115 research outputs found
1. Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit. 2. International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO Performance through Orchestration
1. A new kind of international regulatory system is spontaneously arising out of the failure of international 'Old Governance' (i.e., treaties and intergovernmental organizations) to adequately regulate international business. Nongovernmental organizations, business firms, and other actors, singly and in novel combinations, are creating innovative institutions to apply transnational norms to business. These institutions are predominantly private and operate through voluntary standards. The Authors depict the diversity of these new regulatory institutions on the 'Governance Triangle,' according to the roles of different actors in their operations. To analyze this complex system, we adapt the domestic 'New Governance' model of regulation to the international setting. 'Transnational New Governance' potentially provides many benefits of New Governance and is particularly suitable for international regulation because it demands less of states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). However, Transnational New Governance does require states and IGOs to act as orchestrators of the international regulatory system, and that system currently suffers from a significant orchestration deficit. If states and IGOs expanded 'directive' and especially 'facilitative' orchestration of the Transnational New Governance system, they could strengthen high-quality private regulatory standards, improve the international regulatory system, and better achieve their own regulatory goals. 2. International organizations (IOs) have been widely criticized as ineffective. Yet scholars and practitioners assessing IO performance frequently focus on traditional modes of governance such as treaties and inter-state dispute-resolution mechanisms. When they observe poor performance, moreover, they often prescribe a strengthening of those same activities. We call this reliance on traditional state-based mechanisms 'International Old Governance' (IOG). A better way to understand and improve IO performance is to consider the full range of ways in which IOs can and do operate - including, increasingly, by reaching out to private actors and institutions, collaborating with them, and supporting and shaping their activities. Such actions are helping to develop an intricate global network of public, private and mixed institutions and norms, partially orchestrated by IOs, that we call 'Transnational New Governance' (TNG). With proper orchestration by IOs, TNG can ameliorate both 'state failure' - the inadequacies of IOG - and 'market failure' - the problems that result when the creation and evolution of norm-setting institutions is highly decentralized. Orchestration thus provides a significant way for IOs to improve their regulatory performance. Some IOs already engage actively with private actors and institutions - we provide a range of illustrations, highlighting the activities of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Yet there remains a significant 'orchestration deficit' that provides real opportunities for IOs. We draw on the lessons of existing IO activities to suggest additional possibilities for improving IO performance. -- 1. Ein internationales regulatorisches System neuer Art entsteht derzeit spontan aus dem Versagen der internationalen 'Old Governance' - also der bestehenden internationalen VertrĂ€ge und Organisationen - dabei, den internationalen Handel angemessen zu regulieren. Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Unternehmen und andere Akteure - allein und in ganz neuen Kombinationen - schaffen sich neue internationale Einrichtungen, um transnationale Normen auf internationale GeschĂ€ftstĂ€tigkeit anzuwenden. Es geht dabei vornehmlich um private Einrichtungen, die vor allem ĂŒber freiwillige Standardbefolgung wirken. In diesem Beitrag werden die unterschiedlichen Regulierungseinrichtungen als Teil eines 'Governance Dreiecks' beschreiben und das geschieht vor allem in Blick darauf, welche Rollen die unterschiedlichen Akteure in ihrer TĂ€tigkeit spielen. Um dieses komplexe System zu untersuchen passen wir das innenpolitische Regulierungsmodell der 'New Governance' an den internationalen Rahmen an. Die 'Transnational New Governance' enthĂ€lt viele Vorteile der 'New Governance' und sie ist fĂŒr die internationale Regulierung besonders angemessen, weil sie geringere Anforderungen an die Staatenwelt und an die intergouvernementalen Organisationen, die IGOs, stellen. Allerdings ist es fĂŒr eine wirksame 'Transnational New Governance' weiterhin erforderlich, dass die Staaten und die IGOs das internationale regulatorische System 'orchestrieren'. Das heutige internationale regulatorische System leidet allerdings unter einem Orchestrierungsdefizit. WĂŒrden die Staaten und die IGOs die 'anweisende' und 'ermöglichende' Orchestrierungsfunktion des 'Transnational New Governance System' ausbauen, dann stĂ€rkten sie die privaten regulatorischen Standards von hoher QualitĂ€t, verbesserten das internationale regulatorische System und könnten ihre eigenen regulatorischen Ziele besser verwirklichen. 