Smart Growth and Other Infirmities of Land Use Controls

The great lesson of our time is that the forces of production, conservation, and creativity exist principally in the marketplace and not in government. To be sure, private entrepreneurs act largely in their own self-interest, but probably no more so than government officials, and their endeavors in the economic area are much more beneficial to the public

Majorities May Limit the People\u27s Liberties Only When Authorized to Do So by the Constitution

In this Article, Professor Siegan focuses on the difference between two views of constitutional interpretation. One view, the majoritarian, believes that the only thing majorities may not do is invade the liberties the Constitution specifies. The other, the individualist position, believes that majorities may invade the people\u27s liberties only when specifically or implicitly authorized by the Constitution. After applying these two views to the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and to judicial responsibility, the author concludes that the more favorable approach is the latter

Conserving and Developing the Land

In the Article, Professor Siegan discusses the drawbacks of zoning requirements as a tool in master planning. As a tool of government regulation, zoning requirements hamper creativity, ingenuity, and productivity. The author praises the Houston for that city\u27s refusal to adopt zoning. Recognizing that some land control is necessary, Professor Siegan suggests land use controls be primarily economic. In conclusion, the most socially rewarding use of property should be determined by the marketplace and not by city planners who are interested in politics and personal gain

Rehabilitating Lochner

This Article examines the background and debates on the framing of the fourteenth amendment, in light of the Supreme Court\u27s decision in Lochner v. New York. The author focuses on the framing of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and argues that the Thirty-ninth Congress, which framed the amendment, was strongly dedicated to securing the material rights. He further argues that the Framers regarded due process as a general guarantee for natural and fundamental rights, which included liberty of contract and of private ownership, yet, at the time the amendment was framed and ratified, and for some time thereafter, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court regarded due process as safeguarding vested property interests, but not contractual freedom. The author argues that, by the time of the Lochner case, the Court had erased this distinction and secured liberty of contract, and that this development was consistent with the Framers\u27 meaning of due process