Categorization through Sensory Codes

The central premise of concept empiricism is the denial of unique cognitive mental representations. The negative thesis applies as well to classic empiricists as it does to current ones. John Locke’s (1690) refusal to accept ‘abstract ideas’ is one way of denying unique and distinct cognitive representations. Jesse J. Prinz’s (2002) multi-modality hypothesis, according to which cognition functions on a multi-sensory code instead of a central ‘amodal’ one, is another. Both empiricist models have a common foil in a theory that posits one unique kind of ‘intellectualist’ mental representation to account for human cognitive achievements. For Locke, it was Descartes’ abstract mental medium for clear and distinct ideas and for Prinz it is Jerry Fodor’s Language of Thought. In this paper, I explore the empiricists’ denial of unique cognitive representations and argue that both Locke’s and Prinz’s theories privilege a unique representational medium – a spatial ‘code.’ As such, this tacit assumption does not entail that cognition runs on a unique medium. It does not lead to a ‘common code rationalism,’ to use Prinz’s terms, or support computational theories of the mind that privilege innate linguistic structures over sensory ones. To incorporate the idea of a spatial code more smoothly within empiricist intellectual resources, I interpret it through Lakoff’s experientialist account of categorical cognition. Through Lakoff’s embodied experientialist account – embodied neo-empiricism – the spatiality of cognition becomes founded in a broader and more plausible sensory matrix. I further suggest that Lakoff’s ideas on and use of spatial codes can be given a largely externalist reading. Lakoff’s space is not a unique cognitive one. This way, current neo-empiricism can be saved from assuming any unique internal posits including a language of thought

A Study of Analytic Metaphysics: Meinong, Quine, and Williams on Conceptual Simplicity

[From the introduction]Analytic metaphysics has come under fire from many directions under the rubric of naturalism. The irrelevance of analytic metaphysics for exploring the nature of ultimate reality is already at the level of household slogans: purportedly all it does is rest on armchair analysis consisting of linguistic intuitions. Yet analytic metaphysics even during its heyday was less uniform than the current slogans indicate. If analysis is or was the basis for its epistemology, then practice of analytic metaphysics leaves open not just how the process of analysis occurs, but also the objects of analysis themselves.In this paper, I will consider a couple well-known debates in analytic metaphysics and explicate some of the features of their epistemology. These include Alexius Meinong’s formulation of analysis and his conclusions concerning possible objects and subsistence as interpreted and supported by Roderick Chisholm in Being and Nonbeing; Russell’s reformulation of propositional structure and his use of definite descriptions as presented and discussed by W.V.O. Quine in On What There Is; and trope theory proposed by D.C. Williams in The Elements of Being in which he substitutes the analysis of propositions which contain terms that represent the constituents of concrete objects (labeled ‘abstract particulars’) and their relations in place of propositions which contain terms that represent ‘objects’ and their relations – an approach used by Meinong and Russell. I will argue that some of these examples show some common epistemological criterion such as systematic use of conceptual simplicity or epistemic immediacy as their slogans. Yet I still maintain that the object of analysis differs. They analyze different representational systems based on their ontological commitments – not just their linguistic ones. Thus I will maintain that, like Carnap, we cannot have a uniform epistemology for metaphysics; and we cannot have a principled analysis based epistemology for all represented metaphysics

A Study of Analytic Metaphysics: Meinong, Quine, and Williams on Conceptual Simplicity

[From the introduction] Analytic metaphysics has come under fire from many directions under the rubric of naturalism. The irrelevance of analytic metaphysics for exploring the nature of ultimate reality is already at the level of household slogans: purportedly all it does is rest on armchair analysis consisting of linguistic intuitions. Yet analytic metaphysics even during its heyday was less uniform than the current slogans indicate. If analysis is or was the basis for its epistemology, then practice of analytic metaphysics leaves open not just how the process of analysis occurs, but also the objects of analysis themselves. In this paper, I will consider a couple well-known debates in analytic metaphysics and explicate some of the features of their epistemology. These include Alexius Meinong’s formulation of analysis and his conclusions concerning possible objects and subsistence as interpreted and supported by Roderick Chisholm in Being and Nonbeing; Russell’s reformulation of propositional structure and his use of definite descriptions as presented and discussed by W.V.O. Quine in On What There Is; and trope theory proposed by D.C. Williams in The Elements of Being in which he substitutes the analysis of propositions which contain terms that represent the constituents of concrete objects (labeled ‘abstract particulars’) and their relations in place of propositions which contain terms that represent ‘objects’ and their relations – an approach used by Meinong and Russell. I will argue that some of these examples show some common epistemological criterion such as systematic use of conceptual simplicity or epistemic immediacy as their slogans. Yet I still maintain that the object of analysis differs. They analyze different representational systems based on their ontological commitments – not just their linguistic ones. Thus I will maintain that, like Carnap, we cannot have a uniform epistemology for metaphysics; and we cannot have a principled analysis based epistemology for all represented metaphysics

