On Epistemic Egalitarianism for My P-Zombie Twin: In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy

One current debate in philosophy of mind concerns the ontological and epistemological nature of phenomenal consciousness. Two major camps dominate this debate: property dualists and physicalists. For property dualists, the existence of an epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal—that our knowledge of the physical does not secure our knowledge of the phenomenal—entails an ontological gap, so that the physical and the phenomenal exist as fundamentally distinct domains. For physicalists, the ontological gap does not exist because there is only one ontological type of phenomenal property. In this paper, I will criticize the property dualists’ position. I concentrate on one of the most popular property dualists’ arguments—the conceivability argument. In addition, whilst analyzing the conceivability argument, I hope to draw out an illicit change in the use of ‘epistemic situation,’ thus adding further support to the instability of the conceivability argument. Further, I argue in favour of the conceptual isolation seen between our phenomenal and physical concepts by defending the ‘Phenomenal Concept Strategy’. Conceptual isolation is responsible for our being able to conceive of ‘philosophical zombie twins’, beings that are functionally, physically, and psychologically identical to us and yet which lack phenomenal conscious experiences. The phenomenal concept strategy is designed to provide an explanation of how it is that we can conceive of such beings whilst remaining physicalists and so endorsing an ontological monism. In order for the phenomenal concept strategy to prove fruitful, the physicalist must substantiate that we share an equally good epistemic situation to our philosophical zombie twins. Our philosophical zombie twins assert claims pertaining to their phenomenal conscious experiences in the same manner that you and I do, however, ex hypothesi, we know that they do not possess phenomenal consciousness. I analyze the physicalists’ account of our philosophical zombie twins’ beliefs pertaining to their own phenomenal consciousness and argue for epistemic equality—that our philosophical zombie twins do possess a certain type of consciousness. My thesis has two major goals. First, I hope to weaken the foundation of the property dualists’ argument—the conceivability argument—and second, to force the property dualist to reevaluate the phenomenal concept strategy upon the grounds that it was developed

The Power of the Gaze: Self- and Partner-Objectification Within Same-Sex Relationships

Most of the literature concerning objectification is focused on the individual experiences and the consequences that manifest from objectification. This study sought to address the gap in the existing literature on objectification theory by examining self- and partner- objectification in the context of same-sex relationships. The primary hypothesis of the current study is that gay men experience higher levels of self-objectification and partner-objectification than do lesbian women. A secondary aim of the study was to explore related variables, including enjoyment of sexualization, drive for muscularity, thinness attitudes, internalized heterosexism, and fear of HIV/AIDS. Participants were gay men (n = 32) and lesbian women (n = 43), from across the United States, who were currently in a relationship. Results from an online survey revealed that gay men had marginally higher levels of self-objectification and statistically significant higher levels of partner-objectification than lesbian women; self-objectification was significantly positively correlated to thinness attitudes, marginally positively correlated with body shame and fear of HIV/AIDS; and partner-objectification was significantly positively correlated with internalized heterosexism. These results highlight the importance of studying self- and partner-objectification within same-sex relationships