THE TIME IS NEVER RIPE: The Repeated Defeat of Universal Health Insurance in the 20th Century United States. TWENTY SIXTH GEARY LECTURE, 1995

My presentation for today’s Geary lecture uses a recent episode in US politics - President Bill Clinton’s 1993 Health Security proposal for comprehensive health insurance reform, and the subsequent conservative political backlash against it - as a window into the history of attempts to create universal health insurance in the United States. This episode also reveals much about the present and probable future of social-welfare politics in the United States

Historical sociology, international relations and connected histories

This article addresses three recent developments in historical sociology: (1) neo-Weberian historical sociology within International Relations; (2) the 'civilizational analysis' approach utilized by scholars of 'multiple modernities'; and (3) the 'third wave' cultural turn in US historical sociology. These developments are responses to problems identified within earlier forms of historical sociology, but it is suggested each fails to resolve them precisely because each remains contained within the methodological framework of historical sociology as initially conceived. It is argued that their common problem lies in the utilization of 'ideal types' as the basis for sociohistorical analysis. This necessarily has the effect of abstracting a set of particular relations from their wider connections and has the further effect of suggesting sui generis endogenous processes as integral to these relations. In this way, each of the three developments continues the Eurocentrism typical of earlier approaches. The article concludes with a call for 'connected histories' to provide a more adequate methodological and substantive basis for an historical sociology appropriate to calls for a properly global historical sociology

Historical institutionalism: beyond Pierson and Skocpol

Conclusion: This paper has had three main aims. First, we have argued that Pierson and Skocpols representation of historical institutionalism is problematic because it makes far too many concessions to rational choice theory and presents a bland account of the strengths of historical institutionalism. Second, we presented an analysis of the historical institutionalist position to show that it is diverse, with people operating with quite different views as to the content, purpose and role of historical institutionalism. In particular, we suggest that historical institutionalism needs to be clear about its ontological and epistemological position and its conceptualistion of the relationships between structure and agency, the material and the ideational and institutions and ideas. Finally, we argue that the best way forward is to adopt a critical realist epistemology, which recognises that the relationship between structure/agency etc, should not be see as a dualism, but rather as a duality, or as we put it a dialectical relationship, interactive and iterative. Adopting this position would mean that historical institutionalism would become a more distinctive position and one which can help explain both stability and change

Policy Feedback and the Politics of the Affordable Care Act

There is a large body of literature devoted to how “policies create politics” and how feedback effects from existing policy legacies shape potential reforms in a particular area. Although much of this literature focuses on self‐reinforcing feedback effects that increase support for existing policies over time, Kent Weaver and his colleagues have recently drawn our attention to self‐undermining effects that can gradually weaken support for such policies. The following contribution explores both self‐reinforcing and self‐undermining policy feedback in relationship to the Affordable Care Act, the most important health‐care reform enacted in the United States since the mid‐1960s. More specifically, the paper draws on the concept of policy feedback to reflect on the political fate of the ACA since its adoption in 2010. We argue that, due in part to its sheer complexity and fragmentation, the ACA generates both self‐reinforcing and self‐undermining feedback effects that, depending of the aspect of the legislation at hand, can either facilitate or impede conservative retrenchment and restructuring. Simultaneously, through a discussion of partisan effects that shape Republican behavior in Congress, we acknowledge the limits of policy feedback in the explanation of policy stability and change

The Colonial Dynamic: The Xhosa Cattle Killing and the American Indian Ghost Dance

In 1856, a fourteen year old girl named Nongqawuse (non-see) had a vision on the banks of the Gxarha River in southern Africa. Entranced, she saw dearly departed ancestors, their cattle hiding in the rushes, and she heard other cattle underground waiting to come forth. She was told that if her people would but kill all their cattle, their ancestors would arise from the dead, the cattle lowing in the subterranean passages would come forth, and all the whites would be swept into the sea. Nongqawuse’s prophecy provoked the colonially embittered Xhosa (cōe-săh) people to rise up and kill their cattle. As the movement drew to a close, around 400,000 cattle had been slaughtered and an estimated 80,000 Xhosa died of starvation. Those that remained were reduced to working as laborers throughout the Cape Colony after being pushed off some 600,000 acres of their ancestral lands