Development of a drive system for a sequential space camera

An electronically commutated dc motor is reported for driving the camera claw and magazine, and a stepper motor is described for driving the shutter with the two motors synchronized electrically. Subsequent tests on the breadboard positively proved the concept, but further development beyond this study should be done. The breadboard testing also established that the electronically commutated motor can control speed over a wide dynamic range, and has a high torque capability for accelerating loads. This performance suggested the possibility of eliminating the clutch from the system while retaining all of the other mechanical features of the DAC, if the requirement for independent shutter speeds and frame rates can be removed. Therefore, as a final step in the study, the breadboard shutter and shutter drive were returned to the original DAC configuration, while retaining the brushless dc motor drive

Development of a drive system for a sequential space camera

Breadboard models of single and dual motor drives for the shutter, claw and magazine of a space camera system were designed and tested. The single motor technique utilizes a single electronically commutated motor to drive the claw and shutter without resorting to a solenoid actuated clutch for pulse operation. Shutter speed is established by a combination of the cinemode speed and the opening of the conventional DAC two piece shutter. Pulse mode operation is obtained by applying power at a fixed clock rate and removing power at an appropriate point in the mechanical cycle such that the motor comes to rest by system friction. The dual motor approach utilizes a stepper motor to drive the shutter and an electronically commutated dc motor to drive the claw and magazine functions. The motors are synchronized electronically

Development of a drive system for a sequential space camera contract modification 4(S)

The brush type dc motor and clutch were eliminated from the design of the 16 mm space sequential camera design and replaced by an electronically commutated motor. The new drive system reduces the current consumption at 24 fps to 220 mA. The drive can be programmed and controlled externally from the multipurpose programmable timer/intervalometer, as well as being controlled locally from the camera

Automatic exposure control for space sequential camera

The final report for the automatic exposure control study for space sequential cameras, for the NASA Johnson Space Center is presented. The material is shown in the same sequence that the work was performed. The purpose of the automatic exposure control is to automatically control the lens iris as well as the camera shutter so that the subject is properly exposed on the film. A study of design approaches is presented. Analysis of the light range of the spectrum covered indicates that the practical range would be from approximately 20 to 6,000 foot-lamberts, or about nine f-stops. Observation of film available from space flights shows that optimum scene illumination is apparently not present in vehicle interior photography as well as in vehicle-to-vehicle situations. The evaluation test procedure for a breadboard, and the results, which provided information for the design of a brassboard are given

Automatic Exposure Iris Control (AEIC) for data acquisition camera

A lens design capable of operating over a total range of f/1.4 to f/11.0 with through the lens light sensing is presented along with a system which compensates for ASA film speeds as well as shutter openings. The space shuttle camera system package is designed so that it can be assembled on the existing 16 mm DAC with a minimum of alteration to the camera

Safety and efficacy of blood exchange transfusion for priapism complicating sickle cell disease.

BACKGROUND: Priapism is unwanted painful penile erection that affects about 36% of boys and men with sickle cell disease (SCD) most of whom have sickle cell anemia. Clinically, priapism could be stuttering, minor, or major. The first two types are mild, last \u3c 4 h, are usually treated at home, have good prognosis with normal sexual function. The major type of priapism lasts \u3e4 h, associated with severe pain, requires hospitalization; often does not respond to medical treatment and may require shunt surgery. Untreated major priapism and surgical intervention often cause impotence. In this study, we report our 15-year experience in treating adult patients with SCD and major priapism with blood exchange transfusion after being refractory to other medical therapies. METHODS: Adult male African Americans patients with SCD and major priapism were enrolled in this study and followed for 15 years. A Haemonitics V-50 machine was initially used for whole blood exchange and was later replaced with Cobe Spectra machine for RBC exchange. RESULTS: We used 239 blood exchanges requiring 1,136 RBC units. We maintained a post-exchange hemoglobin level of about 10 g/dL and hemoglobin S level \u3c 30%. None of the patients had any neurological complications such as headache, seizures, neurological deficits, or obtundation post-exchange. CONCLUSION: Together, the data indicate that blood exchange transfusion for the treatment of patients with SCD and major priapism is efficacious and safe