Neuer europäischer Mechanismus für CO2-Grenzausgleich

Im Oktober 2023 tritt das Europäische CO2-Grenzausgleichssystem (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, CBAM) in Kraft. Der neue Mechanismus ist Teil einer Reform des Europäischen Emissionshandels (EHS). Derzeit müssen energieintensive Industrien nur einen Teil der EHS-Emissionszertifikate am Markt kaufen, damit sie im globalen Wettbewerb bestehen können. Der Rest wird frei zugeteilt. Der CBAM soll diese freien Zuteilungen schrittweise durch eine Abgabe auf die in den Einfuhren enthaltenen CO2-Emissionen ersetzen. Nach einer Übergangsphase, in der vorwiegend ein Monitoring erfolgen wird, wird diese Abgabe ab 2026 bei Importen bestimmter Produkte erhoben. Der Grenzausgleichmechanismus kann Emissionsverlagerungen in andere Länder sowie den Produktionsrückgang treibhausgasintensiver Industrien in Folge der Einschränkung der freien Zertifikate und steigender CO2-Preise abfedern. Er kann sie aber nicht vollständig ausgleichen. Insbesondere bietet er keinen ausreichenden Schutz für Exporteure ins Nicht-EU-Ausland. Entscheidend ist dabei, dass der CBAM nicht zu Handelskonflikten führt, die multilaterale Kooperationen erschweren. Internationale Zusammenarbeit ist für die Bewältigung der Klimakrise unabdingbar, da nur dadurch die globalen Emissionen gesenkt werden können

The new European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

In October 2023, the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), a part of the reform of the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), will come into effect. Currently, energy-intensive industries do not need to purchase all of the necessary EU ETS allowances on the market to remain globally competitive, as the remaining allowances are freely allocated to them. The CBAM plans to gradually replace free allowances with a price on the carbon emissions embedded in imports. Following a transitional-primarily monitoring- phase, this price on embedded emissions will be gradually introduced from 2026 on the imports of certain products. While the CBAM can mitigate carbon leakage, production declines in greenhouse-gas intensive industries as a result of limiting free allowances, and rising carbon prices, it cannot compensate for them completely. In particular, the CBAM does not provide sufficient protection for exporters to non-EU countries. It is crucial that the CBAM does not lead to trade conflicts that would make multilateral cooperation more difficult. International cooperation is indispensable, as it is the only way to reduce global emissions

Unilateral carbon pricing and heterogeneous firms

Several empirical studies document the relevance of firm heterogeneity to assess the effect of trade and environmental policy. This paper develops a multi-country and -sector general equilibrium trade model with heterogeneous firms and analyzes the effect of domestic carbon pricing as well as carbon border adjustments. In the presence of heterogeneous firms, these unilateral carbon pricing tools affect the emission intensity both via within- and across-firm adjustments. I show that the across-firm reallocation of market shares can be quantified ex-ante using publicly available data on the share of exporting firms. Applying the model to EU climate policy, I find that emission reductions arise mainly through a lower emission intensity of production within firms, while the reallocation channel is negligible. Scale economies aggravate the output loss of emission-intensive manufacturing and the reduction of real income due to more stringent climate policy, but increase the effectiveness of border adjustments to counter carbon leakage. The selection of heterogeneous plays a more limited role for aggregate effects

New trade models, same old emissions?

This paper investigates the elusive role of productivity heterogeneity in new trade models in the trade and environment nexus. We contrast the Eaton-Kortum and the Melitz models with firm heterogeneity to the Armington and Krugman models without heterogeneity. We show that if firms have a constant emission share in terms of sales - as they do in a wide range of trade and environment models - the three models' emission predictions exactly coincide. Conversely, if firms have a constant emission intensity per quantity - a prominent alternative in the literature - the emission equivalence between the three models breaks. We provide a generalization that nests both constant emission shares in sales and constant quantity emission intensities as special cases. We calibrate the models to global production and trade data and use German firm-level data to estimate the key elasticity of how emission intensity changes with productivity. Our multi-industry quantification demonstrates that the role of firm heterogeneity depends both on the model and the estimated parameters. Moving from the Armington model to the EK model increases the emissions effect on trade, while moving from the Krugman model to the Melitz model decreases the emission effects on trade

New trade models, same old emissions?

