The Economics of Vouchers

This paper aims to provide a swift tour of the economic issues presented by vouchers and thus to fill an apparent gap in the literature for a basic survey of the subject. Among the issues it considers are: factors determining a voucher's cash-equivalence; reasons (such as paternalism, externalities, and distribution) for giving beneficiaries non-cash-equivalent vouchers rather than cash; optimal tax issues involved in the design of vouchers and the choice between vouchers and other delivery mechanisms, including factors determining the optimal marginal reimbursement rate (MRR) in a voucher program, and the similarity between this question and that of determining optimal marginal tax rates (MTRs) under the income tax; the incentive effects of voucher eligibility criteria, such as income or asset tests; factors determining the allocative and price effects of vouchers, both in the short run when unexpectedly enacted and at equilibrium; and factors relevant to the choice between private and public supply that may often overlap with the decision whether to adopt a voucher program.

Communism at Birkbeck

Conference Review: On the Idea of Communism, Birkbeck College, 13–15 March 2009

Innovation And Negation

Review ofMultitude: Between Innovation and Negation by Paolo Virno. Trans. Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito, and Andrea Casson. (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008. Pp. 188. $14.95 paper.

The Mapmaker’s Dilemma in Evaluating High-End Inequality

The last thirty years have witnessed rising income and wealth concentration among the top 0.1% of the population, leading to intense political debate regarding how, if at all, policymakers should respond. Often, this debate emphasizes the tools of public economics, and in particular optimal income taxation. However, while these tools can help us in evaluating the issues raised by high-end inequality, their extreme reductionism—which, in other settings, often offers significant analytic payoffs—here proves to have serious drawbacks. This Article addresses what we do and don’t learn from the optimal income tax literature regarding high-end inequality, and what other inputs might be needed to help one evaluate the relevant issues

An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation

Part I of this article examines the reasons for preferring locationally neutral taxes and explains the basic tension between locational neutrality and state and local autonomy in taxation. Part II examines the federal judicial check on state and local taxation, which often relies on a principle barring discrimination against outsiders or interstate commerce. Part III explores the need for a broad federal judicial check by examining state and local governments\u27 reasons for imposing (or avoiding) locationally distortive taxes, the countervailing benefits of allowing such governments broad autonomy in taxation, and Congress\u27 willingness to strike down locationally distortive taxes under its Commerce Clause powers. Part IV, the conclusion, provides specific recommendations for congressional and judicial action