Assigning committee seats in mixed-member systems: how important is "localness" compared to the mode of election?

"Committees are important features in legislative decision making. The question of who serves on what committee is thus an important one. This paper asks about how mixed electoral systems affect the way committee seats are allocated. Stratmann and Baur (2002) argue that German parties strategically assign nominally elected legislators to those committees that allow them to please their local constituents. Our paper questions this argument in light of the functioning of the German mixed-member system and the individual motivations of German MPs. We argue that the motivations of German legislators do not necessarily mirror their mode of election, and that German parties do not necessarily perceive winning nominal votes as a predominant goal. We hypothesize that German parties aim to increase their vote share on the list-vote (Zweitstimme) by supporting legislators with a strong local focus independent of their mode of election. We will test this argument empirically drawing from the German Candidate Study 2005 and from statistical data on committee membership for the 16th German Bundestag (2005-2009)." (author's abstract

Presidential Election Laws and Multipartism in Latin America

This article examines the interaction between the rules governing presidential elections and multipartism in Latin America. Data from 16 Latin American systems are examined through the use of a multivariate model to gain an understanding of the independent impact of presidential electoral formula (plurality vs. majority), the timing of presidential and legislative elections (concurrent vs. nonconcurrent) and legislative district magnitude on legislative multipartism, and by extension, on the number of relevant political parties operating in the nation. The findings demonstrate the strong and significant impact which formula and timing have on multipartism. They also point to the importance of examining the interaction between elections for different constituent institutions. Finally, they underscore the applicability of Duverger's law to presidential elections.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68710/2/10.1177_106591299404700103.pd

Can Historical Institutionalism be Applied to Political Regime Development in Africa?

Historical institutionalism has been used to explain the emergence of democracy and dictatorship in various regions of the world, but not applied to political development in Africa. Based on the recently refined concepts of historical institutionalism, the aim of this study is to provide a framework for the analysis of the various regime types that have been established in Africa during the last two decades: democratic, hybrid and authoritarian. Surprisingly little effort has been dedicated to a historically grounded explanation of these regime types. Against a common claim that African politics is mainly driven by informal institutions or behaviours, we argue that an institution-based examination of African politics is justified. We then provide a proposition of how to link up concepts of historical institutionalism with empirical cases in Africa, within a comparative approach. Our proposition for tracing specific development paths will not be based on the regimes as a 'whole', but on the deconstruction of a political regime into partial regimes and subsequently into selected formal and informal institutions. This will allow for an empirical analysis of the different components of a regime over long periods of time, and thus for path-dependent analyses of regime development