Simulating and Detecting the Quantum Spin Hall Effect in Kagom\'{e} Optical Lattice

We propose a model which includes a nearest-neighbor intrinsic spin-orbit coupling and a dimer Hamiltonian in the Kagom\'{e} lattice and promises to host the transition from the quantum spin Hall insulator to the normal insulator. In addition, we design an experimental scheme to simulate and detect this transition in the ultracold atom system. The lattice intrinsic spin-orbit coupling is generated via the laser-induced-gauge-field method. Furthermore, we establish the connection between the spin Chern number and the spin-atomic density which enables us to detect the topological quantum spin Hall insulator directly by the standard density-profile technique used in the atomic systems.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figure

Passive faraday mirror attack in practical two-way quantum key distribution system

The faraday mirror (FM) plays a very important role in maintaining the stability of two way plug-and-play quantum key distribution (QKD) system. However, the practical FM is imperfect, which will not only introduce additional quantum bit error rate (QBER) but also leave a loophole for Eve to spy the secret key. In this paper, we propose a passive faraday mirror attack in two way QKD system based on the imperfection of FM. Our analysis shows that, if the FM is imperfect, the dimension of Hilbert space spanned by the four states sent by Alice is three instead of two. Thus Eve can distinguish these states with a set of POVM operators belonging to three dimension space, which will reduce the QBER induced by her attack. Furthermore, a relationship between the degree of the imperfection of FM and the transmittance of the practical QKD system is obtained. The results show that, the probability that Eve loads her attack successfully depends on the degree of the imperfection of FM rapidly, but the QBER induced by Eve's attack changes with the degree of the imperfection of FM slightly

Activating Death Receptor DR5 as a Therapeutic Strategy for Rhabdomyosarcoma

Rhabdomyosarcoma (RMS) is the most common soft tissue sarcoma in children. It is believed to arise from skeletal muscle progenitors, preserving the expression of genes critical for embryonic myogenic development such as MYOD1 and myogenin. RMS is classified as embryonal, which is more common in younger children, or alveolar, which is more prevalent in elder children and adults. Despite aggressive management including surgery, radiation, and chemotherapy, the outcome for children with metastatic RMS is dismal, and the prognosis has remained unchanged for decades. Apoptosis is a highly regulated process critical for embryonic development and tissue and organ homeostasis. Like other types of cancers, RMS develops by evading intrinsic apoptosis via mutations in the p53 tumor suppressor gene. However, the ability to induce apoptosis via the death receptor-dependent extrinsic pathway remains largely intact in tumors with p53 mutations. This paper focuses on activating extrinsic apoptosis as a therapeutic strategy for RMS by targeting the death receptor DR5 with a recombinant TRAIL ligand or agonistic antibodies directed against DR5

Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography

The security of source has become an increasingly important issue in quantum cryptography. Based on the framework of measurement-device-independent quantum-key-distribution (MDI-QKD), the source becomes the only region exploitable by a potential eavesdropper (Eve). Phase randomization is a cornerstone assumption in most discrete-variable (DV-) quantum communication protocols (e.g., QKD, quantum coin tossing, weak coherent state blind quantum computing, and so on), and the violation of such an assumption is thus fatal to the security of those protocols. In this paper, we show a simple quantum hacking strategy, with commercial and homemade pulsed lasers, by Eve that allows her to actively tamper with the source and violate such an assumption, without leaving a trace afterwards. Furthermore, our attack may also be valid for continuous-variable (CV-) QKD, which is another main class of QKD protocol, since, excepting the phase random assumption, other parameters (e.g., intensity) could also be changed, which directly determine the security of CV-QKD.Comment: 9 pages, 6 figure