REGULATION OF BUSINESS-ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-DEFENSE OF MEETING A COMPETITOR\u27S PRICE

Standard Oil sold gasoline to jobber customers at a price lower than that at which it sold to other customers in the area. The price differentials were not justified by lower costs. The jobbers made both wholesale and retail sales of the gasoline; some of them passed on the reduced prices by sales at less than the prevailing rates in the area. The F.T.C. held that Standard\u27s price differential violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. Standard contended that the differential was established in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, and the trial examiner made a finding supporting this contention. The F.T.C. made no finding on the point, holding that under the act, the defense of meeting a competitor\u27s price only rebuts the prima facie case that arises from a showing of discrimination, and that it is immaterial when, as here, there is affirmative proof that the discrimination injured, destroyed, and prevented competition. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, held, three justices dissenting, reversed and remanded for a finding by the commission whether the price reduction was in good faith to meet the equally low price of a competitor. Such a finding establishes a complete defense under the Robinson-Patman Act. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,. (U.S. 1951) 71 S.Ct 240

REGULATION OF BUSINESS-ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-DEFENSE OF MEETING A COMPETITOR\u27S PRICE

Standard Oil sold gasoline to jobber customers at a price lower than that at which it sold to other customers in the area. The price differentials were not justified by lower costs. The jobbers made both wholesale and retail sales of the gasoline; some of them passed on the reduced prices by sales at less than the prevailing rates in the area. The F.T.C. held that Standard\u27s price differential violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. Standard contended that the differential was established in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, and the trial examiner made a finding supporting this contention. The F.T.C. made no finding on the point, holding that under the act, the defense of meeting a competitor\u27s price only rebuts the prima facie case that arises from a showing of discrimination, and that it is immaterial when, as here, there is affirmative proof that the discrimination injured, destroyed, and prevented competition. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, held, three justices dissenting, reversed and remanded for a finding by the commission whether the price reduction was in good faith to meet the equally low price of a competitor. Such a finding establishes a complete defense under the Robinson-Patman Act. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,. (U.S. 1951) 71 S.Ct 240

CITIZENSHIP-INTENT REQUIRED FOR EXPATRIATION

In recent years, many cases have involved the question whether an American citizen has expatriated himself by his actions. Expatriation in the United States is now covered by statute, but the courts, in construing these statutes, have faced a recurrent problem as to what intent on the part of the citizen is required to effect expatriation. To interpret the present doctrine, it is necessary to examine the history of expatriation, the statutes, and the various situations in which the question of intent has arisen

HABEAS CORPUS-JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS TO REVIEW JURISDICTION OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS WHEN THE PRISONER IS PHYSICALLY CONFINED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

The question of the power of federal courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus for a prisoner confined outside the territorial United States has not as yet been completely answered. Until recently, there were few instances in which anyone was confined outside the United States under the authority of the United States. However, during and since World War II, American military tribunals have exercised power over citizens and aliens, civilians and military personnel, in many parts of the world, and especially in Germany and Japan. Because of this extended use of military tribunals, the question of the power of federal courts to review their proceedings has become acute, especially since these courts alone can provide judicial review. It has long been settled that courts can review the proceedings of military tribunals, on habeas corpus, to determine whether the tribunal acted within its jurisdiction. The problem here rather involves federal jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus when the petitioner is not physically confined within the territorial jurisdiction of the court

Scope of Discovery Against the United States

In the interpretation and application of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the most controversial problems is the extent to which discovery is available against the United States when it is a party to an action. Undeniably, the Government is entitled to use the discovery procedures, and it has not hesitated to do so; however, it has often fought vigorously the use of the same procedures against it. At one time the Government argued unsuccessfully that it was entirely exempt from the discovery provisions of the Rules. It has apparently abandoned this argument, but it continues to fight discovery by urging not only its well-recognized evidentiary privileges, but also an all inclusive privilege which, it contends, executive officers alone can apply. In answer to claims of this latter privilege, the courts have gone in all directions, often assuming or inventing such a privilege, and sometimes even applying it, but more frequently finding a way to avoid it. The purpose of this article is to discuss the unique problems arising as to discovery against the United States as a party litigant. The discussion does not cover the situation where discovery is sought against the United States although it is not a party. Nor does it cover the usual problems which are presented in seeking discovery against any private litigant and which are, of course, also present when the United States is involved. The subject to be discussed can be divided into three parts: (1) whether the United States is subject to discovery; (2) whether there are any special privileges available to it which are not available to an ordinary litigant; and (3) to the extent that there are such special privileges, who decides their application

SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES WHEN AN ISSUE OF FACT IS PRESENTED

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure introduced to federal practice the summary judgment procedure, which had been developed previously in England and several of the states. The scope of rule 56 is the broadest possible, since the rule provides that any party may move for a summary judgment in any type of civil action. Rule 56(c) provides that the court shall grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. It is clear from this provision that the movant in order to obtain a summary judgment must show: (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in the case, and (2) that he is entitled to a judgment in his favor as a matter of law. The second of these requirements has not caused much difficulty; here generally the courts have borrowed a test with which they are familiar, holding that the movant to obtain summary judgment must show that he would be entitled to a directed verdict at trial (if the case were tried to a jury) on the basis of the undisputed facts. It is rather the first of these two requirements which has caused conflict and uncertainty

HABEAS CORPUS-JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS TO REVIEW JURISDICTION OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS WHEN THE PRISONER IS PHYSICALLY CONFINED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

The question of the power of federal courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus for a prisoner confined outside the territorial United States has not as yet been completely answered. Until recently, there were few instances in which anyone was confined outside the United States under the authority of the United States. However, during and since World War II, American military tribunals have exercised power over citizens and aliens, civilians and military personnel, in many parts of the world, and especially in Germany and Japan. Because of this extended use of military tribunals, the question of the power of federal courts to review their proceedings has become acute, especially since these courts alone can provide judicial review. It has long been settled that courts can review the proceedings of military tribunals, on habeas corpus, to determine whether the tribunal acted within its jurisdiction. The problem here rather involves federal jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus when the petitioner is not physically confined within the territorial jurisdiction of the court

Validation of magnetophonon spectroscopy as a tool for analyzing hot-electron effects in devices

It is shown that very high precision hot-electron magnetophonon experiments made on n+n−n+-GaAs sandwich device structures which are customized for magnetoresistance measurements can be very accurately modeled by a new Monte Carlo technique. The latter takes account of the Landau quantization and device architecture as well as material parameters. It is proposed that this combination of experiment and modeling yields a quantitative tool for the direct analysis of spatially localized very nonequilibrium electron distributions in small devices and low dimensional structures

Simulation of phosphorus implantation into silicon with a single-parameter electronic stopping power model

We simulate dopant profiles for phosphorus implantation into silicon using a new model for electronic stopping power. In this model, the electronic stopping power is factorized into a globally averaged effective charge Z1*, and a local charge density dependent electronic stopping power for a proton. There is only a single adjustable parameter in the model, namely the one electron radius rs0 which controls Z1*. By fine tuning this parameter, we obtain excellent agreement between simulated dopant profiles and the SIMS data over a wide range of energies for the channeling case. Our work provides a further example of implant species, in addition to boron and arsenic, to verify the validity of the electronic stopping power model and to illustrate its generality for studies of physical processes involving electronic stopping.Comment: 11 pages, 7 figures. See http://bifrost.lanl.gov/~reed