Equality, Authority, and the Locus of International Order

The puzzle of international society has long occupied International Relations (IR) theory, but it lends itself to a clearer articulation in legal positivist theory. On strict legal positivist terms, international society is defined as a compact of legal equals, states. However if states claim to belong to a social order they ought to recognise a common authority. Authority is a form of hierarchy—‘authoritative’ means ‘one that cannot be overridden’, ‘one of a higher standing’. The paradox of international society then is this: state relations are organised horizontally and each state is seen as independent from other states, but at the same time these relations seem to be organised hierarchically because each state is dependent on an authority other than its own. As I argue, the crux of the matter depends on clarifying where authority resides, not who holds it. After discussing authority in political theory (Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben), the essay goes on to articulate a concept of international authority compatible with an equality-of-states principle. Crucially, this concept rests on what I call ‘rule-based legal positivism’ traceable to the writings of H.L.A. Hart. The question of international authority thus invites us to attend to the conversation of three traditions: IR theory, political theory, and legal theory.law; institutions; internationalism; normative political theory; rule of law; sovereignty

Two conceptions of international practice : Aristotelian praxis or Wittgensteinian language-games?

Abstract: Scholars from the recent ‘practice turn’ in International Relations have urged us to rethink the international realm in terms of practices. The principal exponents of the turn, Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, have refurbished Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice to produce their own account of international practices. In a review of the practice turn, Chris Brown has argued that Bourdieu’s notion of practice shares basic affinities with Aristotle’s concept of praxis. While practice turn scholars may not adhere to a rigid canon of thought, they seem to share an Aristotelian conception of praxis. This reading of the turn to practice, though plausible, captures one part of the story. The central thesis of the present article is that instead of one there are two, distinctive conceptions of practice – Aristotelian and Wittgensteinian – and therefore two distinctive ways in which the character of international practices might be understood. More concretely, the aim is to show that the conception of international practices, rooted in Wittgenstein’s view of practices as language-games, can be particularly illuminating to all those who seek to understand international relations