Political economy of the ULCRA in Mumbai

Thesis (M.C.P.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 2013.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 104-112).In this thesis, I look at the political economy of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act (ULCRA) in Mumbai, India. Enacted in 1976, the stated aim of this legislation was to prevent speculation in the urban land market, and to make land available for affordable housing. The legislation imposed a "ceiling" on the amount of vacant land individuals could hold in urban areas. During the years it was in effect (1976-2007), almost all excess vacant land in the Mumbai agglomeration was exempted under the Act. Current literature posits that ULCRA failed to achieve its objective because politicians and bureaucrats were self-motivated rent-seekers, who were not interested in socially just redistribution of urban land. In 2007, using a conditional intergovernmental transfer scheme, the Central Government forced the State Government of Maharashtra to repeal ULCRA. I argue that current literature offers at best broad generalizations of the reasons ULCRA failed to achieve its objective in Mumbai. Through an in-depth analysis of the working of ULCRA in Mumbai, I show that it was never implemented as originally intended. Also, I show that ULCRA was frustrated by a number of deficiencies in institutions such as the lack of political will to take proactive action, capacity and cohesiveness in the bureaucracy, and amendments in other enabling statutes, to name a few. Seen from this perspective, it is incorrect to assume, as the current national urban development policy does, that a turn to market-led development in urban land markets will yield better results in delivering affording housing for the urban poor. Further, by analyzing the political economy of ULCRA's repeal, I show that under certain conditions, Central Government intervention may be a necessary step to protect interests of the poor. However, Central Government intervention needs to be designed keeping in mind the "why" and the "how", to ensure that the intervention's does not become dead letter, or redundant. I conclude with the dilemmas development planners are likely to face when designing laws and regulations in developing countries that feature a thinly institutionalized state, and a weak democracy.by Faizan Jawed Siddiqi.M.C.P

Dalits rights, land reform, and the learning of democratic citizenship

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, September, 2020Cataloged from student-submitted PDF of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (pages 203-214).This dissertation addresses the questions: When, and how, are durable inequalities disrupted and democratic citizenship deepened in societies that are politically committed to liberal democracy but have substantial social inequalities? How do law and social movements influence and shape this process? I develop answers by examining a successful case of land reform in Surendranagar (Gujarat, India), which was the result of socio-legal mobilization spearheaded by a local human rights organization called Navsarjan Trust. My main argument is that by working with Dalits in Surendranagar Navsarjan caseworkers helped articulate and popularize what philosopher Martha Nussbaum has called the "public myth of equality." I develop this main argument by developing responses to four questions.First, what was the role of emotions and reasons in shaping the organizational strategy and praxis of Navsarjan? I show that the robustness of Navsarjan's strategy came from strategic deployment of emotional energy. Second, is the land redistribution implementation better understood as "top-down" or "bottom-up?" By showing how under unanticipated circumstances, Navsarjan partnered with the local bureaucracy, I argue that the implementation process transcends neat categorization into either category. Third, how do constitutional expressive norms--abstract principles that are supposed to order and restrain the state--matter in the shaping Dalit politics? I show that constitutional expressive norms matter fundamentally but contingently.Fourth, was law merely used instrumentally to mount resistance to upper caste oppression or did it also create a "moral deepening" within the Dalit community? I argue that while for many land reform beneficiaries law was a strategic choice, once they expressed loyalty to it, they publicly bound themselves to its moral commitment. This was used strategically and purposively by Navsarjan caseworkers that pressured community members to live up these moral commitments in their social relations. In conclusion, I argue that the project of "realizing dignity" is likely to continue in Surendranagar because Navsarjan's efforts have not only created a narrative of hope in the Dalit community but also helped its members develop the skills, knowledge, and networks that are needed to put rights to work and achieve positive results.by Faizan Jawed Siddiqi.Ph. D.Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Studies and Plannin