135 research outputs found
The chaining lemma and its application
We present a new information-theoretic result which we call the Chaining Lemma. It considers a so-called “chain” of random variables, defined by a source distribution X(0)with high min-entropy and a number (say, t in total) of arbitrary functions (T1,…, Tt) which are applied in succession to that source to generate the chain (Formula presented). Intuitively, the Chaining Lemma guarantees that, if the chain is not too long, then either (i) the entire chain is “highly random”, in that every variable has high min-entropy; or (ii) it is possible to find a point j (1 ≤ j ≤ t) in the chain such that, conditioned on the end of the chain i.e. (Formula presented), the preceding part (Formula presented) remains highly random. We think this is an interesting information-theoretic result which is intuitive but nevertheless requires rigorous case-analysis to prove. We believe that the above lemma will find applications in cryptography. We give an example of this, namely we show an application of the lemma to protect essentially any cryptographic scheme against memory tampering attacks. We allow several tampering requests, the tampering functions can be arbitrary, however, they must be chosen from a bounded size set of functions that is fixed a prior
Non-malleable codes for space-bounded tampering
Non-malleable codes—introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs at ICS 2010—are key-less coding schemes in which mauling attempts to an encoding of a given message, w.r.t. some class of tampering adversaries, result in a decoded value that is either identical or unrelated to the original message. Such codes are very useful for protecting arbitrary cryptographic primitives against tampering attacks against the memory. Clearly, non-malleability is hopeless if the class of tampering adversaries includes the decoding and encoding algorithm. To circumvent this obstacle, the majority of past research focused on designing non-malleable codes for various tampering classes, albeit assuming that the adversary is unable to decode. Nonetheless, in many concrete settings, this assumption is not realistic
Compressed Oblivious Encoding for Homomorphically Encrypted Search
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables a simple, attractive
framework for secure search. Compared to other secure search systems,
no costly setup procedure is necessary; it is sufficient for the client
merely to upload the encrypted database to the server. Confidentiality
is provided because the server works only on the encrypted query and
records. While the search functionality is enabled by the full
homomorphism of the encryption scheme.
For this reason, researchers have been paying increasing attention to
this problem. Since Akavia et al. (CCS 2018) presented a framework for
secure search on FHE encrypted data and gave a working implementation
called SPiRiT, several more efficient realizations have been proposed.
In this paper, we identify the main bottlenecks of this framework and
show how to significantly improve the performance of FHE-base secure
search. In particular,
1. To retrieve matching items, the existing framework needs to
repeat the protocol times sequentially. In our new framework, all
matching items are retrieved in parallel in a single protocol
execution.
2. The most recent work by Wren et al. (CCS 2020) requires
multiplications to compute the first matching index. Our solution
requires no homomorphic multiplication, instead using only
additions and scalar multiplications to encode all matching indices.
3. Our implementation and experiments show that to fetch 16 matching
records, our system gives an 1800X speed-up over the state of the art
in fetching the query results resulting in a 26X speed-up for the full
search functionality
Secure Sampling with Sublinear Communication
Random sampling from specified distributions is an important tool with wide applications for analysis of large-scale data. In this paper we study how to randomly sample when the distribution is partitioned among two parties\u27 private inputs. Of course, a trivial solution is to have one party send a (possibly encrypted) description of its weights to the other party who can then sample over the entire distribution (possibly using homomorphic encryption). However, this approach requires communication that is linear in the input size which is prohibitively expensive in many settings. In this paper, we investigate secure 2-party sampling with \emph{sublinear communication} for many standard distributions. We develop protocols for , and sampling. Additionally, we investigate the feasibility of sublinear product sampling, showing impossibility for the general problem and showing a protocol for a restricted case of the problem. We additionally show how such product sampling can be used to instantiate a sublinear communication 2-party exponential mechanism for differentially-private data release
Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Encryption from Obfuscation
The literature on leakage-resilient cryptography contains various leakage models that provide different levels of security. In this work, we consider the \emph{bounded leakage} and the \emph{continual leakage} models.
In the bounded leakage model (Akavia et al. -- TCC 2009), it is assumed that there is a fixed upper bound on the number of bits the attacker may leak on the secret key in the entire lifetime of the scheme. Alternatively, in the continual leakage model (Brakerski et al. -- FOCS 2010, Dodis et al. -- FOCS 2010), the lifetime of a cryptographic scheme is divided into ``time periods\u27\u27 between which the scheme\u27s secret key is updated. Furthermore, in its attack the adversary is allowed to obtain some bounded amount of leakage on the current secret key during each time period.
In the continual leakage model, a challenging problem has been to provide security against \emph{leakage on key updates}, that is, leakage that is a function not only of the current secret key but also the \emph{randomness used to update it}. We propose a new, modular approach to overcome this problem. Namely, we present a compiler that transforms any public-key encryption or signature scheme that achieves a slight strengthening of continual leakage resilience, which we call \emph{consecutive} continual leakage resilience, to one that is continual leakage resilient with leakage on key updates, assuming \emph{indistinguishability obfuscation} (Barak et al. --- CRYPTO 2001, Garg et al. -- FOCS 2013). Under the stronger assumption of \emph{public-coin differing-inputs obfuscation} (Ishai et al. -- TCC 2015) the leakage rate tolerated by our compiled scheme is essentially as good as that of the starting scheme. Our compiler is obtained by making a new connection between the problems of leakage on key updates and so-called ``sender-deniable\u27\u27 encryption (Canetti et al. -- CRYPTO 1997), which was recently realized for the first time by Sahai and Waters (STOC 2014).
