3 research outputs found
Node-Weighted Prize Collecting Steiner Tree and Applications
The Steiner Tree problem has appeared in the Karp's list of the first 21 NP-hard problems and is well known as one of the most fundamental problems in Network Design area. We study the Node-Weighted version of the Prize
Collecting Steiner Tree problem.
In this problem, we are given a simple graph with a cost and penalty value associated with each node. Our
goal is to find a subtree T of the graph minimizing the cost of the
nodes in T plus penalty of the nodes not in T. By a reduction
from set cover problem it can be easily shown that the problem cannot be approximated in polynomial time within factor of (1-o(1))ln n unless NP has quasi-polynomial time algorithms, where n is the number of vertices of the graph.
Moss and Rabani claimed an O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the problem using a Primal-Dual approach in their STOC'01 paper \cite{moss2001}. We show that their algorithm is incorrect by providing a counter example in which there is an O(n) gap between the dual solution constructed by their algorithm and the optimal solution. Further, evidence is given that their algorithm probably does not have a simple fix. We propose a new algorithm which is more involved and
introduces novel ideas in primal dual approach for network design problems. Also, our algorithm is a Lagrangian Multiplier Preserving algorithm and we show how this property can be utilized to design an O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the Node-Weighted Quota Steiner Tree problem
using the Lagrangian Relaxation method.
We also show an application of the Node Weighted Quota Steiner Tree problem in designing algorithm with better approximation factor for
Technology Diffusion problem, a problem proposed by Goldberg and Liu
in \cite{goldberg2012} (SODA 2013). In Technology Diffusion, we are given a graph G and a threshold θ(v) associated with each vertex v and we are seeking a set of initial nodes called the seed set.
Technology Diffusion is a dynamic process defined over time in which each vertex is either active or inactive. The vertices in the seed set
are initially activated and each other vertex v gets activated whenever there are at least θ(v) active nodes connected to
v through other active nodes. The Technology Diffusion problem asks to
find the minimum seed set activating all nodes. Goldberg
and Liu gave an O(rllog n)-approximation algorithm for the problem where
r and l are the diameter of G and the number of distinct threshold values, respectively. We improve the approximation factor
to O(min{r,l}log n) by establishing a close connection between the problem and the Node Weighted Quota Steiner Tree problem
On a Bounded Budget Network Creation Game
We consider a network creation game in which each player (vertex) has a fixed
budget to establish links to other players. In our model, each link has unit
price and each agent tries to minimize its cost, which is either its local
diameter or its total distance to other players in the (undirected) underlying
graph of the created network. Two versions of the game are studied: in the MAX
version, the cost incurred to a vertex is the maximum distance between the
vertex and other vertices, and in the SUM version, the cost incurred to a
vertex is the sum of distances between the vertex and other vertices. We prove
that in both versions pure Nash equilibria exist, but the problem of finding
the best response of a vertex is NP-hard. We take the social cost of the
created network to be its diameter, and next we study the maximum possible
diameter of an equilibrium graph with n vertices in various cases. When the sum
of players' budgets is n-1, the equilibrium graphs are always trees, and we
prove that their maximum diameter is Theta(n) and Theta(log n) in MAX and SUM
versions, respectively. When each vertex has unit budget (i.e. can establish
link to just one vertex), the diameter of any equilibrium graph in either
version is Theta(1). We give examples of equilibrium graphs in the MAX version,
such that all vertices have positive budgets and yet the diameter is
Omega(sqrt(log n)). This interesting (and perhaps counter-intuitive) result
shows that increasing the budgets may increase the diameter of equilibrium
graphs and hence deteriorate the network structure. Then we prove that every
equilibrium graph in the SUM version has diameter 2^O(sqrt(log n)). Finally, we
show that if the budget of each player is at least k, then every equilibrium
graph in the SUM version is k-connected or has diameter smaller than 4.Comment: 28 pages, 3 figures, preliminary version appeared in SPAA'1