Inflation from Supersymmetric Quantum Cosmology

We derive a special scalar field potential using the anisotropic Bianchi type I cosmological model from canonical quantum cosmology under determined conditions in the evolution to anisotropic variables $\beta_\pm$. In the process, we obtain a family of potentials that has been introduced by hand in the literature to explain cosmological data. Considering supersymmetric quantum cosmology, this family is scanned, fixing the exponential potential as more viable in the inflation scenario $\rm V (\phi) = V_0 \,e^{-\sqrt{3}\phi}$.Comment: 14 pages, latex2e, To appear in Phys. Rev.

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.RJV, moral hazard, adverse selection, subsidies, monitoring

Skill Distributions and the Compatibility between Mobility and Redistribution

We study to what extend in a Tiebout economy, the exogenous distribution of skill across agents affects the compatibility between mobility an redistribution. We propose a two-region economy where: i) each region redistributive policy is elected by majority rule (where both cases: myopic and sophisticated voters are considered), and ii) each region wage is endogenously determined by a separated labor market. We find that the compatibility between mobility and redistribution can be guaranteed when either there is a low-skilled region where the median skilled agent is below the mean skill of the region, or/and when there is a high-skilled region where the median skilled agent is above the mean skill of the region.Tiebout Economy; Redistribution; Sophisticated Voting; Majority rule.

Stable Coalition-Governments: The Case of Three Political Parties

We explore to what extent we can propose fixed negotiation rules as well as simple mechanisms (or protocols) that guarantee that political parties can form stable coalition-governments. We analyze the case where three parties can hold office in the form of two-party coalitions. We define the family of Weighted Rules, that select political agreements as a function of the bliss-points of the parties, and electoral results (Camson's Law and equal-share among others are included). We show that every weighted rule yields a stable coalition. We make use of the theory of implementation to design a protocol (in the form of a mechanism) that guarantees that a stable coalition will govern. We find that no dominant-solvable mechanism can be used for this purpose, but there is a simultaneous-unanimity mechanism that implements it in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium.Coalition-government, Stability, Nash-implementation

- LOBBY GROUPS AND THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

We study a model of competition between two political parties with policy compromise. There is aspecial interest group with well-defined preferences on political issues. Voters are of two kinds:impressionable and knowledgeable. The impressionable voters are influenced by the electioncampaigns. The objective of the parties is to obtain the maximum votes. Parties compete forfinancial support from a given interest group. Each party proposes a plataform in exchange for anamount of campaign funds, and the interest group decides whether to accept or reject each ofcampaign funds, and the interest group decides whether to accept or reject each of theseproposals. We show that parties competition resembles, to a certain extent, Bertrandcompetition. Furthermore, in equilibrium only one party gets funds from interest group. This resultdiffers from the one obtained in a similar model by Grossman and Helpman (1996a) (1996b), inwhich, in equlibrium, both parties are financed by the interest group. This differnce asisesbecause Grossman and Helpman assume that it is the interest group who makes the proposalsto the political parties.Contract proposal, Lobby groups, Policy compromise