in Germany between 1996 and 2003, paying particular attention to their respective composition in terms of venture capital, basic science institutions and biotechnology firms. Drawing upon the significance of co-location of "money and ideas", the literature stressing the importance of a cluster's openness and external linkages, and the path dependency debate, the paper aims to analyse how certain cluster characteristics correspond with its overall performance. After identifying different cluster types, we investigate their internal and external interconnectivity in comparative manner and draw on changes in cluster composition. Our results indicate that the structure, i.e. to which group the cluster belongs, and the openness towards external knowledge flows deliver merely unsystematic indications with regard to a cluster's overall success. Its ability to change composition towards a more balanced ratio of science and capital over time, on the other hand, turns out as a key explanatory factor. Hence, the dynamic perspective proves effective illuminating cluster growth and performance, where our explorative findings provide a promising avenue for further evolutionary research

Overcoming the Impasse in Modern Economics

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Francesca Gagliardi, and David Gindis, 'Overcoming the Impasse in Modern Economics', Competition and Change, Vol. 15 (4): 336-42, November 2011, doi: 10.1179/102452911X13135903675732. Published by SAGE.Peer reviewe

Securitization and financialization

Securitization and financialization are the main causes of the financial crisis. These two concepts explain not only Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis but also the off-balance-sheet operations represented by erivative products, which are closely related to mortgage loans. Financial intermediaries in need of liquidity did everything in their power so that the securitization of assets could have a life of its own in financial operations. This is a process that is endogenous to the development of financialization. Because said process was a violation of the monetary economy, it was necessary for central banks to intervene as “lenders of last resort” as well as to nationalize and restructure all the financial intermediaries

Crises and collective socio-economic phenomena: simple models and challenges

Financial and economic history is strewn with bubbles and crashes, booms and busts, crises and upheavals of all sorts. Understanding the origin of these events is arguably one of the most important problems in economic theory. In this paper, we review recent efforts to include heterogeneities and interactions in models of decision. We argue that the Random Field Ising model (RFIM) indeed provides a unifying framework to account for many collective socio-economic phenomena that lead to sudden ruptures and crises. We discuss different models that can capture potentially destabilising self-referential feedback loops, induced either by herding, i.e. reference to peers, or trending, i.e. reference to the past, and account for some of the phenomenology missing in the standard models. We discuss some empirically testable predictions of these models, for example robust signatures of RFIM-like herding effects, or the logarithmic decay of spatial correlations of voting patterns. One of the most striking result, inspired by statistical physics methods, is that Adam Smith's invisible hand can badly fail at solving simple coordination problems. We also insist on the issue of time-scales, that can be extremely long in some cases, and prevent socially optimal equilibria to be reached. As a theoretical challenge, the study of so-called "detailed-balance" violating decision rules is needed to decide whether conclusions based on current models (that all assume detailed-balance) are indeed robust and generic.Comment: Review paper accepted for a special issue of J Stat Phys; several minor improvements along reviewers' comment