In the bounded leakage model, we develop a new approach to constructing leakage-resilient encryption from obfuscation, based upon the public-key encryption scheme from \iO and punctured pseudorandom functions due to Sahai and Waters (STOC 2014). In particular, we achieve leakage-resilient
public key encryption tolerating bits of leakage for any from \iO
and one-way functions. We build on this to achieve leakage-resilient public key encryption with optimal leakage rate of based on public-coin differing-inputs obfuscation and collision-resistant hash functions. Such a leakage rate is not known to be achievable in a generic way based on public-key encryption alone. We then develop entirely new techniques to construct a new public key encryption scheme that is secure under (consecutive) continual leakage resilience (under appropriate assumptions), which we believe is of independent interest
Reversible Proofs of Sequential Work
Proofs of sequential work (PoSW) are proof systems where a prover, upon receiving a statement and a time parameter computes a proof which is efficiently and publicly verifiable. The proof can be computed in sequential steps, but not much less, even by a malicious party having large parallelism. A PoSW thus serves as a proof that units of time have passed since was received.
PoSW were introduced by Mahmoody, Moran and Vadhan [MMV11], a simple and practical construction
was only recently proposed by Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18].
In this work we construct a new simple PoSW in the random permutation model which is almost as simple and efficient as [CP18] but conceptually very different.
Whereas the structure underlying [CP18] is a hash tree, our construction is based on skip lists and
has the interesting property that computing the PoSW is a reversible computation.
The fact that the construction is reversible can potentially be used for new applications like constructing \emph{proofs of replication}. We also show how to ``embed the sloth function of Lenstra and Weselowski [LW17] into our PoSW to get a PoSW where one additionally can verify correctness of the output much more efficiently than recomputing it (though recent constructions of ``verifiable delay functions subsume most of the applications this construction was aiming at)
Reversible Proofs of Sequential Work
Proofs of sequential work (PoSW) are proof systems where a prover, upon receiving a statement and a time parameter computes a proof which is efficiently and publicly verifiable. The proof can be computed in sequential steps, but not much less, even by a malicious party having large parallelism. A PoSW thus serves as a proof that units of time have passed since was received.
PoSW were introduced by Mahmoody, Moran and Vadhan [MMV11], a simple and practical construction
was only recently proposed by Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18].
In this work we construct a new simple PoSW in the random permutation model which is almost as simple and efficient as [CP18] but conceptually very different.
Whereas the structure underlying [CP18] is a hash tree, our construction is based on skip lists and
has the interesting property that computing the PoSW is a reversible computation.
The fact that the construction is reversible can potentially be used for new applications like constructing \emph{proofs of replication}. We also show how to ``embed the sloth function of Lenstra and Weselowski [LW17] into our PoSW to get a PoSW where one additionally can verify correctness of the output much more efficiently than recomputing it (though recent constructions of ``verifiable delay functions subsume most of the applications this construction was aiming at)
Reversible Proofs of Sequential Work
Proofs of sequential work (PoSW) are proof systems where a prover, upon receiving a statement and a time parameter computes a proof which is efficiently and publicly verifiable. The proof can be computed in sequential steps, but not much less, even by a malicious party having large parallelism. A PoSW thus serves as a proof that units of time have passed since was received.
PoSW were introduced by Mahmoody, Moran and Vadhan [MMV11], a simple and practical construction
was only recently proposed by Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18].
In this work we construct a new simple PoSW in the random permutation model which is almost as simple and efficient as [CP18] but conceptually very different.
Whereas the structure underlying [CP18] is a hash tree, our construction is based on skip lists and
has the interesting property that computing the PoSW is a reversible computation.
The fact that the construction is reversible can potentially be used for new applications like constructing \emph{proofs of replication}. We also show how to ``embed the sloth function of Lenstra and Weselowski [LW17] into our PoSW to get a PoSW where one additionally can verify correctness of the output much more efficiently than recomputing it (though recent constructions of ``verifiable delay functions subsume most of the applications this construction was aiming at)
Upper and Lower Bounds for Continuous Non-Malleable Codes
Recently, Faust et al. (TCC\u2714) introduced the notion of continuous non-malleable codes (CNMC), which provides stronger security guarantees than standard non-malleable codes, by allowing an adversary to tamper with the codeword in continuous way instead of one-time tampering. They also showed that CNMC with information theoretic security cannot be constructed in 2-split-state tampering model, and
presented a construction of the same in CRS (common reference string) model using collision-resistant hash functions and non-interactive
zero-knowledge proofs.
In this work, we ask if it is possible to construct CNMC from weaker assumptions. We answer this question by presenting lower as well as upper bounds. Specifically, we show that it is impossible to construct 2-split-state CNMC, with no CRS, for one-bit messages from any falsifiable assumption, thus establishing the lower bound. We additionally provide an upper bound by constructing 2-split-state CNMC for one-bit messages, assuming only the existence of a family of injective one way functions.
We also present a construction of 4-split-state CNMC for multi-bit messages in CRS model from the same assumptions. Additionally, we present definitions of the following new primitives: (1) One-to-one commitments, and (2) Continuous Non-Malleable Randomness Encoders, which may be of independent interest
Brief of Tax Law Professors as \u3ci\u3eAmici Curiae\u3c/i\u3e in Support of Petitioner in \u3ci\u3eLoudoun County, Virginia v. Dulles Duty Free, LLC\u3c/i\u3e
Amici are professors of tax law at universities across the United States. As scholars and teachers, they have considered the doctrinal roots and practical consequences of judicial limits on state and local taxation. Amici join this brief solely on their own behalf and not as representatives of their universities. A full list of amici appears in the Appendix to this brief
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