Disaggregating the dependent variable in policy feedback research: An analysis of the EU Emissions Trading System

The literature on policy dynamics has long argued for a better conceptualization and measurement of the dependent variable (“policy”), but this fundamental point has often been neglected in the policy feedback literature. In this paper we explore how far disaggregating policy into different elements (policy instruments, objectives, and settings) addresses this gap. We do so by examining the world’s largest market-based climate policy instrument – emissions trading in the European Union – and reveal a number of valuable new insights. First, even if positive policy feedback locks in a policy instrument, actor contestation does not disappear, but narrows down to the more detailed level of policy settings. Second, feedback may operate differently at each policy level: the policy instrument and its settings may strengthen at the same time as support for broader objectives weakens. Finally, positive feedback may simultaneously strengthen opposing actors’ support for multiple policy elements, leading to a form of “policy stability by stalemate”. These findings highlight the need for a new, interdisciplinary phase of policy feedback research that more fully disaggregates the dependent variable across a wider range of policy areas and policy instrument types. Policy scientists are well equipped to contribute to and benefit from such a debate

Black Mayors in Non-Majority Black (Medium Sized) Cities: Universalizing the Interests of Blacks

The nature of political representation of Black constituents\u27 interests from their elected Black representatives is changing in the twentyfirst century. Increasingly, African Americans are being elected to political offices where the majority of their constituents are not African American. Previous research on this question tended to characterize Black politicians\u27 efforts to represent their Black constituents\u27 interests in two frames: deracialized or racialized (McCormick and Jones 1993; Cruse 1990). However, the advent of the twenty-first century has exhausted the utility ofthat polarization. Black politicians no longer find explicit racial appeals appropriate for their electoral goals, given the changing demographic environment, and greater acceptance of African American politicians in highprofile positions of power. Black politicians also increasingly find that a lack of attention to racial disparities facing constituents within their political boundaries does not effectively address why certain groups like Blacks are disproportionately and negatively affected than others, across a range of issues. Rather than continue to make efforts to represent Black interests within those two frames, Black politicians have begun to universalize the interests of Blacks

Left Behind: Social Movements, Parties, and the Politics of Reform

How does social reform occur in America? Is it through major public policy innovation? Is it through periodic partisan or electoral alignment? Or is it through moments of popular mobilization we call social movements? Can we explain the origin, development, and legacy of the civil rights movement by focusing on Brown v. Board of Education, Little Rock, the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, bussing and affirmative action? Do we focus on the electoral dynamics, the liberal revolution in Congress in 1958, and the landslide reelection of the president in 1964? Or do we start with the Montgomery bus boycott, the sit-ins, SCLC, SNCC, CORE, the freedom rides, the marches, and other forms of direct action? In this paper I argue, first, that institutional constraints built into our electoral system inhibit the formation of social reform initiatives from the inside government officials, elected officials, or parties. Social reform initiatives are initiated, however, but from the outside, as social movements. Second, these social movements unfold in a uniquely American way. They make moral claims. They employ organizational forms to strategically link local action with national goals in intense, outcome focused, campaigns. And they develop leadership skilled in arts of collective action what de Tocqueville called knowledge of how to combine. Third, as social movement leaders find that achieving their goals requires new public policy, they gain leverage by engaging in electoral politics, most often aligned with a political party, which they may well transform in the process. Fourth, although social movements form and reform around fault lines in the American polity of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, class, and generation, in the last 30 years this dynamic has produced far more change on the right than on the left. One reason is that the right has made more robust linkages among its social movement base, its partisan politics, and public policy than the left.* Explaining how this process works and why the left lost its movement - may help explain why this has occurred and clarify options available to those who would change it. * Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, Off-Center: The Republican Revolution & the Erosion of American Democracy, (Yale University Press, 2005). The authors show how the conservative movement has leveraged its partisan influence to dominate public policy.This publication is Hauser Center Working Paper No. 34. The Hauser Center Working Paper Series was launched during the summer of 2000. The Series enables the Hauser Center to share with a broad audience important works-in-progress written by Hauser Center scholars and researchers