2. Internationale Organisationen (IOs) werden vielfach ob Ihrer Ineffizienz kritisiert. Allerdings konzentrieren sich Wissenschaftler und Praktiker bei dieser Bewertung der LeistungsfĂ€higkeit von IOs hĂ€ufig auf MaĂstĂ€be, die den herkömmlichen Formen von Governance - wie internationalen VertrĂ€gen und den Mechanismen fĂŒr die Schlichtung zwischenstaatlicher Konflikte - entlehnt sind. Soweit eine ungenĂŒgende Leistung festgestellt wird, empfehlen sie zudem meist, TĂ€tigkeiten der traditionellen Art zu verstĂ€rken. Wir bezeichnen dies als ein Sich-Verlassen auf die herkömmlichen staats-basierten Mechanismen, als 'International Old Governance' (IOG). Man versteht die IOs besser und verbessert ihre LeistungsfĂ€higkeit aber der Situation weitaus angemessener, wenn man die gesamte Vielfalt wirklicher und möglicher IO-TĂ€tigkeiten in den Blick nimmt: Das umfasst vor allem, dass die IOs private Akteure und Organisationen einbeziehen, mit ihnen zusammenarbeiten, ihre AktivitĂ€ten stĂŒtzen, sie formen und ihnen Richtung geben. Diese TĂ€tigkeiten schaffen ein fein gesponnenes globales Netzwerk von öffentlichen, privaten und gemischten Organisationen und Normen, das seinerseits teilweise durch die IOs orchestriert wird. Dieses Netzwerk bezeichnen wir als 'Transnational New Governance' (TNG). Wenn die Orchestrierung durch IOs gut funktioniert kann sie auch Staatsversagen (state failure) abmildern - also hier die InadĂ€quanzen von 'International Organization Governance' - und ebenso kann sie Marktversagen ausgleichen, also die Probleme, die sich ergeben wenn Herausbildung und Schaffung normgebender Einrichtungen höchst dezentralisiert verlĂ€uft. Ăber die Orchestrierung können die IOs auch die LeistungsfĂ€higkeit ihrer Regulierungen erhöhen. Einige IOs sind schon jetzt stark zusammen mit privaten Akteuren und Einrichtungen unterwegs; in diesem Beitrag mustern wir das Spektrum solcher AktivitĂ€ten. Wir betonen dabei die Unternehmungen des UN Environment Programme (UNEP), des Umweltprogramms der VN. Allerdings verbleibt ein erhebliches 'Orchestrierungsdefizit', das fĂŒr die IOs zugleich Herausforderung und Chance ist. Wir stĂŒtzten uns auf den Erfahrungsschatz der vorgefundenen IO-AktivitĂ€ten, um den Möglichkeitsraum der IOs fĂŒr die Zukunft auszumessen und MaĂnahmen zur Verbesserung der LeistungsfĂ€higkeit von IOs anzuregen.
The power of the âweakâ and international organizations
By nearly every measure, power in the international system is concentrated, meaning that most states lack significant power resources. And yet international relations theory tends to focus on the behavior of great powers. This special issue instead explores the strategies that âweakâ states use in the context of international organizations both to advance their interests and to resist pressure from stronger states. We define weakness as a relative lack of power across one or more dimensions. While the literature, to the extent it has focused on weak actors, has too often defined weakness solely in material terms, we adopt a broader conception that builds on the influential typology of power by Barnett and Duvall (Barnett and Duvall, 2005a, Barnett and Duvall, International Organization 59, 39â75, 2005b). A multidimensional conceptualization of power allows analysts to show how actors that are weak in one dimension (often material power) may be stronger on other dimensions, giving them greater capacity for action than is often recognized. From this framework we create a typology of âstrategies of the weakâ that emphasizes the agency of weaker actors to make the most of their positions. The contributions to the special issue, summarized here, illuminate and substantiate many of these strategies across a diverse range of international organizations, understood as both forums and actors. As the articles show, these alternative theoretical mechanisms help explain how and why seemingly weak states sometimes fare better than a simplistic assessment of their material capabilities might suggest. By deepening our understanding of weakness and how it influences state behavior, the volume advances our theoretical understanding of how power is built, wielded, and resisted in and through international organization
A integração regional como mecanismo para provisĂŁo de bens pĂșblicos: uma anĂĄlise comparativa da agenda de segurança pĂșblica no Mercosul e na Comunidade Andina de NaçÔes
The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.
Do international organizations really do what their creators intend them to do? In the past century the number of international organizations (1Os) has increased exponentially, and we have a variety of vigorous theories to explain why they have been created. Most of these theories explain IO creation as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, and other barriers to Pareto efficiency and welfare improvement for their members. Research flowing from these theories, however, has paid little attention to how IOs actually behave after they are created. Closer scrutiny would reveal that many IOs stray from the efficiency goals these theories impute and that many IOs exercise power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated by states at their creation. Understanding how this is so requires a reconsideration of IOs and what they do. In this article we develop a constructivist approach rooted in sociological institutionalism to explain both the power of IOs and their propensity for dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior. Drawing on long-standing Weberian arguments about bureaucracy and sociological institutionalist approaches to organizational behavior, we argue that the rational-legal authority that IOs embody gives them power independent of the states that created them and channels that power in particular directions. Bureaucracies, by definition, make rules, but in so doing they also create social knowledge. They define shared international tasks (like "development"), create and define new categories of actors (like "refugee"), create new interests for actors (like "promoting human rights"), and transfer models of political organization around the world (like markets and democracy.) However, the same normative valuation on impersonal, generalized rules that defines bureaucracies and makes them powerful in We are grateful t
The Politics of Environmental Dispute Resolution
Also PCMA Working Paper #17.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/51148/1/380.pd
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