Экономические основания изменений тарификации услуг связи: цифровой бизнес в «аналоговой» регуляторной среде?

The article analyses the economic aspects of the application of antitrust legislation in the context of abuse of dominant position prohibition (primarily in the form of setting excessive prices) in industries that are characterized by a complexity of services both on the production side and on the demand side. Evidence from several recent antitrust cases against mobile network operators in Russia has shown that the analysis of prices for individual mobile services is incorrect outside the context of complex pricing under high joint fixed costs. The aim of this article is to explain the economic basis for changing the tariffs of telecommunication services in terms of antitrust legislation requirements. The article presents a direction for assessing the state of competition and the corresponding behavior of market participants (for example, attributes of determining excessive prices) taking into account the characteristics of the telecommunications industry, specially, the mobile services industry. Moreover, it is shown that mobile services exhibit the effects of active competition: a high quality of communication, high rates of innovative activity in the industry as a whole, as well as low prices.Статья посвящена анализу экономических аспектов применения норм антимонопольного законодательства в части запрета на злоупотребление доминирующим положением (в первую очередь в форме установления монопольно высокой цены) в отраслях с комплексностью услуг как на стороне производства, так и на стороне спроса. На примере недавних антимонопольных дел против операторов мобильной связи в России показано, что анализ цен на отдельные услуги мобильной связи вне контекста комплексности ценообразования в условиях высоких совместных постоянных издержек является некорректным. Цель работы — объяснить экономические основания изменения тарификации услуг связи с точки зрения требований антимонопольного законодательства. В статье предложены направления оценки состояния конкуренции и связанной с ней оценки поведения участников рынка (на примере признаков установления монопольно высокой цены) с учетом специфики телекоммуникационной отрасли, а именно — сферы мобильной связи. Также показано, что в сфере мобильной связи наблюдаются эффекты, характерные для активной конкуренции: высокое качество связи, высокие темпы инновационной активности в отрасли в целом, а также низкие цены

Problems of the Economic Efficiency of Foreign Trade in the Socialist Countries

The achievement of the Party Program requires the most expedient use of the material and labor resources. The 22nd Party Congress established as the objective of the economic agencies to achieve the utmost results in economic undertakings with the least expenditures, i.e., to increase their efficiency to the maximum.

Monogoroda: novyj vzgljad na staruju problemu

The authors of this paper propose an approach to studying risk management in the most vulnerable monotowns that would account for the relations between major stakeholders and use the tools developed in the framework of the new institutional economic theory. Having compared the existing definitions of the “monotown” concept, the authors present their own approach. They identify key reasons behind monotown vulnerability and systematize stakeholders’ risks. The authors then posit that a study of monotown- related issues would be incomplete without accounting for stakeholders’ interests and relations. Monotown problems become apparent in the context of institutional agreements carried out with high transition costs and increased risks of opportunistic behaviour encountered by the institutional agreement stakeholders. Solving these problems through the methods proposed in the article would help to identify a wider range of alternatives while still taking into account all the typical scenarios. The authors analyse the process of risk management in monotowns from the viewpoint of international practices; and identify structural alternatives of outweighing these risks by considering key relations affecting the implementation of each alternative