Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots

Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule. --Airports,Grandfather rights,use-it-or-lose-it rule,airport slots

On a CFT limit of planar γi\gamma_i-deformed N=4\mathcal{N}=4 SYM theory

We show that an integrable four-dimensional non-unitary field theory that was recently proposed as a certain limit of the $\gamma_i$-deformed $\mathcal{N}=4$ SYM theory is incomplete and not conformal -- not even in the planar limit. We complete this theory by double-trace couplings and find conformal one-loop fix-points when admitting respective complex coupling constants. These couplings must not be neglected in the planar limit, as they can contribute to planar multi-point functions. Based on our results for certain two-loop planar anomalous dimensions, we propose tests of integrability.Comment: LaTeX, 3 pages, 1 Figur

Welfare effects of public service broadcasting in a free-to-air TV market

Viewer's private information consumption generates external benefits for society, because information improves the ability of voters to control politicians. Our study compares two settings in a free-to-air TV market: a differentiated duopoly of private channels and an oligopoly with both private channels and a public service broadcaster broadcasting information as well as entertainment programs. We find that welfare effects of public service broadcasting depend on its program design and cost efficiency, the external benefits of voter's information, and the magnitude of lost rents from the advertising market.Media, two-sided TV market, information externalities

When to regulate airports: A simple rule

Landing fees at airports are regulated almost all over the world since airports are assumed to abuse their market power. We find that monopolistic airports have an incentive to restrain landing fees when they generate additional non-aviation revenues and that the optimal landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, we show that monopolistic airports will not have an incentive to abuse their market power anymore so that a price regulation becomes inappropriate as soon as non-aviation revenues increase above 50% of all airport revenues. --airport regulation,aviation and non-aviation revenues,complementarity of aviation and non-aviation,locational rents

Strategic debt management within the stability and growth pact

Opportunistic politicians use the composition of public debt as a signal for competence. A competent government will not issue long-term nominal debt, as optimal to balance the budget, but long-term inflation-indexed debt. We consider politicians that pursue the objective of a balanced budget subject to the Stability and Growth Pact and reelection. A government's competence is reflected by its ability to produce a public service at a lower cost (taxes). Competence is private information of politicians. --Political Budget Cycle,Debt Management,Inflation-indexed Bonds,Stability and Growth Pact