This paper investigates the elusive role of productivity heterogeneity in new trade models in the trade and environment nexus. We contrast the Eaton-Kortum and the Melitz models with firm heterogeneity to the Armington and Krugman models without heterogeneity. We show that if firms have a constant emission share in terms of sales - as they do in a wide range of trade and environment models - the three models' emission predictions exactly coincide. Conversely, if firms have a constant emission intensity per quantity - a prominent alternative in the literature - the emission equivalence between the three models breaks. We provide a generalization that nests both constant emission shares in sales and constant quantity emission intensities as special cases. We calibrate the models to global production and trade data and use German firm-level data to estimate the key elasticity of how emission intensity changes with productivity. Our multi-industry quantification demonstrates that the role of firm heterogeneity depends both on the model and the estimated parameters. Moving from the Armington model to the EK model increases the emissions effect on trade, while moving from the Krugman model to the Melitz model decreases the emission effects on trade

Europa kann die Abhängigkeit von Russlands Gaslieferungen durch Diversifikation und Energiesparen senken

Die Erdgasversorgung der Europäischen Union stützte sich bisher zu einem großen Teil auf Lieferungen aus Russland. In Deutschland, Italien, Österreich und den meisten Ländern Ost- und Mitteleuropas war diese Abhängigkeit besonders hoch. Allerdings spielt Erdgas nicht in allen diesen Volkswirtschaften eine gleich große Rolle. Mit dem völkerrechtswidrigen Krieg Russlands in der Ukraine stellen sich die dringlichen Fragen, wie diese Abhängigkeit reduziert werden kann und was im Fall einer Lieferunterbrechung von russischen Erdgasexporten passieren würde. Dieser Bericht skizziert die Ausgangslage und diskutiert kurzfristige Anpassungsreaktionen. Modellrechnungen zeigen, dass die Europäische Union bei einem Komplettausfall russischer Erdgaslieferungen einen Großteil kompensieren kann. Kurzfristig stehen die effiziente Bewirtschaftung bestehender Infrastruktur, die Diversifizierung der Bezugsverträge sowie Maßnahmen zur Nachfrageanpassung im Mittelpunkt. Mittelfristig sollte der Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien im Kontext des EU Green Deal beschleunigt werden, inklusive eines zeitnahen Ausstiegs aus der Nutzung fossilen Erdgases, der die europäische Energiesicherheit weiter stärken würde

Broad electricity price subsidies for industry are not a suitable relief instrument

The sharp rise in electricity prices has led to a discussion on possible subsidies for companies in the form of an industrial power tariff. The subsidies should help companies remain internationally competitive and prevent them from relocating overseas. Although German electricity prices for (industrial) firms are around the European average due to many tax exemptions, they are significantly higher compared to other non-European countries. Simulations using price increases of different magnitudes show that only a small share of companies would face major price increases compared to their value added. Moreover, there is considerable heterogeneity between the sectors. For example, the industrial gases or aluminum production sectors would be much more affected than other sectors. Thus, a large-scale industrial electricity price subsidy does not seem to be very effective. Selective relief for certain sectors may be problematic under competition law and may need to be granted well beyond the temporary nature of the subsidy

Energy supply security in Germany can be guaranteed even without natural gas from Russia: Special issue on the war in Ukraine

The Russian war on Ukraine and Germany's dependence on Russian gas require a rethink of German energy supplies. While there is a heated debate about an immediate energy embargo, Russia could also stop its supplies at any time. To date, Germany has purchased around 55 percent of its natural gas from Russia. DIW Berlin has developed scenarios for how the German energy system could become independent of these imports as quickly as possible in the European context: On the supply side, deliveries from other natural gas exporting countries could compensate for some of the Russian exports. Security of supply would be significantly strengthened if the pipeline and storage infrastructure were used more efficiently. On the demand side, there is a short-term savings potential of 19 to 26 percent of current natural gas demand. In the medium term, a push towards renewable heat supply and higher energy efficiency is particularly necessary. If the energy-saving potential is exploited to the maximum and supplies from other natural gas supplier countries are expanded as far as technically possible at the same time, Germany's supply of natural gas will be secure in 2022 and in the coming winter 2022/2023, even without Russian imports

Energieversorgung in Deutschland auch ohne Erdgas aus Russland gesichert

Der russische Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine und die Abhängigkeit Deutschlands von Energielieferungen aus Russland erfordern ein Umdenken: Während die Debatte über ein sofortiges Energie-Embargo hochkocht, könnte auch Russland jederzeit seine Lieferungen einstellen. Deutschland bezog bisher rund 55 Prozent seines Erdgases aus Russland. Das DIW Berlin hat Szenarien entwickelt, wie das deutsche Energiesystem im europäischen Kontext schnellstmöglich von diesen Importen unabhängig werden könnte: Auf der Angebotsseite können Lieferungen anderer Erdgasexportländer einen Teil der russischen Exporte kompensieren. Die Versorgungssicherheit würde es erheblich stärken, wenn die Pipeline- und Speicherinfrastruktur effizienter genutzt wird. Auf der Nachfrageseite gibt es ein kurzfristiges Einsparpotenzial von 19 bis 26 Prozent der bisherigen Erdgasnachfrage. Mittelfristig ist insbesondere ein Schub in Richtung erneuerbarer Wärmeversorgung und höherer Energieeffizienz notwendig. Wenn Einsparpotenziale maximal genutzt und gleichzeitig die Lieferungen aus anderen Erdgaslieferländern so weit wie technisch möglich ausgeweitet werden, ist die deutsche Versorgung mit Erdgas auch ohne russische Importe im laufenden Jahr und im kommenden Winter 2022/23 gesichert