Incentive-driven inattention

“Rational inattention” is becoming increasingly prominent in economic modeling, but there is little empirical evidence for its central premise-that the choice of attention results from a cost-benefit optimization. Observational data typically do not allow researchers to infer attention choices from observables. We fill this gap in the literature by exploiting a unique dataset of professional forecasters who update their inflation forecasts at days of their choice. In the data we observe how many forecasters update (extensive margin of updating), the magnitude of the update (intensive margin), and the objective of optimization (forecast accuracy). There are also “shifters” in incentives: A contest that increases the benefit of accurate forecasting, and the release of official data that reduces the cost of processing information. These features allow us to link observables to attention and incentive parameters. We structurally estimate a model where the decision to update and the magnitude of the update are endogenous and the latter is the outcome of a rational inattention optimization. The empirical findings provide support for the key implication of rational inattention that information-processing efforts react to changing incentives. Counterfactuals reveal that accuracy is maximized if the contest date coincides with the release of information, aligning higher benefits with lower costs of attention

Heterogeneity, Inattention and Bayesian Updates

We formulate a theory of expectations updating that fits the dynamics of accuracy and disagreement in a new survey of professional forecasters. We document new stylized facts, including the puzzling persistence of disagreement as uncertainty resolves. Our theory explains these facts by allowing for different channels of heterogeneity. Agents produce an initial forecast based on heterogeneous priors and are heterogeneously “inattentive.” Updaters use Bayes’ rule and interpret public information using possibly heterogeneous models. Structural estimation of our theory supports the conclusion that in normal times heterogeneous priors and inattention are enough to generate persistent disagreement, but not during the crisis

Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection

We study the design of interventions to stabilize financial markets plagued by adverse selection. Our contribution is to analyze the information revealed by participation decisions. Taking part in a government program carries a stigma, and outside options are mechanism dependent. We show that the efficiency of an intervention can be assessed by its impact on the market interest rate. The presence of an outside market determines the nature of optimal interventions and the choice of financial instruments (debt guarantees in our model), but it does not affect implementation costs. (JEL D82, D86, G01, G20, G31)