Representing the Child in Child Protective Proceedings: Toward A New Paradigm

This article will attempt a new approach, one based on an analysis of the child\u27s interests in a child protective proceeding. As will be discussed in Part 1, most interests are surprisingly overlooked or barely articulated in the representation debate. Part 2 will summarize the statutes and case law governing the role of the child\u27s counsel in the child protective litigation continuum. The frequently lengthy process may range from initiation by a child protective agency to the achievement of family reunification or other permanency goal. For children, the continuum of sequential proceeding may span years or decades. Finally, Part 3 will outline a possible solution to the present complex, inconsistent, and frequently incoherent paradigm, one grounded upon traditional representation, as applied to the multiple child interests at stake in every child protective case

The State of American Juvenile Justice

This article will summarize the major twenty-first century state legislative and case law developments. It will also briefly note the expansion of state and local initiatives limiting the prosecution of youthful offenders, such as diversion and restorative justice programs. The state of American juvenile justice has improved significantly in the past several years. However, the reforms are best viewed as a work in progress. Much has been accomplished, but much remains to be accomplished. Crucially, after a generation of “tough on kids” measures, we are on the road toward a true “justice” system for children

Why Full Implementation Is Long Overdue

In 1980, the American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated a far-reaching comprehensive body of Juvenile Justice Standards, thereby providing a blueprint for the reform of a system that had serious deficiencies. Developed in partnership with the Institute of Judicial Administration (IJA) at New York University, the standards address the entire juvenile justice continuum, from police handling and intake to adjudication, disposition, juvenile corrections, and ancillary functions. Approximately 300 professionals collaborated for a decade to produce the 23 volumes approved by the ABA House of Delegates. To this day, the standards remain relevant and reformist. Several have been implemented in whole or in part. However, since institutional resistance has compromised the meaningful consideration of the standards as a whole, the ABA must redouble its efforts to promote their acceptance and implementation. This article looks at the history of the standards\u27 development and implementation, and delineates the need for updating several provisions and the urgent need to advocate for their application

Whatever Happened to the Best Interests Analysis in New York Relocation Cases? A Response

This response to Justice Sondra Miller’s article will first discuss the competing interests and expectations of the parties to a relocation dispute, and briefly outline the national view or views. In fact, there is no national standard, or anything approaching a consensus among the states. The New York experience under the exceptional circumstances standard will then be analyzed and appraised. My conclusion is that the standard should be maintained, although I believe that the Court of Appeals should revisit the issue to clarify the factors and criteria relevant to a determination

The Meaningful Representation of Children: An Analysis of the State Bar Association Law Guardian Legislative Proposal

This article will outline the background and history of the law guardian system, summarize the Task Force proposal and analyze the proposal\u27s effects. The intent is to present a synopsis of the issues addressed by the proposal, which has been forwarded to the Legislature for consideration during the 1992 session

A Law Guardian by the Same Name: A Response to Professor Guggenheim\u27s Matrimonial Commission Critique

I commence this article with a discussion of the statutory provisions governing the appointment and responsibilities of attorneys who represent children in New York. Part II briefly outlines the chronological implementation from initial enactment through the Matrimonial Commission Report, a period spanning forty-five years. Parts III and IV explore the specific nature of child custody representation and the relationship between the attorney and the child client during the course of a frequently lengthy proceeding. Last, the Commission\u27s conclusions and recommendations are critiqued in Parts V and VI

The Delinquent “Toddler”

Twenty-first century juvenile justice jurisprudence has focused on the criminal responsibility of adolescents, including, notably, the interface between psychological and neurological development and social accountability. The focus has led to a growing awareness that teenagers should not be equated with or held as accountable as adults. For example, several states, including Connecticut, Illinois, and Mississippi, have raised the age of criminal responsibility from 16 or 17 to 18, with a corresponding expansion of juvenile court jurisdiction. Of potentially greater significance, the principle of diminished criminal responsibility has gained credibility. Witness, for example, the US Supreme Court holding that capital punishment cannot be imposed on persons under the age of 18 (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)), while life without the possibility of parole cannot be imposed when a juvenile has been convicted of a nonhomicide offense (Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. (2010).) Simultaneously, several states have statutorily restricted the transfer of cases from the juvenile courts to the adult criminal court, partially reversing the late twentieth century “get tough” approach. Overlooked has been the younger or preteen child. Most American states do not maintain a minimum age limitation for juvenile delinquency jurisdiction. Thirty-five states lack any statutory provision, permitting at least the theoretical prosecution of an infant. The remaining 15 have enacted statutes establishing minimum ages ranging from six to 10. The vast majority of American children under the age of 12 may be charged with criminal activity. The vast majority may consequently be subject to detention, confinement in residential institutions, and the adverse collateral consequences of a delinquency finding

The Family Court: An Historical Survey

The New York Family Court this year celebrates its twenty-fifth anniversary. Hailed as an experimental tribunal, designed to resolve society\u27s most intractable problems, including family dissolution, delinquency and child neglect, the court has been perceived as a radical development which altered the then existing legal rules governing family affairs. The Family Court Act indeed incorporates several creative provisions. But the court\u27s foundations were built upon solid jurisprudential underpinnings, principles which had evolved over the course of the preceding century. Establishment of the court was neither radical nor experimental; in reality, Family Court represents the latest increment in the development of legal principles to protect children and adjudicate family disputes. In view of the controversies which have surrounded the court since its inception, an historical silver anniversary analysis may be helpful

Second Hand Smoke and Child Custody Determinations - A Relevant Factor or a Smoke Screen

The thesis of this brief article is simply that the tobacco habits of a parent are relevant and worthy of consideration when a child is asthmatic, or suffers from some other definable medical condition which would be exacerbated by passive smoke. However, when the child is healthy and there exists no definitive short-term medical risk, the issue should be irrelevant. In other words, the court should consider those factors, and only those factors, which are of significant importance to the child, such as stability, caretaker skills, home environment and the child\u27s wishes. Concededly, second-hand smoke is harmful even to a healthy child, or for that matter a healthy adult. But the risk is no greater than a multitude of potential harms every youngster faces, ranging from unbuckled automobile seatbelts to the consumption of junk food. Courts should focus exclusively on those factors which are important to every child, such as bonding and stability, as well as those factors which are important to the case specific child, such as explicit health or educational needs. Any other consideration intensifies the emotional and often nasty course of litigation, and diverts the court from more essential issues