The Evolution of Extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of previous interactions. In the context of evolution of cooperation, repeated games represent the mechanism of reciprocation. Recently a new class of strategies has been proposed, so called 'zero determinant strategies'. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one's own payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies are 'extortioners' which ensure that any increase in the own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed percentage. Here we analyze the evolutionary performance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large populations they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat, but they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In very small populations, however, relative payoff differences between two players in a contest matter, and extortioners hold their ground. Extortion strategies do particularly well in co-evolutionary arms races between two distinct populations: significantly, they benefit the population which evolves at the slower rate - an instance of the so-called Red King effect. This may affect the evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts.Comment: contains 4 figure

Fetishism and the social value of objects.

The idea of the fetish has a particular presence in the writings of both Marx and Freud. It implies for these two theorists of the social, a particular form of relation between human beings and objects. In the work of both the idea of the fetish involves attributing properties to objects that they do not 'really' have and that should correctly be recognised as human. While Marx's account of fetishism addresses the exchange-value of commodities at the level of the economic relations of production, it fails to deal in any detail with the use-value or consumption of commodities. In contrast Freud's concept of the fetish as a desired substitute for a suitable sex object explores how objects are desired and consumed. Drawing on both Marx and Freud, Baudrillard breaks with their analyses of fetishism as demonstrating a human relation with unreal objects. He explores the creation of value in objects through the social exchange of sign values, showing how objects are fetishised in ostentation. This paper argues that while Baudrillard breaks with the realism characteristic of Marx's and Freud's analyses of fetishism, he does not go far enough in describing the social and discursive practices in which objects are used and sometimes transformed into fetishes. It is proposed that the fetishisation of objects involves an overdetermination of their social value through a discursive negotiation of the capacities of objects that stimulates fantasy and desire for them

Public Goods with Punishment and Abstaining in Finite and Infinite Populations

The evolution and maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies challenges various disciplines ranging from evolutionary biology, to anthropology, social sciences and economics. In social interactions, cooperators increase the welfare of the group at some cost to themselves whereas defectors attempt to free-ride and neither provide benefits nor incur costs. The problem of cooperation becomes even more pronounced when increasing the number of interacting individuals. Punishment and voluntary participation have been identified as possible factors to support cooperation and prevent cheating. Typically, punishment behavior is unable to gain a foothold in a population, while volunteering alone can efficiently prevent deadlocks in states of mutual defection but is unable to stabilize cooperation. The combined effects of the two mechanisms have surprisingly different consequences in finite and infinite populations. Here we provide a detailed comparison of the two scenarios and demonstrate that driven by the inherent stochasticity of finite populations, the possibility to abstain from social interactions plays a pivotal role, which paves the way for the establishment of cooperation and punishment.Organismic and Evolutionary Biolog

Briefwechsel 1907-1925

The letters between Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham constitute one of the most important correspondences of Freud. Karl Abraham was an important and influential early member of Freud's inner circle of trusted colleagues. As such he played a significant part in the establishment of psychoanalysis as a discipline. Regarded by Freud biographer Ernest Jones as one of the best clinical analysts among his contemporaries, he also contributed important elaborations and developments of Freud's theories. In 1965, there appeared a first, censored and incomplete edition of this correspondence. In 2002, a completed edition came out in English translation. The present publication will be the first complete edition of this major correspondence in the original German, All letters, postcards, telegrams, notes, and enclosures that have been preserved and could be found are reprinted without omissions or pseudonyms. Added are both editorial and text-critical footnotes, plus an introduction and an appendix with pertinent additional material. It is now possible to explore first-hand the complex relationship that existed between Freud and his master pupil, and to follow their exchange on theoretical and clinical matters, but also on family members, their various travels, political and historical events, etc., and on their combined and individual relationships with other colleagues, such as C. G. Jung or the members of the so-called Secret Committee around Freud. This substantial and absorbing collection of letters enables the reader to gain valuable insights into these two pioneers of psychoanalysis, into the history of the psychoanalytic movement, and into the development of both Freud's and Abraham's theories. Due to the length of this correspondence (appr. 900 pages in print), this edition will appear in two volumes

Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment

In human societies, cooperative behavior in joint enterprises is often enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on defectors. Many experiments on so-called public goods games have shown that in the absence of such institutions, individuals are willing to punish defectors, even at a cost to themselves. Theoretical models confirm that social norms prescribing the punishment of uncooperative behavior are stable—once established, they prevent dissident minorities from spreading. But how can such costly punishing behavior gain a foothold in the population? A surprisingly simple model shows that if individuals have the option to stand aside and abstain from the joint endeavor, this paves the way for the emergence and establishment of cooperative behavior based on the punishment of defectors. Paradoxically, the freedom to withdraw from the common enterprise leads to enforcement of social norms. Joint enterprises that are compulsory rather than voluntary are less likely to lead to cooperation.MathematicsOrganismic and Evolutionary BiologyMathematic

3 kirja Karl Morgensternile, Halle

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Kiri Karl Morgensternile, Berlin

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Unmet needs in the diagnosis and treatment of dyslipidemia in the primary care setting in Germany

Objectives and methods: DETECT is a cross-sectional study of 55,518 unselected consecutive patients in 3188 representative primary care offices in Germany. In a random subset of 7519 patients, an extensive standardized laboratory program was undertaken. The study investigated the prevalence of cardiovascular disease, known risk factors (such as diabetes, hypertension and dyslipidemia and their co-morbid manifestation), as well as treatment patterns. The present analysis of the DETECT laboratory dataset focused on the prevalence and treatment of dyslipidemia in primary medical care in Germany. Coronary artery disease (CAD), risk categories and LDL-C target achievement rates were determined in the subset of 6815 patients according to the National Cholesterol Education Program (NCEP) ATP III Guidelines. Results: Of all patients, 54.3% had dyslipidemia. Only 54.4% of the NCEP-classified dyslipidemic patients were diagnosed as ‘dyslipidemic’ by their physicians. Only 27% of all dyslipidemic patients (and 40.7% of the recognized dyslipidemic patients) were treated with lipid-lowering medications, and 11.1% of all dyslipidemic patients (41.4% of the patients treated with lipid-lowering drugs) achieved their LDL-C treatment goals. In conclusion, 80.3% of patients in the sample with dyslipidemia went undiagnosed, un-treated or under-treated